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Introduction
Not too long ago, the most talked-about school desegregation
case was Brown v. Board of Education.' What was its promise, its
guarantee for our public school children? 2 Today that honor belongs
to Missouri v. Jenkins,3 and the conversation has changed from
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown I).
2. For three excellent articles considering the promise of Brown, see Paul Gewirtz,
Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLuM. L.
REv. 728 (1986); James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: "All-Out" School
Desegregation Explained, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1463 (1990); Peter M. Shane, School
DesegregationRemedies and the Fair Governance of Schools, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1041
(1984). Scholarship concerning Brown has certainly continued. See, e.g., Kevin Brown,
Has the Supreme Court Allowed the Curefor De Jure Segregation to Replicatethe Disease?,
78 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1992); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Originalismand the
DesegregationDecisions, 81 VA. L. REv. 947 (1995); Mark Tushnet, The Significance of
Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV. 173 (1994).
3. The main remedial order in the case is reported as Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.
Supp. 19 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
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defining the meaning of Brown I to criticism of the expansiveness

(and expensiveness) of the school desegregation remedy for Kansas
City, Missouri. How can a school desegregation remedy properly

require a 3,500 square-foot, dust-free mechanics' room and a Model
United Nations meeting hall wired for language translation? 4 At a
staggering cost of $2,000,000,000 over thirteen years, 5 the Jenkins
remedy has included a local property tax, a systemwide magnet
school program, multiple compensatory education programs, and
extensive capital improvements and has affected all facets of school
administration-student
assignment,
faculty
assignment,
transportation, facilities, curriculum, staff development, and
educational programs. 6 The Supreme Court has considered the case
4. The case has been the subject of scholarship as well as judicial comment. See, e.g.,
Jose Felipe Anderson, Perspectives on Missouri v. Jenkins: Abandoning the Unfinished
Business of Public School Desegregation "With All Deliberate Speed," 39 How. L.J. 693
(1996); Richard A. Epstein, The Remote Causes of Affirmative Action, or School
Desegregation in Kansas City, Missouri, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1101 (1996); Bradley W.
Joondeph, Missouri v. Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced
Desegregation,71 WASH. L. REV. 597 (1996); Theodore M. Shaw, Missouri v. Jenkins:
Are We Really a Desegregated Society?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 57 (1992); John Choon
Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent Remedial Authority of the
FederalCourts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121 (1996).
The dialogue generated by the example of this case is not confined to dark lecture
halls or Supreme Court opinions or even enlightened law review articles. The case has
invaded public thought. Multiple newspaper articles and editorials and even Sixty Minutes
have examined the case. See, e.g., Affirmative Reaction II, WALL ST. J., June 13, 1995, at
A18; Carole Ashkinaze, Kennedy's Boneheaded Dissent, CH. SUN-TIMES, April 24, 1990,
at A29; Court-Ordered Taxation, WASH. PoST, April 20, 1990, at A26; Dennis Farney,
Fading Dream? Integration Is Faltering In Kansas City Schools as Priorities Change,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 1995, at Al; James J. Kilpatrick, King Numbers Rules Supreme in
Kansas City Schools, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., Aug. 17, 1989, at A17; Charles E.M.
Kolb, Kansas City Judge Needs Lesson in Federalism, WALL ST. J., Jan. 5, 1988 at A24;
George F. Will, The ImperialJudiciary,WASH. PoST, April 26,1990, at A23.
Of course, underlying the discussion over the Jenkins remedy lurks a question over
the rights at issue. See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of JudicialPower in Ordering
Remedies: Civil Rights and Remedies, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 103, 103 (1991)
("When we hear an objection to the remedy, it is almost always a disguised objection to
the definition of what is due, and not to the methods used to apply the balm."); Paul
Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE LJ.585, 593 & n.16 (1983) ("Criticism of a
remedy... may reflect criticism of the underlying right."); Susan P. Sturm, A Normative
Theory of Public Law Remedies, 79 GEO. LJ.1355, 1382 (1991) ("At least some of the
debate over the court's proper remedial role is a thinly veiled attack on the prevailing
interpretation of the Constitution.").
5. The desegregation remedy began in 1985. To fund that remedy, as of 1997, the
State had spent approximately $1.2 billion, and the school district had spent approximately
$600 million. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1156 (W.D. Mo.), afJ'd, 122 F.3d
588, 591 (8th Cir. 1997). By the end of 1998, the estimated cost reached $2.0 billion. See
Julie Blair, Mo. Makes Final K C. DesegregationPayment, EDUC. WK., Dec. 16, 1998, at
20.
6. See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26-43
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three times,7 and the district court and court of appeals have issued
between them scores of opinions. 8
In an ironic coincidence, just across the river in Kansas City,
Kansas, there exists a felicitous alternative example of a federal
court's remedial powers. That school desegregation case, although
lasting almost twenty-four years, involved a limited, hands-off
remedy. The remedy directly involved only student and faculty
assignment. 9 After the district court ordered the remedy in 1981, the
case only produced one formal status conference, one unopposed
hearing, and a single published opinion. The lawsuit ended in 1997,
without opposition from the plaintiff and without national fanfare. 10
The different remedial processes in the two cases are stunning.
Some commentators would argue that one or both of the cases, like
other public law litigation, illustrates federal courts overstepping their
limited powers and effectively running local school systems." Others
as agents of
might use the cases to evaluate the competency of courts
12
social change or to declare one court's remedy superior.

7. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Jenkins III) (reversing and remanding
on the scope of the school desegregation remedy); Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990)
(Jenkins II) (considering the power of a federal court to order an increase in local taxes);
Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) (JenkinsI) (affirming award of attorneys' fees).
8. For example, from August 1997 to August 1998, the court of appeals issued eight
separate opinions. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 133 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins v.
Missouri, 133 F.3d 559 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins v. Missouri, 131 F,3d 716 (8th Cir. 1997);
Jenkins v. Missouri, 128 F.3d 1201 (8th Cir.), vacated,133 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins
v. Missouri, 127 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins v. Missouri, 124 F.3d 1310 (8th Cir. 1997);
Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins v. Missouri, 121 F.3d 712 (8th
Cir.), vacated, 133 F.3d 560 (8th Cir. 1997). In 1996, the Eighth Circuit noted that it had
heard appeals in the case more than 20 times. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 78 F.3d 1270, 127273 (8th Cir. 1996).
9. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367,1373-80 (D. Kan. 1997).
10. See icL at 1386.
11. See generally Colin S. Diver, The Judge as PoliticalPowerbroker: Superintending
Structural Change in Public Institutions, 65 VA. L. REV. 43 (defining the role of judges in

structural injunctions as "political," rather than judicial); William A. Fletcher, The
Discretionary Constitution:Institutional Remedies and Judicial Legitimacy, 91 YALE L.J.
635 (1982) (contending that courts generally make illegitimate, political decisions in public
law remedies); Gerald E. Frug, The JudicialPower of the Purse, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 715
(1978) (examining the structural limits on federal judicial power in public law litigation);
Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30

STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (advocating the application of separation of powers principles
to limit the scope of public law remedies). Much of the debate concerning public law
remedies centers on the role of the judges. See Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978
Term Foreword The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1979). Even strong

proponents of public law question the role of the judiciary in the remedy. See id. at 57
(noting the loss ofjudicial independence in the public law remedy). For a summary of this
critique, see Sturm, supranote 4, at 1403-06.
12. See DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 17-19, 106-70

March 1999]

A TALE OF TWO KANSAS CITES

This Article takes a different approach to analyzing public law
cases and suggests that the two Kansas City cases are remarkable not
for their differences, but for their similarities. In both cases,
defendants chose, to a large extent, their different remedies and drove
The district courts exercised very little
the remedial process.
direction and control, and the plaintiffs had an effective voice only to
the extent allowed by defendants.
This occurred because the district courts behaved as they are
directed: follow Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court's
13

approach to school desegregation in particular and public law
remedies in general has prevented lower court judges from
undertaking principled, well-grounded remedial processes and has
ceded too much remedial power to the defendants, the alleged or
adjudicated wrongdoers. Thus, this Article seeks to shift the debate

over public law remedies from a vigorous discussion of the propriety
and competency of federal courts in public law cases 14 to a
recognition of a judicial system that cedes to defendants a remarkable
degree of remedial authority, at the plaintiffs' expense. To rectify the
plaintiffs' disadvantage in school desegregation cases, this Article
proposes that judges define more precisely plaintiffs' rights, focus
(1977) (analyzing the competency of federal courts in school desegregation); MICHAEL A.
REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING AND THE COURTS: AN
EMPIRICAL STUDY OF JUDICIAL AcTIVISM 147-74 (1982) (conducting empirical
investigation of school desegregation case to determine legitimacy and competency of
federal courts in public law cases); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 39-169 (1991) (critiquing the role of federal
courts in integrating public schools). For a description of the debate over the judiciary's
competency in public law litigation, see Sturm, supranote 4, at 1406-08; Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1137-38.
13. This Article uses the phrase "public law" to refer to cases challenging the
operation of public institutions, i.e., school desegregation, the rights of institutionalized
persons, public housing discrimination, and voting rights. See Sturm, supra note 4, at 1357
n.1; see also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1284 (1976); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1122 n.6. This type of litigation is also
referred to as "institutional reform litigation" and "structural reform litigation." See Carl
Tobias, Public Law Litigation and the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,74 CORNELL L.
REV. 270,279 (1989); Sturm, supra note 4, at 1357 n.1. This Article uses the terms "public
law," "institutional reform," and "structural reform" interchangeably, although some
distinguish the terms. See Tobias, supra, at 280. For citations to key scholarship on public
law, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law Litigation:
Notes on the Jurisprudenceof Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 n.1 (1984); Barry Friedman,
When Rights Encounter Reality: EnforcingFederalRemedies, 65 CAL. L. REV. 735,736 n.4
(1992).
14. See supra authorities cited in footnotes 11-12. As Professor Owen M. Fiss has
described, the debate about public law remedies often speaks of a particular judge, rather
than of the "law." See OWEN M. FISS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCrION 28 (1978)
("[W]hen we speak of the decisional authority in the injunctive process we often talk not
of the law or even of the court, but of Judge Johnson or Judge Garrity.").
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more particularly on the prospective aspects of the remedy, and
recognize their own remedial discretion.
Part I of this Article tells the tale of the two cities and their
school desegregation lawsuits. It chronicles the constitutional
violations and the multifaceted remedies in these two school districts
to demonstrate their shared remedial weaknesses. Despite more than
four decades of school desegregation law conducted throughout our
country, neither court had a meaningful definition of the desired end
result of the lawsuit. The courts approached the remedy as primarily
a reparative task-to eliminate the continuing segregative effects of
the past violations-but their approach depended on a fruitless
proximate cause analysis. 15 This created in both cases unacceptable
remedial ambiguity. In turn, the ambiguity allowed defendants, who
have a high degree of control over the particular means of the
remedy, to define the desired end result and, to a certain extent, the
plaintiffs' rights themselves. Finally, the cases placed an increased
importance on returning school districts to "local control," which
dominated the later stages of the remedy because of the imprecision
of the other remedial goals. Taken together, these principles ensured
that the defendants, more than the plaintiffs or even the district court,
would drive the remedial process.
These problems are not unique to the Kansas City metropolitan
area, but are present in most pending school desegregation cases,
which number in the mid-to-high hundreds, 16 and in the hundreds of
15. See infra Parts ILB.I.b, ll.B.2.c (arguing that proximate cause in crafting the public
law remedy provides little guidance for it is almost impossible to define the present day
effects of defendants' unlawfulness).
16. The United States alone is a party in pending cases governing approximately 400
school districts. See U.S. Dep't of Just., Civil Rights Division, Educational Opportunities
Section Docket Sheet as of March, 1997 (on file with author). Approximately 100 of these
school districts operate under "general" orders to desegregate, with the case placed on the
inactive court docket. The majority of the United States' cases are in southern states,
although a great number of northern school desegregation cases (where the Justice
Department has had minimal involvement) remain open. One school desegregation
expert estimates that approximately 695 schools districts (educating 3.9 million school
children) currently operate under formal school desegregation plans. See DAVID J.
ARMOR, FORCED JUSTICE: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND THE LAW 166 (1995).
School districts may under-report their operation under school desegregation decrees.
Only 256 school districts, with student enrollment exceeding two million, reported in 1990
to the Department of Education that they were subject to school desegregation orders.
See David S. Tatel, DesegregationVersus School Reform: Resolving the Conflict, 4 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REV. 61, 63 n.20 (1993) (citing OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, DEP'T OF EDUC.,
1990 ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOL CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY: COURTORDERED SCHOOL DISTICrS (1990)); see also David I. Levine, The Latter Stages of
Enforcement of EquitableDecrees: The Course of InstitutionalReform Cases After Dowell,
Rufo, and Freeman, 20 HASTINGS. CONST. L.Q. 579, 584 n.30 (1993) (counting 500
pending school desegregation lawsuits).

March 1999]

A TALE OF TWO KANSAS CITIES

America's
other public law remedies that continue to influence
17

housing, prisons, mental hospitals, and work places.
Part II turns to identifying why the defendants have the most
control over the remedial process and argues that the cause of the
problem is the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, after a decade of
almost complete silence, has decided since 1991 seven cases

concerning public law remedies. Four cases, Lawyer v. Departmentof

Justice,18 Lewis v. Casey,19 United States v. Virginia,20 and Missouri v.
Jenkins,2 1 concern the scope of the remedy (i.e., what the remedy can

seek to achieve). Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County addresses how a
public law remedy may be modified. 22 Finally, two cases, Freeman v.
Pitts,23 and Board of Education v. Dowell,24 provide when and how

the lawsuits may be terminated.
This is the first article to examine these seven cases as a group. It
attempts to synthesize the separate stages of the public law remedy

(initial remedy, modification, and termination) and the two main
types of public law remedies (injunctive relief and consent decrees) to
define comprehensively the Supreme Court's conception of public

law remedial power and all opportunities for judicial relief.25
17. See, e.g., In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d
1525 (11th Cir. 1994) (employment discrimination case in its 21st year); Huertas v. East
River Hous. Corp., 992 F.2d 1263 (2d Cir. 1993) (housing discrimination case marking its
second decade); Navarro-Ayala v. Hernandez-Colon, 951 F.2d 1325 (1st Cir. 1991) (mental
health institution case lasting 23 years); Keith v. Volpe, 960 F. Supp. 1448 (C.D. Cal. 1997)
(environmental protection and housing discrimination case marking a quarter century);
Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 848 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (prison
conditions case lasting 21 years); Wyatt v. King, 803 F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Ala. 1992) (mental
health institution case 25 years old); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1124 (describing the broad,
continued reach of public law remedies).

18. 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
19. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
20. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
21. 515 U.S. 70 (1995)(Jenkins III).

22. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
23. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
24. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
25. Prior scholarship has examined particular aspects of public law remedial power.
For a thorough article examining the standard for injunctive relief, see David S.
Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction:A Principleto Replace Balancingthe Equities
and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 MINN. L. REV. 627 (1988). For scholarship examining
implementation issues, see Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in
Structural Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REv. 725 [hereinafter Anderson,
Implementation]; Gewirtz, supra note 2; Friedman, supra note 13; Donald H. Zeigler,
Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal
Courts,38 HASTINGS L.J. 665 (1987); Karla Grossenbacher, Note, Implementing Structural
Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227 (1992).
Articles concerning modification and termination include Lloyd C. Anderson, Release and
Resumption of Jurisdiction Over Consent Decrees in Structural Reform Litigation, 42 U.
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The cases reflect five principles that, taken together, result in
excessive remedial authority being yielded to the defendants.
Specifically, the Court has maintained consistently that:
(1) the scope of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy;
(2) defendants deserve deference;
(3) federalism counts;
(4) through consent decrees parties can circumvent the limits on
injunctive relief; and
(5) effectiveness is sometimes too difficult to achieve.
These five principles, taken together, guarantee little opportunity
for redressing plaintiffs' rights. Part III argues that three changes in
the Supreme Court's approach to public law remedies must occur if
school desegregation plaintiffs are to have a meaningful opportunity
for an effective remedy. The school desegregation right, almost
completely retarded in its development, must be further defined.
Further, school desegregation remedies should focus on barring
current and future discrimination. School districts should have to
justify (either on practicality or educational grounds) or redress any
policy or practice that causes racial disparities. Finally, judges should
recognize the choices inherent in public law remedies and their own
role, not just the role of the defendants, in making those choices.
I. The Tale Of Two (Kansas) Cities
Almost twenty years after the Supreme Court declared in Brown
v. Board of Education that "separate but equal" had no place in the
Topeka, Kansas public schools, school desegregation traveled 60
26
miles due east to Kansas City, Kansas and Kansas City, Missouri.

The two cities are primarily separated by a state line, a road for the
greater part. While the two cities are separate political units and the
MIAMi L. RaV. 401 (1987); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond:
Modification of Injunctions in the Federal Courts, 64 TEX. L. REV. 1101 (1986); Levine,
supra note 16; David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional
Reform Litigation. A Commentary on the Supreme Court's Adoption of the Second
Circuit'sFlexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239 (1993); Donald E. Lively, Desegregation
and the Supreme Court: The Fatal Attraction of Brown, 20 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 649
(1993). For an excellent article considering the appropriate process for the public law
remedy, see Sturm supra note 4. Finally, for three interesting articles addressing the rights
of third parties in public law remedies, see Owen M. Fiss, The Allure of Individualism, 78
IOWA L. REV. 965 (1993); Douglas Laycock, Due Process of Law in TrilateralDisputes, 78
IOWA L. REV. 1011 (1993); Susan P. Sturm, The Promise of Participation,78 IOwA L.

REV. 981 (1993).
26. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (Brown I). Brown I considered four school districts:
Topeka, Kansas; Clarendon County, South Carolina; Prince Edward County, Virginia; and
New Castle County, Delaware. See id. at 486 n.1.
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Missouri city is approximately three times as large as the Kansas one,
the two cities have similar racial makeups and socioeconomic
populations. 27
Before and after Brown I, the two cities separately operated
public school systems segregated by race. A Kansas statute permitted

the establishment and maintenance of a dual school system 8--one for
African-American students and one for white students-and the
Kansas City, Kansas school district operated "a formal, statutorily
sanctioned dual system."2 9

In Missouri, the state constitution

required that public elementary and secondary schools be segregated
27. Census data from 1970, the decade in which both suits were filed, and from 1990
indicate similar racial makeups in both cities. In 1970, the white to black ratio in the
Kansas city was .793 to .204, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, KANSAS, Table 6, at 690-701 (1970) [hereinafter 1970
KANSAS], while in the Missouri city it was .775 to .221. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, MISSOURI, Table 6, at
714-25 (1970) [hereinafter 1970 MISSOURI]. In 1990, the ratio changed to .65 to .293 in the
Kansas city, see BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF
THE POPULATION, KANSAS, Table C at 734-45 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 KANSAS], and
.668 to .296 in the Missouri city. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1990 CENSUS OF THE POPULATION, MISSOURI, Table C at 770-81 (1990)
[hereinafter 1990 MISSOURI]. In 1970 the unemployment rate in both cities was 3.8%. See
1970 KANSAS at 692; 1970 MISSOURI at 716. In 1990, a small gap in unemployment rates
emerged, with the Kansas city having a rate of 8.9% and the Missouri city having a rate of
7.3%. See 1990 KANSAS at 741; 1990 MISSOURI at 777. In 1970, the median income of all
families for the Missouri and Kansas cities was $9,904 and $9,162, respectively. See 1970
KANSAS at 693; 1970 MISSOURI at 717. In 1990, the gap widened a little to $32,969 and
$28,082, respectively. See 1990 KANSAS at 738; 1990 MISSOURI at 774.
Differences between the cities certainly exist. The Missouri side is considered to be
more cosmopolitan; the Kansas side, more blue collar. The Missouri city has more
commercial and service industry, while the Kansas side is more industrial. Another
difference between the two cities is in education levels. In 1970, the Missouri city had
10.1% of its population 25 years and older having attended four or more years of college
while the Kansas city had only 6.6%. See 1970 KANSAS at 691; 1970 MISSOURI at 715. In
1990, the Missouri city had 22.0% of its population 25 years and older having that level of
education while the Kansas city had only 10.1%. See 1990 KANSAS at 738; 1990 MISSOURI
at 774.
28. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 610 F.2d 688,689 (10th Cir. 1979).
29. Id.The Supreme Court had already analyzed the constitutionality of the Kansas
state statute in Brown I, 347 U.S. at 495 n.1. The student and faculty at the elementary
schools were segregated pursuant to Kansas Laws of 1867, Ch. 49, § 7 from 1886 until
1954, which permitted cities with a population of more than 15,000 to establish and
maintain public elementary schools segregated by race. That statute did not apply to
secondary schools, and until 1905, the Kansas City, Kansas school district maintained
integrated secondary schools. In 1905, however, the defendants sought and received
special legislation which permitted the Kansas City, Kansas schools to operate segregated
high schools as well. See Kansas General Statutes § 72-1729 (1949). See generally Graham
v. Board of Educ., 114 P.2d 313 (Kan. 1941) (ruling that Topeka, Kansas junior high was
separate and unequal).
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by race, and the Kansas City, Missouri school system complied. 30 The
public schools in the two cities were segregated by race at the time of
Brown I, and continued to be segregated school systems even after
Brown I. To complete the parallel, both school districts also
experienced "white flight" starting in the 1950's, 31 and had segregated

housing patterns.
Since Brown I, the Supreme Court has often considered how to
redress unlawful school segregation.3 2 For example, the scope of the

remedy should be determined by a three-part test developed in the
Detroit, Michigan school desegregation case of Milliken v. Bradley
33
11.
The Milliken II test provides that:

[1] the nature of the.., remedy is to be determined by the
nature and scope of the constitutional violation...;
[2] the decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it
must be designed as nearly as possible to restore the
victims... to the position they would have occupied in the
absence of such conduct; and ...

[3] the federal courts in devising a remedy must take into
account the interests of state and local authorities in

managing their
Constitution.34

own

affairs,

consistent

with

the

A case concerning the remedy for unconstitutional prison

30. See Mo. CONST. Art. IX, § 1(a) (1945) (rescinded 1976); MO. REV. STAT.
§§163.130, 165.117 (repealed 1957). The provision was removed from the Missouri
Constitution in 1976. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
The State had, however, issued a statement in 1954 that the Missouri Constitution and
statutes mandating school segregation were unenforceable. See id.; see also Adams v.
United States, 620 F.2d 1277, 1280-81 (8th Cir.) (discussing history of school segregation in
Missouri in considering the St. Louis school desegregation case); Joondeph, supra note 4,
at 617-18 (discussing Missouri's history of school segregation).
31. See GARY ORFIELD & SUSAN EATON, DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE
QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 244 (1996) (noting that the
Kansas City, Missouri school district lost 67,000 white persons and gained 64,000 AfricanAmerican persons between 1950 and 1970); United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500,
Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 33 (D. Kan. March 18, 1981)
(second order holding defendants liable and setting the remedy; finding that since 1954 the
white student population had decreased by 73.8% and the African-American student
population had increased by 25 %).
32. The standards are generally applicable to all types of public law, not just school
desegregation. The high ambiguity of the standards is discussed infra Part H.
33. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)(Milliken H).
34. l at 280-81 (internal quotation marks deleted). The first two elements of the
Milliken II test are discussed in detail infra Part II.B. The third part of the Milliken II test
is discussed in detail infra Part II.C.
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conditions, Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County,35 provides the test for
deciding whether a public law remedy, including a school
desegregation remedy, may be modified:
(1) courts may grant requests for modifications based upon a
change in fact or law that was not formerly anticipated by the
parties,
to the
(2) so long as the proposed
36 change "is suitably tailored
changed circumstance.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Board of Education v. Dowell,37
the Oklahoma City school desegregation case, devised a three-part
test for evaluating when the school desegregation case should end.
That test provides that defendants must prove that they:
(1) have "complied in good faith with the desegregation
decree since it was entered";
(2) have eliminated "the vestiges of past discrimination... to
the extent practicable"; and
'38
(3) "would not return to [their] former ways.
As the two Kansas City cases demonstrate below, however, the
tests provide little guidance for judicial involvement in the remedial
process and afford defendants the opportunity, largely unfettered, to
choose their remedies.
A. The Constitutional Violations
(1) Kansas City, Kansas
The Kansas suit began small, in 1973 when the United States,
through the Nixon Justice Department, filed suit and alleged that the
school district for Kansas City, Kansas-Unified School District No.
500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas (hereinafter "USD
No. 500")-and USD No. 500's school board and superintendent had
Judge Earl E.
unlawfully segregated their faculty by race. 39
35. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
36. 1L The standard for modification is explored in detail infra notes 265-77 and
accompanying text.
37. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
38. Id. at 249-50. The standard for termination is explored in detail infraPart II.B.2.a.
39. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367,1370 (D. Kan. 1997). The school district's assignment of faculty
on the basis of race had been the subject of an earlier federal suit, which cleared USD No.
500 of any wrongdoing. See Londerholm v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500,430 P.2d 188, 203-
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O'Connor, in his second year as a federal judge, was assigned the
case, and the United States eventually expanded its allegations to
include systemwide racial segregation of both faculty and students. 4°
Judge O'Connor held that the school district engaged in
intentional segregation in only five predominately African-American
schools.41 The other fifty schools were either deemed segregated (but
not as a result of defendants' actions), or integrated. 42 The district
court also held that the school district had not desegregated its
faculty.43 The district court's extremely limited liability holdings (it is
quite rare for only parts of a school district to be declared unlawfully
segregated) rejected plaintiff's claim of systemwide de jure
segregation.44 The district court also rejected defendants' requests to
add as defendants suburban, predominately white school districts and
local and federal housing authorities. 45 The United States did not
04 (Kan. 1967).
40. See USD No. 500, 974 F. Supp. at 1370.
41. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 94-95 (D. Kan. March 18,1981).
42. Specifically, the district court held that the defendants had proven that segregation
in part of the system was caused by demographic changes and housing discrimination for
which the defendants had no legal responsibility. See id. at 70, 91-93. Remarkably, even if
the defendants' student assignment practices had contributed at one point to the
concentration of African-American students in a school, the court would not have held the
defendants liable, on the grounds that demographic changes in housing patterns would
have eventually resulted in the same level of school segregation. See id. at 93.
43. The district court actually made its liability decisions twice. After the first liability
The Tenth Circuit remanded for
ruling in 1977, the United States appealed.
reconsideration in light of recent Supreme Court cases. See United States v. Unified Sch.
Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, 610 F.2d 688, 693 (10th Cir.
1979). The district court on remand reaffirmed its earlier liability decisions. See United
States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC3738, at 1 (D. Kan. March 18, 1981). The Department of Justice again appealed, but then
subsequently withdrew its appeal. The withdrawal of the appeal can only be explained by
a change in school desegregation policy due to a change in Presidents. Jimmy Carter was
president when the appeal was filed; Ronald Reagan, the president when the appeal was
withdrawn. The Reagan Administration substantially changed the Department of
Justice's approach to school desegregation cases. See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 31,
at 4, 16-19, 339-43; Levine, supra note 16, at 582 n.15.
44. De jure school segregation is the product of discriminatory actions by state
authorities and is unlawful. De facto school segregation, on the other hand, is any
segregation that is not the result of discriminatory actions by state authorities (i.e.,
discrimination by private individuals) and is not unlawful. Specifically, the district court
rejected plaintiff's allegations of discrimination in transportation, see United States v.
Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 7879, 97-98 (D. Kan. March 18, 1981); site selection and new school construction, see id. at
88, 107-08; attendance zones, see id. at 71; staff assignment, see id. at 83-84, 102; student
transfers, see id. at 80, 82; and athletic programs. See id. at 86.
45. USD No. 500 argued that if the court held a violation, an effective remedy could
only be achieved by joining the surrounding school districts because of the extensive white
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raise any concerns with quality of education, and the district court
noted that it was "greatly impressed by the apparent high quality of
46
educational
minimal. programs" provided. In short, the liability findings were
(2) Kansas City, Missouri

The Kansas City, Missouri case, by contrast, began big, but the
district court also rejected substantial portions of plaintiffs'
allegations. In 1977, the Kansas City Missouri School District
(KCMSD) itself, along with a class represented by four minor
children of KCMSD school board members, sued for desegregation.
The school district claimed its efforts to desegregate were unlawfully

impeded by more than thirty-five defendants classified into three
groups: the Kansas defendants, the Missouri defendants, and the
federal defendants. 47
The plaintiffs alleged that the various defendants had unlawfully
discriminated in the Kansas City metropolitan area (acting within and
beyond the borders of the school district) in the fields of housing,
education, and transportation to cause a high concentration of
African-American students in KCMSD and of whites in the
surrounding school districts. 48 The plaintiffs contended, in other
flight. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 4-5 (D. Kan. March 18, 1981); United States v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 4 (D. Kan. Feb. 14,
1977) (first order holding defendants liable and setting the remedy). The district court
held that the school district was not legally responsible for white flight, which the district
court found was due to inadequate housing supply, and refused to add the suburban
school districts. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte
County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 64 (D. Kan. March 18,1981). USD No. 500 also argued
that unlawful housing discrimination by others caused segregated housing patterns that
impeded efforts to operate a desegregated school district. The district court rejected the
school district's motion to add the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
and the local public housing authority as parties. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 111 (D. Kan. Feb. 14,
1977).
46. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 9 (D. Kan. March 18, 1981).
47. The defendants included the following entities and their respective executive
officers: the States of Kansas and Missouri; the Kansas State Board of Education; the
Missouri State Board of Education; suburban school districts surrounding Kansas City,
Missouri located in both Kansas and Missouri; and the U.S. Departments of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD); of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW); and of
Transportation (DOT). See School Dist. v. Missouri, 460 F. Supp. 421, 427 (W.D. Mo.
1978), appeal dismissed on jurisdictionalgrounds, 592 F.2d 493 (8th Cir. 1979). Before
filing suit, the school board had engaged in extensive negotiations with HEW, which was
threatening to discontinue federal funding because of the school board's refusal to
desegregate. See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 31, at 245.
48. See Jenkins, 460 F. Supp. at 427. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that discrimination
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words, that the defendants' wrongdoing was of an interdistrictnature,
as opposed to intradistrict.The case was assigned to Judge Russell G.
Clark, in his first year as a federal judge.
Not surprisingly, the first published opinion in the case begins
with the statement that "[t]his school desegregation action is truly a
case of first impression. '49 Yet, the district court quickly relegated
the case to its traditional, intradistrict components. KCMSD was
realigned as a nominal defendant, 50 and the remaining plaintiff class
had most of its case rejected. The district court denied the claims of
an interdistrict violation involving the surrounding suburban school
districts and of housing discrimination. 51 Judge Clark held only
KCMSD and the State of Missouri in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment because of the continued operation of segregated school
52
buildings.
The plaintiffs, State, and KCMSD all appealed to the Eighth
Circuit, which heard the appeals en banc. The court, either by a 5bare
3
majority or an equal division, affirmed all liability determinations.
In sum, the violations in the two Kansas City cases at their core
involved segregated school buildings within one school district. Both
courts rejected the legal responsibility of surrounding white school
districts and local and federal housing authorities to desegregate
predominately African-American school districts with concentrated
pockets of African-American housing. USD No. 500, with twelve of
its fifty-five school buildings overwhelmingly African-American, was
held to have intentionally segregated only five of its schools.5 4
had caused an erosion in the taxing potential of KCMSD, which faced high operating costs
because of the high number of disadvantaged students. See id. at 428.
49. Id. at 426.
50. See id at 441-42. The district court held that KCMSD lacked standing to proceed
as a plaintiff and could not adequately represent the school district's school children.
51. The district court dismissed the claims against the Kansas defendants, see id. at
445; federal defendants, see Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1488, 1506 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (HUD); Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 661 n.5 (8th Cir. 1986) (DOT & one
suburban school district); and the Missouri suburban school districts. See id. at 661-62;
Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1488.
52. As of the 1983-84 school year, when the school district's overall student population
was 27.3% white and 67.7% African-American, 24 of the school district's schools were
90% African-American. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1493, 1495.
53. With a vote of 5-3, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the suburban
school districts on the ground that no interdistrict violation involving the suburban school
districts had been proven. See Jenkins, 807 F.2d at 661. On a vote of 4-4, the court
affirmed the district court's holding that plaintiffs had also failed to prove an interdistrict
housing violation. See id. The court focused on the importance of deference to the district
court's factual findings, while acknowledging the "oftimes contradictory record." See id.
at 667-68; see also id. at 706 (Lay, J., dissenting).
54. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 94-95 (D. Kan. March 18,1981).
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KCMSD, on the other hand, was held responsible for systemwide
segregated school buildings, with twenty-five of its sixty-eight school
55
buildings predominately African-American.

B. The Remedy
After liability is determined, the court's next step is to determine
the remedy. Generally, the public law remedy is intended to
accomplish three tasks: enjoin ongoing violations, redress the present

day effects of past violations, and prevent future violations. 56

To accomplish these goals, the remedial phase typically includes
three stages. At the first stage of the initial remedy, the district court

usually either orders injunctive relief57 or approves a proposed
consent decree. 58 Monetary relief is unusual.59 Implementation of

55. See Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1495.
56. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547 (1996); Louisiana v. United
States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965); Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 589.
57. Court-ordered relief in public law cases often takes the form of a prospective
injunction detailing the steps defendant must take to comply with the constitutional or
statutory law at issue. The injunction imposes affirmative duties on defendants and is
designed to remedy continuing effects of past violations and to end current unlawful
policies and practices. Professor Owen M. Fiss has defined such an injunction as a
"structural injunction." Fiss, supra note 14, at 7 (structural injunction "seeks to effectuate
the reorganization of an ongoing social institution"). A negative injunction ordering
defendant to cease unlawful behavior is generally considered to be ineffective. See Sturm,
supra note 4, at 1362-63, 1378 ("[Tlhe underlying causes of the legal violation disable the
defendants from complying with a general directive to cease violating the law."); Chayes,
supranote 13, at 1293, 1295 ("Negative orders directed to one of the parties--even though
pregnant with affirmative implications-are often not adequate.") (footnote omitted).
58. A consent decree is a settlement agreement of the parties that is approved by the
court and is judicially enforceable. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S.
367, 378 (1992).
59. Monetary relief for violations of public law rights is rare and considered to be
generally inadequate as a remedy. See Fiss, supra note 14, at 75 n.25, 87 (noting that the
civil rights "experience is a conception of rights that denies their reducibility to a series of
propositions assuring the payment of money to the victims"); Friedman, supra note 13, at
759 n.68 (describing why some scholars prefer injunctions instead of compensatory
damages and explaining why author disagrees); Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 598 n.29
(discussing the problems with damages); Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at
Law Prerequisitefor an Injunction, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 346, 352 (1981) (characterizing
damages as "administratively unsound because they are both more expensive and less
precise."); Sturm, supra note 4, at 1361 & n.18, 1361-62 & n.20, 1378 & n.126 (noting that
"damage awards... do not provide adequate relief in the context of much public law
litigation"). Immunity law is an obvious practical obstacle to monetary damages. See
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1073-76 (4th ed. 1996); Fletcher, supra note 11, at 652 n.51 (listing
the "considerable" unanswered legal questions regarding the availability of damage
remedies). Plaintiffs in statutory employment and housing discrimination cases may seek
compensatory damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1999) (providing for unlimited punitive
damages and limited compensatory damages for employment discrimination); 42 U.S.C. §
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the remedy often takes years, if not decades. 6° Second, modification

of the initial remedy is almost always needed. The parties may
discover that particular terms of the remedy are ineffective; or,
through the passage of time, other terms may need modification in
response to changed factual conditions or legal standards. Finally,
termination of the remedy is itself a separate third stage. At that
time, the court considers whether the remedy has served its purpose

and whether jurisdiction over the defendants should end.
(1) The InitialRemedy
(a) Kansas City, Kansas
Like its liability determinations, the remedy in Kansas City,
Kansas was relatively straightforward, although it required a
significant change for the school district. At the district court's
request, the defendants filed a plan to desegregate the five

intentionally segregated schools (the "liability schools"). In 1977, the

district court approved that plan, 61 with very minor modifications. 62

The defendants' plan was not expected to produce actual
desegregation in the three elementary liability schools, but only to
3613(c)(1)(1999) (allowing actual and punitive damages for discriminatory housing acts).
60. One exception is voting rights. Restructuring public institutions is an ongoing
process, usually far from immediate result. The voting rights remedy, on the other hand,
usually involves the drawing of new voting districts or setting up a revised voting system.
As a result, the voting rights remedy can be immediate, with little need for continuing
judicial oversight. Thus, the issues of modification and termination are not as important in
redistricting and single-member district litigation as in other public law litigation.
61. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 23 (D. Kan. Oct. 6, 1977) (entry of judgment). Pursuant to the
defendants' plan, the school district closed the liability junior and liability senior high
schools, reassigned those students to surrounding schools, converted the senior high
school into a magnet program, and adopted a majority-to-minority ("M-to-M") transfer
program for elementary students in the three liability elementary schools. An M-to-M
transfer program permits students who are attending a school in which their race is in the
majority to transfer to a school in which their race is in the minority. The transfer
program applied to the three liability elementary schools and six surrounding
predominately white elementary schools. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500,
Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 3,6 (D. Kan. June 8, 1977)
(ruling upon various remedial motions). An M-to-M transfer program is typical of school
desegregation plans, although almost always ordered along with other methods of
achieving desegregation.
62. For example, noting that the proposed letter to parents for the M-to-M program
"could scarcely be worded in a manner more calculated to discourage exercise of that
option," the district court required that the letter be changed. United States v. Unified
Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 23 (D. Kan.
June 8, 1977). The district court rejected the plaintiffs proposed changes to the
defendants' plan.
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produce the opportunity for students to have an integrated
elementary school experience. 63
Perhaps recognizing that the Supreme Court had long held that
the mere opportunity for an integrated school experience was an
insufficient remedy, the district court subsequently granted in part
plaintiff's request for additional desegregative means at the
elementary level.64 The district court ordered the defendants to
devise a plan so that grades three through six in the three elementary
schools would be within plus or minus fifteen percentage points of the
racial makeup of the districtwide elementary school population. 65
Given that the three elementary liability schools were at least ninety
percent African-American, this order necessarily involved nonliability schools as well. 66
63. For a description of the plan for elementary schools, see supra note 61. The
district court held that the "opportunity" for an integrated education was more important
than any particular racial balance. United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas
City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 4 (D. Kan. June 8, 1977). The district
court expected no elementary school to achieve racial balance; the school superintendent
testified that the impact on the three liability elementary schools would be "negligible."
Id. at 16. The court held that mandatory desegregation would be "unwise by a number of
legitimate educational considerations." Id. at 20. In approving only an "opportunity" for
an integrated elementary school experience, the court held that a court must examine the
school district as a whole to determine remedial compliance with the Fourteenth
Amendment. This is completely contrary to the court's approach to liability, which was
done on a school-by-school basis, and resulted in extremely limited liability holdings. See
United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No.
KC-3738, at 27-28 (D. Kan. March 18,1981).
64. The district court apparently changed its mind about the necessity of actual
desegregation, which is not surprising given that the M-to-M plan was clearly inadequate
according to Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). The district court
held that the M-to-M plan had proved "inadequate to accomplish any significant degree of
integration." United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte
County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 2 (D. Kan. March 18, 1980)(order requiring defendants
to produce a desegregation plan for the liability elementary schools). No white child had
transferred to any liability, predominately African-American elementary school, and in
1979-80 only 160 African-American school children had transferred from the liability,
predominately African-American elementary schools. See id.
65. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 120 (D. Kan. March 18,1981). The court held that desegregation
of grades one and two was unwarranted. Excluding such early grades is relatively
common in school desegregation cases. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 31 (1971).
66. If the remedy were confined solely to these three schools and the children within
them, no student assignment remedy could possibly have produced an integrated student
population. There were simply no white children in the liability schools with which to
desegregate. Instead, the remedy would need to be limited to compensatory education
programs within the schools, as some courts have ordered for majority African-American
school districts and majority African-American schools. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 284 (1977) (Milliken I).
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The defendants proposed to desegregate grades three through six
through pairing and clustering schools and by voluntary student
transfers. 67 After modifying which non-liability schools would be
involved
in the plan, the district court approved the defendants'
8
plan.

6

The only violation other than student assignment was faculty
assignment on the basis of race. The district court issued only a
general order to desegregate faculty assignment, with no timetables

or measurements included. 69

(b) Kansas City, Missouri.
The remedial process in Kansas City, Missouri began as it did for
USD No. 500: the district court directed both defendants (the State

and KCMSD) to prepare a desegregation plan.70 The district court
set forth some very general, hardly controversial, directives for the
defendants to consider in devising their plans.71 Subsequently, the

State and school district submitted separate remedial plans to which
the plaintiffs responded.
In a 1985 remedial order, the district court made several findings
regarding the vestiges of segregation in the school district. In

addition to maintaining segregated school buildings, the defendants
were also held liable for an inferior education that had led to a
"system wide reduction in student achievement" 72 and "literally
rotted" school buildings. 73 Although the district court held previously
67. Pairing and clustering are traditional school desegregation methods. In pairing,
two schools combine their respective student attendance zones and then the combined
school children attend one grade at one school and another grade at the other school. See
ARMOR, supra note 16, at 162. Under clustering, more than two schools are involved in
combining student attendance zones, typically three. See id. Thus, under clustering,
children from three different elementary attendance zones may attend together one school
for the fourth grade, another for fifth grade, and a third school for the sixth grade.
68. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 1-6 (D. Kan. July 3, 1980) (order regarding what non-liability
schools would be included in the remedial order).
69. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1378 (D. Kan. 1997). The school district had previously
adopted a goal of assigning faculty to within plus or minus five percentage points of their
racial makeup in the school district.
70. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485,1506 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
71. See id. Specifically, the court directed that the defendants concentrate on schools
with student enrollment more than 90% African-American, use neighborhood schools to
the extent compatible with school desegregation, and be sensitive to financial and quality
of education issues. See id.
72. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,24 (W.D. Mo. 1985), aff'd as modified, 807
F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
73. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 411 (W.D. Mo. 1987), affd in part,rev'd
in part on other grounds, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988), mandate recalled in part on other
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no interdistrict violation, it found that segregation had caused white
flight to private and suburban schools. 74
Regarding the systemwide decline in student achievement, the
State and KCMSD both proposed extensive quality of education

programs. With one exception, the district court ordered only the
components found in both plans.75 Regarding the particular plans to
implement the components,
the district court generally approved the
school district's plans.76
The defendants also both proposed remedying the inadequate
school facilities. Here the proposals differed greatly in their cost.
The State's plan totaled $20,000,000, while the estimate of the school

district's plan ranged from $55,000,000 to $70,000,000. 77 The district

court ordered the school district to devise a capital improvement plan

grounds, 864 F.2d 1454 (8th Cir. 1989). The district court held that the conditions of the
schools adversely affected the learning environment and discouraged parents from
enrolling their children in KCMSD. The school conditions also decreased the chance of
effectiveness of the quality of education programs. See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 39-40.
Remarkably, at one point, the district court disavowed any relevancy of proximate cause:
"The State's argument that the present condition of the facilities is not traceable to
unlawful segregation is irrelevant." Id. at 40.
74. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1300 (8th Cir. 1988). As the Supreme
Court noted in Jenkins III, the district court was not entirely consistent in its findings
regarding the interdistrict effects of the defendants' unlawful actions. See Missouri v.
Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 94-95 (1995)(JenkinsIII); infra notes 249-50 and accompanying text.
75. Both defendants proposed the following quality of education programs to redress
the systemwide decline in student achievement: attainment of AAA status, reduction of
class size, summer school, full day kindergarten, tutoring, early childhood development
programs, and staff development. See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 26-33. AAA status is the
highest rating a school can receive from the Missouri State Department of Elementary and
Secondary Education, which rates schools based upon their quality and quantity of
educational programs and services, including teacher qualifications, class size, instructional
equipment, library resources, and instructional materials. See id. The district court also
approved the school district's proposal to have an effective schools program whereby
schools would be given a budget with which to choose and implement the school's chosen
achievement programs. See id. at 33-34.
76. See id. at 26-33. The district court at times changed particular details of the
defendants' proposals. For example, the district court rejected KCMSD's and the State's
proposals on how to select the schools for the tutoring program, and held that the program
would be offered "in at least ten schools where participation is of a sufficient level to
operate the program efficiently, economically and effectively." Id. at 32; see also id. at 3132 (changing the number of schools to be included in the full day kindergarten program).
Another example concerns the achievement of AAA status, which required a certain
amount of planning time for teachers. The State had proposed the teachers share recess
supervision loads to ensure the requisite planning time, while the school district proposed
the hiring of 62 additional teachers. See id. at 27. Here the district court required that the
school district hire 31 teachers and 31 teaching assistants to provide the needed planning
time. See id.
77. See id. at 40.
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at a cost of $37,000,000.78
In one area-student assignment to desegregate school
buildings-the district court completely rejected defendants'
proposals because of its concern with both achieving desegregation
and avoiding white flight.79 Even here, the court did not order its own
plan, but instead required the defendants to submit additional plans
for student assignment. Specifically, the court ordered the defendants

to study the feasibility of decreasing the African-American
enrollment in the schools with a student population of ninety percent
African-American, 80 the school district to submit a budget for the
three magnet schools already in operation and a plan for additional
magnet programs, 81 and the State to develop and maintain a
voluntary interdistrict transfer plan whereby surrounding suburban
school districts would allow its students to transfer to KCMSD and
accept KCMSD transfer students.82 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the
remedy, with a few modifications concerning the school district's
financial responsibility for the remedy and the voluntary interdistrict
transfer plan.83
78. The court directed the school district to focus on "(1) eliminating safety and health
hazards; (2) correcting those conditions existing in the KCMSD school facilities which
impede the level of comfort needed for the creation of a good learning climate; and (3)
improving the facilities to make them visually attractive." Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.
Supp. 19, 41 (W.D. Mo. 1985), affd as modified, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986). After
implementation of this plan, the district court would consider a plan to make the facilities
comparable to those of the surrounding suburban school districts. See id
79. See id. at 36-37. The school district proposed to continue the current student
assignment policy which required that no school have enrollment of less than 30%
minority for grades 1-12. See id The State requested that all schools reflect the
districtwide African-American percentage of 68% which would have required massive
cross-town busing. See id Before requiring additional busing to achieve its goal, the State
proposed first analyzing whether additional voluntary student transfers could achieve the
goal. See id
80. See id. at 38.
81. See id. at 34-35.
82. See Jenkins, 639 F. Supp. at 38-39. To educate the public on the remedy, the
district court ordered the hiring of a public information specialist. See id. at 41. The final
remedial component was a monitoring committee which would conduct evaluations,
collect information, and make recommendations for modifications of the plan. See id at
41-43.
83. Specifically, the Eighth Circuit ordered that the two defendants share the costs
equally for decreasing class size, the effective school programs, and capital improvement
costs. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 684-86 (8th Cir. 1986). The Eighth Circuit
thereby increased the school district's financial responsibility. The Eighth Circuit, while
acknowledging the deference afforded to district courts in school desegregation cases,
noted the lack of stated reasons for not imposing the costs equally for the reduction in
class size and the effective schools program. See id. at 685. The Eighth Circuit relied on
the district court's findings in concluding that the defendants should share the costs of the
capital improvement costs. See id.
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In considering both Kansas City cases, at the stage of the initial
remedy the two cases diverge most starkly-the Missouri remedy is
clearly expansive and expensive, while the Kansas one is notably
narrow in its scope. Yet, even at this stage, similarities exist. In both
cases, it is the defendants who are proposing the remedies, and the
district courts generally approved the defendants' plans. The district
courts typically only changed details in the defendants' proposed
plans-for example, the wording of the letter to parents about a
program or how teachers would be afforded planning time.84 Even
when the courts rejected wholesale the defendants' proposals (as both
courts did with the proposals for student assignment, on the grounds
of efficacy), the courts requested the defendants to propose another,
more acceptable plan, rather than ordering the courts' own view of an
acceptable remedy. The district courts only set forth general
directives, with very general prescriptive capacity, for the defendants
to follow.
One could attempt to explain the differences in the two remedies
by arguing that KCMSD was the cause of the differences.
Specifically, because KCMSD was only a nominal defendant and
could expect additional state funding to cover part of the remedy,
KCMSD had the incentive to propose unnecessarily expensive and
intrusive remedies. While this argument certainly has some merit, 85 it
cannot be overlooked that the State,86a true defendant, was also at this
stage proposing extensive remedies.
(2) Modification

A hallmark of public law litigation-explicitly recognized by the
Supreme Court in Brown II, its first decision concerning a public law
remedy-is that jurisdiction over the suit continues after the remedy
is ordered.87 During implementation of the remedy, parties are often
confronted with changes in the legal and factual conditions
underlying the remedy or with remedial approaches that prove
The Eighth Circuit also ordered changes in the voluntary interdistrict transfer
program. First, the program should comply with a similar remedy ordered in the St. Louis,
Missouri school desegregation case. Specifically, the program should include a citizen
committee to monitor and assist the program and should use a particular system for state
funding. See icL at 684; Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1302 (8th Cir. 1984). Further,
the district court should consider the legality of including Kansas schools in any voluntary
interdistrict plan. See Jenkins, 807 F.2d at 686.
84. See supra notes 62, 76.
85. See infra note 368 and text following note 108.
86. For example, the State's plan included a wide range of quality of education
programs, a $20,000,000 capital improvement plan, and possible widespread cross-town
busing. See supranotes 77,79 and accompanying text.
87. 349 U.S. 294,300 (1955)(Brown II).
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ineffective with time.8 8 Thus, it is not surprising that throughout
public law litigation parties request and receive changes in the initial
remedy. The two Kansas City school desegregation cases are no
exception.
(a) Kansas City, Kansas.
In Kansas, the parties immediately involved Judge O'Connor in
the details of administering the remedy, and the scope of the remedy
increased over time. Soon after ordering the first remedy, for
example, the district court approved the school district's proposed
plans and curriculum guide for the magnet school, 89 and approved the
parties' proposed consent decree regarding the admissions criteria to
a magnet school. 90
Thereafter, the defendants filed numerous requests for approval
of matters beyond the scope of liability and the initial remedy. By so
doing, the defendants increased the involvement of the district court.
For example, although only one high school was held to be unlawfully
segregated and converted to a magnet school, the district court
granted a joint motion to establish magnet programs at four other
high schools. 91 Furthermore, at the defendants' requests, the district
court approved the placement of grade six in the middle schools and
of grade nine in the high schools, various changes in attendance zone
lines, school closings, and new school construction. 92 The defendants'
motions for modification were routinely granted wholesale by the
district court, with little (if any) opposition from the United States. In
fact, many of the motions are properly considered to be proposed
consent decrees, for the motions were made by the defendants with

88. See Diver, supra note 11, at 63; Jost, supra note 25, at 1103-04; Fiss, supra note 11,
at 27-28 (describing the remedial phase as "concerned not with the enforcement of a
remedy already given, but with the giving or shaping of the remedy itself").
89. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1374 (D. Kan. 1997) (summarizing modifications requested and
approved).
90. See id.
91. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 33 (D. Kan. March 17, 1993) (agreed-upon Order of Amendment
to Desegregation Plan Granting Leave to Modify the Approved Desegregation Plan by
Establishing Magnet Programs Within Harmon, Schlagle, Wyandotte and Washington
High Schools).
92. The defendants also filed annual reports beginning in 1978 documenting their
desegregative efforts, which the district court "approved," again with little (if any)
opposition from the United States. The annual reports covered more than compliance
with the remedial order, reaching other areas of school administration as well. See, e.g.,
United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas,
No. KC-3738, 1991 WL 75552, at *1 (D. Kan. 1991).
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the agreement of the United States. 93
The district court, acting on its own, imposed no modifications on
the plan, even if the district court thought a modification necessary.
For example, rather than ordering a middle school magnet program,
the district court "urged" the defendants to consider one. 94 Other
than requiring annual reports, 95 the district court largely confined
itself to approving defendants' motions.
(b) Kansas City, Missouri.

The requested modifications in Kansas City, Missouri were
generally of the same type as in Kansas, but of a greater magnitude
because of the scope of the initial remedy and the litigiousness of the
parties.
The school district proposed that the student body be
desegregated through a systemwide magnet school program whereby
all high and middle schools and half the elementary schools would be
converted to magnets. 96 Faced with the State's decision to object but
not to propose another method of desegregating student assignment,
the district court approved the school district's proposal. 97 Likewise,
the district court approved the school district's long range capital
improvement plan, after finding the State's proposal wholly
inadequate. 98 The most controversial ruling was that involving the
local property tax levy. So that the school district could fund its
portion of the increasingly expensive remedy, the district court was
allowed, for all practical purposes, to impose a property tax levy on
the local residents.9 9 The school district further made scores of
93. See, e.g., United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte

County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 33 (D. Kan. May 20, 1994) (agreed-upon Order
Approving Stipulation for Boundary Line Change for Central Middle School); United
States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No. KC3738 (D. Kan. March 17, 1993).
94. See USD No. 500, 1991 WL 75552, at *1.
95. See supra note 92.

96. Magnets have been criticized for creating a two-tiered school system-with the
magnet tier providing superior education to the non-magnet tier. The school district
proposed a systemwide magnet program to avoid the two-tiered system. The State
opposed the system, but offered no alternative.
97. The district court approved the systemwide plan to avoid a two-tiered system and
to attract white students into the system. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1303-04
(8th Cir. 1988); ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 31, at 248-49.
98. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400, 408 (W.D. Mo. 1987), aff'd in relevant
part,rev'd in part,855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).

99. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) (Jenkins II). The Supreme Court held
that the district court could "authorize KCMSD to submit a levy to the state tax collection
authorities and ... enjoin the operation of state laws hindering KCMSD from adequately
funding the remedy." Id. at 43; see also id. at 52-58. The district court could not impose
the tax increase itself. See id at 52.
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implementation proposals, and the district court also generally
approved the school district's proposals (some of which gained all

parties' approval), mandating only minor changes or modifications. 100
The State at this stage continually challenged the school district's
particular implementation strategies in the hopes of reducing the
financial tab borne by the State. For example, the State sought

judicial intervention on many relatively minor issues including:

whether asbestos abatement was a desegregation expense, 10 1 whether
the State could have a court reporter at Desegregation Monitoring
Committee meetings,'02 whether a magnet school should have a tenmeter diving platform, 0 3 whether the district should use an
identification system for security purposes,'0 4 and whether a high
school should get additional coaches. 10 5 The State was continually
appealing the district court's decisions, even those costing only a few
thousand dollars, °6 and usually losing.1 7 The case was in constant

litigation, which adversely affected the school district's available time

100. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1991 WL 538841, at *10-11
(W.D. Mo. 1991) (approving school district's proposal for spending in the upcoming year,
except for the request for coaches at Central High, tuition assistance for paraprofessionals,
and parts of the library budget); Jenkins v. Missouri, No. 77-0420-CV-W-4, 1990 WL
515176, at *3 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (approving KCMSD's proposed budget for upcoming year,
except for request for five additional patrol officers); Jenkins v. Missouri, 672 F. Supp. 400,
407 (W.D. Mo. 1987) (changing architect and engineering fee from eight percent to six
percent on capital improvement plan and requesting information on furniture request, but
otherwise approving school district's request for a $194 million capital improvement plan),
affd in relevantpart,rev'd in part,855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir. 1988).
101. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470, 479 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
condition of facilities, including asbestos removal, was a factor in overall success of plan, in
attracting non-minority enrollment, and in increasing quality of education).
102. See id. at 480 (holding that within sound discretion of district court to deny State's
request to have a court reporter at Desegregation Monitoring Committee meetings).
103. See i&. at 482 (affirming the district court for rejecting a proposed diving platform).
104. See Jenkins, 1991 WL 538841, at *6 (approving the security plan, but requesting
that the school district attempt to involve the police department in security issues).
105. See id. at *7 (denying the request for more coaches, but allowing future individual
motions to be filed requesting coaches for specific sports).
106. For example, the State appealed the cost of tuition costs for two KCMSD students
participating in the voluntary transfer program to suburban school districts. The parties
had agreed that the costs would be $5,000, but the State wanted to modify this amount to
the actual cost of $3,672.74. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 965 F.2d 654, 655-56 (8th Cir. 1992).
The Eighth Circuit denied the request and noted the great deference afforded to district
courts. See id at 656-57.
107. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 600 (8th Cir. 1997) (rejecting State's
appeal of denial of unitary status for the entire system); Jenkins v. Missouri, 103 F.3d 731,
738 (8th Cir. 1997) (denying State's requests regarding particular programs in the 1996-97
desegregation budget); Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470, 483 (8th Cir. 1991) (rejecting all
five bases of State's appeal). But see Jenkins v. Missouri, 38 F.3d 960, 964 (8th Cir. 1994)
(agreeing with State that district court had exceeded its remedial powers).
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for effective implementation.108
Throughout both the Kansas and Missouri cases, modifications
increasing the reach of the remedy were sought by USD No. 500 and
KCMSD and occurred through consent decrees and motions, which
were generally approved with minor changes, if any. As a result, the
scope of both remedies increased over time, and the remedy reached
more and more facets of school administration. Critically, the district
courts were involved in the litigation almost exclusively through the
requests of the defendants. USD No. 500 and KCMSD were
continually seeking judicial approval of remedial approaches, and the
State of Missouri often requested (albeit usually unsuccessfully) the
district court to limit KCMSD's remedies. Except for their assent to
consent decrees, the plaintiffs are notably absent in the requests for
modifications. In short, the defendants drove the involvement of the
judiciary.
Yet, this conclusion begs the question of whether a true
defendant, i.e., KCMSD, was allowed to set the remedial process in
Jenkins. Unlike its behavior at the initial remedy hearing where the
State (like KCMSD) sought expansive judicial expansive judicial
remedies, the State now almost always lost its attempts to limit the
remedy. Furthermore, KCMSD was originally a plaintiff, worked
closely with the plaintiff class, and was only a nominal defendant.
KCMSD also had the incentive to seek costly judicial involvement,
knowing that the State (or a court-ordered property tax levy) would
finance the program. Yet, it is inconceivable that the expansive
remedy in Jenkins could have occurred without KCMSD's active
request and support. Federal courts, after all, recognize school
districts' special expertise in school administration and in the
particularities of the individual school district-even if only a nominal
defendant. A non-school district plaintiff on the other hand, is
comparable in expertise to the judge. Further, given that the State of
Missouri generally refused to propose specific remedies, most notably
for student assignment, the district court was left with the option of
108. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 942 F.2d 487, 492 (8th Cir. 1991) (problems with
implementation caused in part by "protracted" litigation); Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F.
Supp. 1151, 1172 (W.D. Mo.) (noting that "the State has been more litigious than
necessary and the remedy may have achieved better results had the State chosen to be
more cooperative"), affd, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
Judge Clark described the State's position in an interview: "[The state's policy of
ORFIELD &
'total opposition' [w]as counterproductive and politically motivated."
EATON, supra note 31, at 249. Further, "[a]ccording to... former director of
desegregation services for the Missouri Department of Elementary and Secondary
Education (DESE), in the late 1980's, the governor and attorney general discouraged
DESE from taking an active role in monitoring the plan and chose to appeal even those
components of the remedy that DESE favored." IL at 256.
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either approving KCMSD's proposals or crafting its own, and the
court generally decided to defer to KCMSD.
(3) Termination
Although school desegregation and other public law remedies
routinely last more than twenty years, court jurisdiction does not
operate into perpetuity. In a public law suit, court jurisdiction ends
when the defendants prove that the remedy has served its purpose.
In school desegregation, this has occurred when the defendants prove
that the school district is no longer dual, but "unitary."' 9 A school
district is unitary when it no longer discriminates on the basis of race
and when it has eliminated, to the extent practicable, the "vestiges" of
discrimination.
The Supreme Court has never defined specifically what it means
by vestiges, but it most certainly involves six factors: student
assignment, faculty assignment, staff assignment, facilities,
transportation, and extra-curricular activities. These are the six
Green factors, named after the case of Green v. County School
Board."0 In that 1968 case, the Supreme Court ruled that the
adoption of race-neutral admission policies, highly unsuccessful in
desegregating student bodies, was an insufficient remedy. Rather, the
school district must desegregate the six areas to the extent
most notably
practicable."' Courts often consider other factors,
2
quality of education as a vestige of discrimination."
(a) Kansas City, Kansas
The United States and school district engaged in an extensive
and "unprecedented collaborative" process to produce, with the3
active involvement of the community, a Desegregation Exit Plan."
Throughout the process, the district court held informal, off-therecord status conferences and expressed its support of the
cooperative effort. The plan, covering all aspects of the school
administration and all schools, was "'designed to improve the state of
the District's educational opportunities by improving facilities and

109. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,250 (1991).

110. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
111. See id. at 439.
112. The Supreme Court has noted that it was not an abuse of discretion for a district
court to examine "quality of education" in assessing unitary status. Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 492-93 (1992); see also Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281-82 (1977) (Milliken
II) (approving the use of compensatory education programs for Detroit, Michigan, which
could not practically desegregate its student body).
113. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367,1385 (D. Kan. 1997).
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programs for the students,"'

4

which "'may be achieved, in part, by

The
and through schools that are racially balanced.' ' ' u 5
Desegregation Exit Plan was expected6 to increase slightly the level of
integration within the school district."
Thereafter, and after 408 docket entries over twenty-four years,

the Kansas district court terminated its jurisdiction over USD No.
500, at the defendants' request and with the United States'
approval." 7 In holding unitary status, the court made findings on all
six Green factors-student assignment, faculty assignment, staff

assignment, facilities, transportation, and student extra-curricular
activities-even though liability was based on only two of the factors
(student assignment and faculty assignment).
Regarding student assignment, the court found "considerable
progress" in reducing the racial identifiability of the five liability

schools 18 and held the defendants not responsible for current
imbalance in the non-liability schools. 119 Segregation certainly

remained, however. Roughly two-thirds of the elementary schools
were racially imbalanced. 120 The court concluded "that there are no

114. Id at 1383 (quoting the Desegregation Exit Plan).
115. Id (quoting the Desegregation Exit Plan).
116. The plan was expected to increase from 36% to 38% the percentage of elementary
schools that are racially balanced; from three to five the number of junior highs to be
racially balanced; and from two to three the number of high schools to be racially
balanced. See Motion of Defendants Unified School District No. 500, Kansas City,
Wyandotte County, Kansas, Members of the Board of Education and Superintendent of
Schools of Said District for Declaration of Unitary Status and Order of Dismissal at 38,
United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, 974
F. Supp. 1367 (D. Kan. 1997)(No. KC-3738).
117. See USD No. 500,974 F. Supp. at 1368.
118. See id. at 1375. The three liability elementary schools had a student population for
grades three through six that mirrored the school district's elementary school population
by a plus or minus 10% standard over a three-year period, except for one school's white
population with a variance of plus or minus 15% for one year. See id at 1375-76. The
variances were greater when grades one and two, which were desegregated only by
voluntary transfers, were included. See id. at 1375. Then the variances ranged from 11%
to 25%. See id. The one liability junior high was closed, so the court looked at the four
junior high schools where the students in the closed school were reassigned. See id at
1376. These four schools had variances from the junior high African-American population
as a whole ranging from 0.2% to 21.2%. See id at 1376. The high school, converted to a
magnet, had a variance of 20%. See id. at 1375.
119. See id. at 1376 ("[A]ny racial imbalance existing at [the non-liability] schools either
in 1977 or today has been caused by independent factors such as demographics. There is
no evidence that the District has contributed either directly or indirectly to the
demographic changes in the area.").
120. For example, using a plus or minus 15% standard, 36% of the elementary schools
were racially balanced, three of the eight middle schools were racially balanced, and two
of the five high schools were racially balanced. See Motion of Defendants Unified School
District No. 500, Kansas City, Wyandotte County, Kansas, Members of the Board of
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other practicable measures to achieve further desegregation,"''
although the court noted that the school district's Desegregation Exit
Plan12 2 would increase slightly the level of student desegregation.'23
Regarding faculty assignment, the defendants had voluntarily
adopted a strict plus or minus five percent standard, which required
that the faculty's racial proportion at each school be within plus or
minus five percentage points of the overall faculty population at the
school district 24 The district court ruled that the defendants had
desegregated its assignment of faculty to the "extent practicable,"
noting "significant progress in achieving faculty racial balance."'125
For the remaining Green factors, the district court noted the
126
absence of any racial disparities, albeit with little analysis.
Interestingly, the district court refused to analyze quality of education
issues, although both the United States and the school district had
addressed quality of education in their respective motions. The court
Education and Superintendent of Schools of Said District for Declaration of Unitary
Status and Order of Dismissal at 38, United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500 Kansas
City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Kan. 1997)(No. KC-3738).
Looking at schools with 75% or more African-American population, it appears that the
school district in 1997 was as segregated as it was in 1977. In 1977, 11 out of 55 schools had
more than a 75% African-American student population. One of those schools was
subsequently closed. In 1997, nine out of 46 schools had more than 75% AfricanAmerican student population. This can be explained in part by the increase in the overall
African-American student population from 41% in 1977 to 54% in 1997.
121. USD No. 500, 974 F. Supp. at 1376.
122. See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
123. See USD No. 500,974 F. Supp. at 1383-84.
124. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1378 (D. Kan. 1997). Further, the school district would deem
particular faculties in compliance with the plus or minus five percent standard if the
addition or subtraction of one or two teachers would place the faculty within the 10-point
goal. See hi
125. See id at 1379. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the racial
population of faculty at nine schools that had at the time of unitary status a student
population of 75% or more African-American. See itlat 1378. Four of the nine schools
met the plus or minus five percent standard; three others met a plus or minus 15%
standard. See id.at 1378-79. One school had a variance of 21.8%, but was less than its
variance in 1977 of 28.9%. See i. at 1379. Of the remaining 46 schools, 40 schools either
met the plus or minus five percent standard or would meet the standard with the addition
of one or two African-American faculty. See id.Desegregation of faculty is discussed
further infra Part II.F.
126. Transportation and extra-curricular activities were governed by non-discrimination
policies. See id.at 1371. Facilities in white neighborhoods and African-American
neighborhoods had no "discernible" differences. Id at 1382. USD No. 500 had made
"substantial progress" in increasing the number of minority staff. Id at 1379. The court
did not examine whether racial disparities in participation in extra-curricular activities
existed or whether staff was assigned on the basis of race. Further, the district court did
not analyze whether the burden of busing was shared equally between African-American
and white school children.
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noted the absence of earlier liability allegations or holdings regarding
quality of education and the existence of findings in 1977 and 1981
that the court was "greatly impressed" with the quality of education
of the school district. 127 The court concluded that examination of
quality of education was therefore "unnecessary."' 128 The district
court failed to explain why it examined Green factors for which no
liability had been held, but refused to examine quality of education
on the ground of an absence of liability.
On the basis of this proof, the district court declared USD No.
500 to be a unitary school district and "dissolved" all outstanding
injunctions. 129 In so doing, the court emphasized
the importance of
130
returning school districts to "local control.'
(b) Kansas City, Missouri
Across the river in Kansas City, Missouri, jurisdiction continues,
but the focus has recently shifted from expanding the remedy to
curtailing and ending it. The Jenkins district court has explicitly
recognized the importance of ending jurisdiction. A mere eight years
after the initial remedy was ordered-an incredibly short time for any
school desegregation remedy-the district court ordered that the
school district devise transition plans to end the litigation. 13' The
district court so ordered in response to the State's request to be
dismissed from the lawsuit.
Next, in Missouri v. Jenkins, the Supreme Court mandated
significant limits on particular remedial programs when it ruled
impermissible the goal of attracting white students outside of
KCMSD school district lines to attend KCMSD (one of the reasons
for the magnet program and capital improvements plan and the only
justification for the voluntary interdistrict transfer program) and
when it held that the district court had used impermissible reasons for
requiring the State to continue funding the quality of education
programs. 32 KCMSD and the State eventually entered into a
127. Id. at 1371-72.
128. Id. at 1372.
129. Id. at 1386.
130. Id. at 1372.
131. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755,762 (8th Cir. 1993) (referring to April 16, 1993
district order requesting plans assuming withdrawal of court-ordered funding), rev'd, 515
U.S. 70 (1995); Jenkins v. Missouri, 13 F.3d 1170, 1174 (8th Cir. 1993) (same), rev'd, 515
U.S. 70 (1995).
132. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,72 (1995)(JenkinsIII). Jenkins III is discussed
in detail below. See infra notes 202 & 242-52 and accompanying text. The defendants can
still implement programs to encourage students living within KCSMD, but attending
private or parochial schools, to enroll in KCMSD. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 103 F.3d 731,
741 (8th Cir. 1997). Professor Richard A. Epstein has argued that Jenkins III will not
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settlement agreement whereby the State of Missouri would be

dismissed in exchange for a cash settlement. 133 In his last decision
before stepping down from the case, Judge Clark approved the
The Eighth Circuit, calling the issue "close,"
settlement.534
3

affirmed.
As part of its approval of the settlement agreement, the district
court set forth steps the school district must take to achieve unitary
status and found that the steps should be achievable within two to

three years, and the Eighth Circuit also affirmed this order. 136 The
areas left to be desegregated included five of the six Green factors
and a gap in achievement scores between African-American and
white students. 137 Both the district court and the court of appeals

ensure an end to the lawsuit. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1117 ("The standard that [the
Court] ultimately adopted recognized the formal possibility that supervision could end,
but at the same time made it highly unlikely that this desirable outcome could ever be
achieved.").
133. On December 3, 1998, the State fulfilled its financial obligation under the
settlement agreement, seven months ahead of schedule. See Blair, supra note 5.
134. Discussions between KCMSD and the State that led to the settlement began in
February 1995, before the Supreme Court decided Jenkins III. See ORFIELD & EATON,
supra note 31, at 251. The district court increased the settlement payment, to take into
account another remedial order, by $6 million to $320 million. See Jenkins v. Missouri,
959 F. Supp. 1151, 1169 (W.D. Mo.) affid. 122 F. 3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997). KCMSD was to
receive the money over three years and spend the money over five years. See id. at 116970. The district court judge now handling the case is Judge Dean Wipple.
135. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 605 (8th Cir. 1997) ("Many aspects of the
agreement and its effects are troublesome, and we remain deeply concerned about the
future of the KCMSD. The issue of whether the district court erred in approving the
agreement is a close one."). The district court approved the agreement in part because of
its recognition that the Supreme Court's opinion in Jenkins III severely limited the remedy
itself and the expectation of continued state funding and that the payment of $320 million
to the school district was more than the school district could expect from continued
litigation. See Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1169. But the district court also emphasized that
the district court hoped that approval of the settlement agreement would allow KCMSD
to eliminate the constant litigation of the case so that KCMSD could concentrate on
implementation of the remedy and that approval would increase cooperation between the
State and school district. See id. Further, the school district would still have ample funds
at its disposal with the settlement. See id at 1172.
136. See Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1165-69; Jenkins, 122 F.3d at 599-600.
137. For student assignment, the remaining concern was the minority enrollment given
the recent loss of 1476 white transfer students in response to the Supreme Court's order
that the remedy could no longer attempt to attract non-minority students outside of
KCMSD. Here, the school district was to ascertain the effect of this loss on the enrollment
statistics. See Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1167. For faculty and staff assignment, the court
required that the school district "attempt to achieve by all practicable measures, a plus or
minus range of 15% in faculty assignment at 80% of elementary schools." Id at 1168. For
facilities, the school district was ordered to complete already ordered facilities upgrades
within two years, and to prepare a transition plan for facilities given the expected decline
in funding. See id. For transportation, continued court supervision was needed because of
expected changes in the magnet programs (which would affect transportation) and in the
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KCMSD would be able to achieve these
openly questioned whether
1 38

goals within three years.
Yet, the case is certainly heading toward dismissal, due in large
part to the new-founded cooperation between the defendants, the
Missouri state government, the Missouri voters, and the widespread
dissatisfaction with the systemwide magnet program. 139 Pursuant to
the defendants' settlement agreement, the district court dismissed the
case against the State.14° Yet, the State has committed itself to

continue extra funding of the KCMSD, beyond that required by the
settlement agreement. Legislation increased state monies to KCMSD
to replace more than one-third of the State's previous annual
Even Missouri voters-anxious
desegregation subsidies. 141

apparently to end the suit against KCMSD-passed a constitutional
amendment to alleviate the effects of the expected end of the court-

ordered property tax levy.142

Finally, and most significantly, the

budget. See id. No party protested partial unitary status for extra-curricular activities,
which the district court granted. See id. The district court rejected the school district's
claim of a "financial vestige" - KCMSD's inability to raise sufficient funding because of
past state discrimination. Id. at 1169.
138. See Jenkins, 122 F.3d at 604 (noting "substantial obstacles" to the KCMSD's
satisfying its obligation to provide quality education); Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1178
(observing that problems in KCMSD's administration make achievement of unitary status
difficult and that KCMSD needs outside assistance). In addition, both the district court
and Eighth Circuit noted that significant administrative problems have plagued the school
district, which in the last nine years has had ten different school district superintendents.
See Jenkins, 122 F.3d at 604-05; Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1173. Thereafter, the tenth
superintendent was fired after a court-appointed committee issued a report challenging his
leadership capabilities. See Karen L. Abercrombie, Mo. School Chief Voted Out, EDUC.
WK., Oct. 28, 1998, at 4. The district court also severely criticized the school district for its
implementation of the remedy: "The District's recent performance has been dismal at
best." Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at 1173. For example, the school district had astronomical
operating costs, yet the school district's teacher-student ratios failed to satisfy state
standards. See id. at 1174.
139. Magnets are viewed as a conservative alternative to the much maligned mandatory
busing; yet, this magnet program is the subject of intense conservative criticism. See, e.g.,
Epstein, supra note 4, at 1102-05; Yoo, supra note 4, at 1125-28. More recently, even
liberals have criticized KCMSD's magnet program. See Caroline Hendrie, Falling Stars,
EDUC. WK., Feb. 25, 1998, at 39 ("National experts on school desegregation who disagree
on nearly everything else can find common ground on this: Kansas City simply went
overboard when it came to magnet schools.")
140. See Caroline Hendrie, St. Louis, Kansas City Move Closer to End of Desegregation
Cases, EDUC. WK., Feb. 10, 1999 at 10.
141. See Caroline Hendrie, Taxes, Transfer Program on the Table in St. Louis
DesegregationSettlement, EDUC. WK., Aug. 5,1998, at 8.
142. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 158 F.3d 984, 985 (8th Cir. 1998). The constitutional
amendment allows KCMSD to set the property tax levy one penny less than the courtordered property tax levy. See id. A constitutional amendment, which required a simple
majority, was considered to be an easier way to maintain the property tax levy than a local
vote on the tax levy, which required a two-thirds majority. See Jessica L. Sandham,
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school district plans to convert half of the nearly sixty magnet schools
in 1999.143 A unitary status hearing is set for January 3, 2000.144 In
sum, although jurisdiction in Jenkins continues, the focus now is
ending the lawsuit, although district court and court of appeals have
questioned the school district's ability to manage the process
effectively.
At the point of termination, the defendants in both cases
continued to lead the remedial process. USD No. 500 requested and
received unitary status, even though disparities remained in student
and faculty assignment, and with little thorough judicial analysis of
what the lawsuit was particularly expected to achieve. In Jenkins, the
State has successfully re-oriented the suit to termination, admittedly
with assistance from the Supreme Court's decision in Jenkins III and
the school district's acquiescence, and the district court and parties
are now directing their efforts toward termination. Yet, the expected
outcome (other than eventual termination of the suit) remains
unclear.
C. The Problems

The divergent remedial processes in the two cases are easy to
spot; the scope and judicial involvement could not be more different.
The Kansas suit involved traditional approaches to student
assignment and a general order to desegregate the assignment of
faculty. In Kansas, the parties had almost no conflict after 1981 and
judicial involvement was continuous but limited largely to approving
defendants' uncontested motions. Although USD No. 500 involved a
more limited remedy and few post-liability party disputes, the suit
lasted twenty-four years. School children across the river in Missouri,
however, had a desegregation plan that at its core included magnets
in all junior and high schools and half the elementary schools; capital
improvement plans in the nine figures; and substantial quality of
education programs. The State of Missouri funded part of the
remedy with 1.2 billion dollars, and the funding created the school
district's financial dependence on continued court supervision. The
Missouri lawsuit had active and continuous court involvement and,
for much of the litigation, serious intraparty conflict. In Jenkins,
however, the district court requested, in response to the State's
motion, a plan for ending court jurisdiction after only eight years of
overseeing the remedial plan.
Amendment's Passage Stabilizes Fundingfor Kansas City Schools, EDUC. WK., April 15,
1998, at 26.
143. See Hendrie, supra note 139. In addition, the school district plans to close five
schools, including three high schools.
144. See Hendrie, supra,note 140.
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Despite the extreme differences at both a macro and micro level
in the remedial processes, the two remedies demonstrate four
common analytic problems. First, school desegregation remedies
seem to suffer from indeterminacy-the scope of the school
desegregation suit in both cases appears limitless and what remedy
children receive appears to depend more on what side of a river they
were born than on the actual violation. Second, to the extent
determinacy exists, it exists for the benefit of the defendants, who
exercise a high degree of control over the remedial process. Third,
and relatedly, local control is becoming increasingly important, at the
expense of meaningful desegregation. Fourth and finally, the idea of
effective desegregation appears illusive. Taken together, these
factors result in a remedial process largely driven by the defendants,
with the occasional judicial involvement limited to remedial details
unresolvable by the parties and with plaintiff participation when
provided by the defendants. Further, the factors seriously impede
plaintiffs' opportunity for an effective school desegregation remedy.
In Part II, I further define these four problems and argue that the
Supreme Court's approach to public law remedies is their cause.
H. Recent Supreme Court Analysis of Public Law Remedies
This part analyzes Supreme Court precedent to argue that the
Court is contributing to the four problems identified in the two
Kansas City cases. In doing so, this Article must shift from school
desegregation to public law in general because the Supreme Court's
approach to public law remedies is generally transsubstantiveprinciples developed in one area of public law are applied in other
areas as well.145
Part II considers seven cases, decided since 1991, that address
public law remedial power, and identifies five principles that cause
the four problems identified above. In analyzing these seven cases,
145. The Supreme Court does at times speaks of remedial principles unique to

particular subject matters. In Lewis v. Casey, the Court notes the special deference
afforded to defendant prison officials. 518 U.S. 343, 362-63 (1996). The remedial analysis
in the three school desegregation cases-Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins HI-relies on the
importance of local control over public education. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
102 (1995)(Jenkins III); Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); Dowell v. Board of
Educ., 498 U.S. 237, 248 (1991). In the one voting case, Lawyer v. Departmentof Justice,
the Supreme Court noted the distinctive role of the state defendants in proposing the
voting rights remedy. 521 U.S. 567, 576-77. Even though prison officials might be entitled
to an extra level of remedial deference, local control is a critical value in school
desegregation cases, and the legislatures have a special role in crafting the voting rights
remedies, this does not mean that no transubstantiate idea of public law remedial power
exists. The differences all arise out of federalism concerns, which is a transubstantiate
principle expressed differently in different public law areas.
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Part II examines in particular their impact on school desegregation,

but many aspects of the analysis apply equally to other public law
areas.
Generally, I argue that the cases prevent a principled way for
courts to decide the scope of school desegregation injunctions (as
opposed to consent decrees) in particular and in all likelihood the
scope of all public law injunctions. The resulting remedial ambiguity
is resolved most often by the defendants, who are afforded deference
throughout the remedial process, and leaves courts with little means
with which to control the terms of the remedy. Only through consent
decrees, which require the assent of the defendants, are plaintiffs
truly afforded input into the remedial process. Because of the lack of
a meaningful definition of the right and because the defendants are
largely defining the remedy, plaintiffs have little guarantee of an
effective remedy.
A. Public Law Remedies

The Supreme Court began its analysis of public law remedies in

1955 with Brown v. Board of Education,146 and until 1979, the

Supreme Court regularly decided cases implicating public law
but not solely, 148 in the
remedial power. 47 This took place primarily,
149
context of school desegregation cases.
From 1980150 until 1990, the Court had, however, remarkably
146. 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
147. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526 (1979)(Dayton II);
Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979)(Columbus II). For two excellent
articles examining the Supreme Court's approach to public law remedies in the 1970's, see
generally Robert D. Goldstein, A Swann Song for Remedies: Equitable Relief in the Burger
Court,13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1978); Mark G. Yudof, School Desegregation:Legal
Realism, Reasoned Elaboration, and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 72
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 56 (1978).
148. See, e.g., Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682 (1979) (social security benefits);
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) (prisons); Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976)
(housing); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)(Lemon II) (voting).
149. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)(Milliken I); Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
150. In 1980, over the dissents of three Justices, the Court denied three petitions for
certiorari contending that the reach of a school desegregation remedy was excessive. See
Alexis I. DuPont Sch. Dist. v. Evans, 446 U.S. 923 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari, joined by Justices Stewart and Powell); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Reed, 445 U.S. 935 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Powell); Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 438
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted, joined
by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist); see also Mark V. Tushnet, The Supreme Court and
Race Discrimination,1967-1991: The View From the MarshallPapers,36 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 473, 508-10 (1995) (discussing the events that lead to the dismissal of certiorari in
Estes). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Davis, 454 U.S. 904, 904-07 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
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little to say about remedial power in public law cases and nothing to
say about school desegregation remedies. 151 Public law remedies in

the 1980's were principally affected by legal developments in nonremedial areas such as 152
immunity, standing, and the constitutionality
of race-conscious relief.
In 1990, the Court accepted for review two school desegregation
cases with comprehensive remedies challenged by the defendants, but
decided both cases on narrow grounds regarding enforcement
powers, rather than evaluating the remedies themselves. 153 Then in

from denial of certiorari) (arguing that Supreme Court should have accepted for review
the question of whether the school desegregation case was moot). For dissents from
earlier denials of certiorari in school desegregation cases, see Medley v. School Bd., 482
F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1172 (1974) (White, J. and Powell, J.,
dissenting), and Goss v. Board of Educ., 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1171 (1974) (White, J. and Powell, J., dissenting).
151. The most significant development in the Supreme Court regarding public law
remedial power in the 1980's was a decision holding that a court could approve a consent
decree that imposes relief beyond that compelled by the Constitution. See Local Number
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986). The Court
also held that the effect of any public law remedy on innocent parties must be "minor" or
"ancillary." See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 398-402
(1982).
Other than Local Number 93 and GeneralBuilding Contractors,the Supreme Court
had surprisingly little to say about the general scope of remedial power in public law cases
in the 1980's. The issue was mentioned, of course, but little development in the law
occurred. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111-13 (1983) (noting that
even if plaintiff had standing to seek injunctive relief, plaintiff failed to demonstrate
likelihood that defendants would use unlawful choke holds in future police stops and
noting that "[i]n exercising their equitable powers, federal courts must recognize '[t]he
special delicacy of the adjustment to be preserved between federal equitable power and
State administration of its own law"' (quoting Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120
(1951)); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 201 n.12 (1980) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (noting "the importance in a democratic society of preserving local control of
local matters").
152. See, e.g., Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986) (Eleventh Amendment immunity);
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 74 (1985) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (taxpayer standing); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (Eleventh Amendment immunity); Lyons, 461 U.S. at 11113 (standing); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,471-76 (1982) (taxpayer standing).
The Supreme Court considered, however, specific remedies for Title VI and Title VII
that raised questions as to substantive law. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n,
463 U.S. 582 (1982) (Title VI remedies); United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149 (1987)
(plurality opinion) (race conscious relief in employment discrimination case); Local
Number 28, 478 U.S. 421 (same as Paradise);Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts,
467 U.S. 561 (1984) (same as Paradise).
153. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 50-51 (1990) (Jenkins II ) (refusing to consider
the scope of an extensive school desegregation remedy but holding that a federal court
could require a defendant to levy taxes in excess of state limits to fund a constitutional
remedy); Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 280 (1990) (noting that the issue of the

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

1991, the Supreme Court returned to the public law remedial power
and, in the subsequent six-year period, decided seven cases
implicating public law remedies. The cases concern all three remedial
stages: the initial remedy, modification, and termination. Although
the seven cases involve different subject matters-school
desegregation, higher education (both race and gender), prisons, and
voting rights-the remedial approaches in each case generally apply
to other types of public law. 54
Four cases of the seven cases addressed the initial remedy.
Three cases concerned the scope of a structural injunction in response
156
to a proven violation: Lewis v. Casey,'155 United States v. Virginia,
and Missouri v. Jenkins.157 The fourth case, Lawyer v. Departmentof
Justice,'58 examined when a court may approve a proposed consent
decree without holding defendants liable.
Another case addressed modification issues. Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County159 determined when and how a consent decree may be
modified in response to changed circumstances. 6° Two other cases,
Freeman v. Pitts'6 ' and Board of Education v. Dowell,162 answered the
question of how to terminate a pending public law remedy, whether it
be a structural injunction or a consent decree. 63
Through the seven cases, the Supreme Court has developed five
principles to guide the public law remedial process, and those
remedial order in this housing and school desegregation case had earlier been denied for
consideration and holding that contempt sanctions must first be attempted against the city
to compel compliance before attempting contempt against individual city council
members); see also Friedman, supra note 13, at 757 (noting the narrow scope of both
Jenkins II and Spallone).
154. For the remedial approaches unique to particular public law subjects, see supra
note 145.
155. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
156. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
157. 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Jenkins III).
158. 521 U.S. 567 (1997).
159. 502 U.S. 367 (1992).
160. The Supreme Court recently applied the Rufo test to an injunction concerning the
use of public Title I funds in private religious schools in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203
(1997). See infra notes 271-72.
161. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
162. 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
163. Another case that should also be noted is United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717
(1992), in which plaintiffs challenged Mississippi's efforts to desegregate its public colleges
and universities. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the State had not fulfilled its
Fourteenth Amendment duty to desegregate its dual college and university system with its
adoption of race-neutral admission policies. See id. at 728. Because the Court primarily
approached the issue as one of liability, rather than as one of remedy, the case provides
little guidance on the scope of public law remedial power. Where appropriate, however,
this Article discusses Fordice. See infra notes 228,366, & 408.
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principles contribute to the four problems identified in the Kansas

City cases.
The five principles are as follows:
(1) the scope of the violation determines the scope of the

remedy;
(2) defendants deserve deference;

(3) federalism counts;
(4) through consent decrees parties can circumvent the limits on

injunctive relief; and
(5) effectiveness is sometimes too difficult to achieve.
B. The Right-Remedy Connection

The overwhelmingly dominant test for determining the scope of
an injunction (as opposed to a proposed and approved consent
decree, which is discussed below), 164 is a traditional private law
remedial principle. 165 The test can be stated in one of two ways: the
scope of the remedy is determined by the scope of the violation; or
the remedy is to place the plaintiffs in the position they would have
occupied but for the violation (referred to herein as the "rightful

position" doctrine). 166 The analysis presumes that victims can be

"made whole," meaning returned to their pre-violation status. This
Article will use the phrase the "right-remedy connection" to refer to
both formulations, for under either the right determines the
remedy. 167

The Supreme Court firmly adopts the right-remedy connection in
the recent cases. The ideas of the right determining the remedy and
the rightful position doctrine appear in Lewis v. Casey (prison
conditions),168 United States v. Virginia (gender discrimination in
164. Consent decrees are considered infra Part II.E.
165. This Article uses the term "private law" to refer to litigation that is bipolar,
retrospective, self-contained, party-initiated, and party-controlled, with the right and
remedy interdependent. See Chayes, supranote 13, at 1282-83.
166.

DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS

16 (2d ed. 1994).
167. It is unclear how the two elements differ from each other. See id. at 291. Both are
founded on corrective justice. The remedy should be compensatory, to be gauged by what
duty the defendant violated and its effect on the plaintiff. The remedy is not designed to
punish defendant, as punitive damages are, nor is the remedy a vehicle for the judge to
address more than the proven violation. Rather, the court is to confine the remedy to
correcting the legally recognizable harm caused by defendant.
168. The entire Court adopted the right-remedy connection in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 357-60 (1996) ("The remedy must of course be limited to the inadequacy that
produced the injury-in-fact that the plaintiff has established."); id. at 397 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the
district court's remedy exceeded the scope of the violation held); id. at 409 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he relief ordered by the District Court was broader than necessary to

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. so

Jenkins (school
Missouri v.
education), 169 and
higher
articulate the
desegregation). 70 Not only does the Supreme Court
171
standard, but the standard is actually deciding cases.
(1) Criticisms of Right-Remedy Connection
The right-remedy connection is a traditional approach to private
law remedies, 172 and the Supreme Court began using it for public law
The Supreme Court's recent adoption and
cases in 1971.173
application of the right-remedy connection can be viewed, therefore,
as a straightforward application of stare decisis. Yet, the Supreme
Court's approach is actually quite remarkable because the rightremedy connection has been the subject of substantial criticismfrom both the left and the right.174 The two Kansas City cases, in
redress the constitutional violations identified in the District Court's findings.").
169. In Virginia, the seven Members of the Court considering the remedy all agreed
that the right-remedy connection was the appropriate standard. See United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 547-48 (1996) ("A remedial decree, this Court has said, must
closely fit the constitutional violation; it must be shaped to place persons
unconstitutionally denied an opportunity or advantage in the position they would have
occupied in the absence of (discrimination).") (internal quotations marks and citation
omitted); id. at 565 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the rightremedy test allows either gender-neutral admission policies or comparable colleges for
both men and women).
170. In Jenkins III, the entire Court adopted the right-remedy connection, but the
dissent advocated a looser connection between the right and remedy than the majority.
Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 88 (1995) (JenkinsIII) (stating both the rightful position
and the rule that the scope of the violation determines the scope of the remedy); id. at 15355 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating and applying the right-remedy connection). The
Supreme Court also stated the right-remedy connection in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk
County Jail, a case concerning modification of the public law remedy. 502 U.S. 367, 389
(1992).
171. The Court adopted the doctrine to limit the remedy in Lewis to two prison
facilities. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360. The Court employed the doctrine also to rule that
the State's program for women in Virginia was inadequate. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 548.
Further, the Court used the doctrine to rule "desegregative attractiveness" an
impermissible school used goal. See Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 100. The application of the
right-remedy connection by the Supreme Court is discussed further infra notes 198-202
and accompanying text.
172. See Wicker v. Hoppock, 73 U.S. 94, 99 (1867) ("The general rule is, that when a
wrong has been done, and the law gives a remedy, the compensation shall be equal to the
injury.... The injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would
have occupied if the wrong had not been committed.").
173. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1,16 (1971).
174. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Supreme Court 1981 Term-Foreword:Public Law
Litigationand the Burger Court,96 HARV. L. REV. 4,55 (1982) (suggesting that the Court
has "more or less given up the effort" of forming any "systematic substantive limitations
on the scope of relief"); Fiss, supra note 11, at 46-48 (characterizing the right-remedy as a
test that "fundamentally misleads" and "gives us an impoverished notion of remedy");
Friedman, supra note 13, at 747 (arguing that the right-remedy test is "vague and
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which the judges followed the right-remedy connection, likewise

demonstrate problems with the right-remedy connection, as do Casey,
Virginia, and Jenkins. The right-remedy test leaves district courts
with almost no framework from which to rule on remedial orders,
creating remedial ambiguity and a gap in judicial remedy authority.
This Article argues that the right-remedy connection achieves this

result through its extreme indeterminacy and its failure to recognize
the special role of proximate cause and group rights in public law
litigation.
(a) Indeterminacy
The first problem is the test's indeterminacy. 175 Stating that the
scope of the injunction will be defined by the scope of the violation
and will be confined to restoring the victims to their rightful place
reveals very little about what the remedy should be. This loose

standard does not logically compel a particular result, thus permitting
a great deal of unrestricted discretion. This indeterminacy arises
from the standard's presumption that the right is definable-without
reference to its remedies-and that a right-remedy connection exists
in public law cases.

somewhat indeterminate... [and] permit[s] courts to do pretty much what they want");
John Leubsdorf, Completing the DesegregationRemedy, 57 B.U. L. REV. 39, 83, 85 (1977)
(describing the test as "so trite that it is hard to see how it could either enlighten or cause
controversy"); Robert F. Nagel, Controlling the StructuralInjunction, 7 HARV. J. L. &
PUB. POL'Y 395, 402-03 (1984) (arguing that the Supreme Court has never articulated a
constitutional standard in school desegregation or prison litigation); Nagel, supra note 11,
at 715 (critiquing the right-remedy connection as "indeterminate"); Kent Roach, The
Limits of Corrective Justice and the Potential of Equity in Constitutional Remedies, 33
ARIz. L. REv. 859, 879 (1991) (criticizing the right-remedy connection for its lack of
honesty); Sturm, supra note 4, at 1389 n.185 (quoting Professor Abram Chayes as writing
that "'[then] Justice Rehnquist has mounted a serious effort to reimpose the right-remedy
linkage as a way of limiting the power of judges.... [P]reoccupation with the right-remedy
analysis has prevented the Court from developing any other basis for effective supervision
of the remedial discretion of trial courts."') (quoting Abram Chayes, Rights and Remedies
in Public Law Litigation 47 (unpublished manuscript)); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1127, 1132,
1172 (describing the right-remedy connection as "Delphic"); see also Missouri v. Jenkins,
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("The standard reduces to
515 U.S. 70, 134 (1995) (Jenkins III)
what one believes is a 'fair' remedy, or what vaguely appears to be a good 'fit' between
imposing the constraints on the equity power.").
175. The law of remedies, perhaps by definition, suffers from some indeterminacy.
Professor Paul Gewirtz has defined remedies as "a jurisprudence of deficiency, of what is
lost between declaring a right and implementing a remedy." Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 587;
see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-retroactivity, and
ConstitutionalRemedies, 104 HARV. L. REV.1731,1778 (1991) ("ITihe law of remedies is
inherently a jurisprudence of deficiency."). Others have declared that "[t]o think of
remedies necessarily plunges us into a study of uncertainty." Leubsdorf, supra note 174, at
133.
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(i) The PublicLaw Right

Public law fights are largely defined through their remedies. By
way of contrast, first consider private law rights and remedies.
Private law rights are typically definable without reference to their
remedies. For example, to declare that individuals have the right to
be free of battery is relatively straightforward: a person should be free
from unwanted, intentional touching. 76 The definition of the right is
by its terms definite and self-contained. Courts need say nothing
about the77 remedy for battery and still fully explain the right
involved.
Public law rights are quite different. Their definition has
depended in large part on how the court defines the remedy. For
example, the Supreme Court in Brown I concluded, pursuant to the
Fourteenth Amendment, "that in the field of public education the
doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place."' 78 Knowing that the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from establishing "separate
but equal" schools based on race tells us little about the nature of the

right. 179 What does it mean to be free from racial discrimination in

public schools? Do children have a right to attend an integrated
school; or a more limited right to attend an integrated school to the
extent feasible using the students within the school district lines; or
an even more limited right to attend schools with race-neutral
attendance zones? In addition, does the right include anything other
than student assignment? At a minimum, the establishment of
separate school systems included unequal facilities, assignment of
teachers and principals on the basis of race, and unequal funding.
These questions go unanswered in Brown I, with its pronouncement
of the right, to be answered (somewhat) in subsequent remedial
decisions. In short, the Supreme Court has used the remedy to
define, in part, the school desegregation right.
Another way to approach the issue is to argue that the public law
right is easily manipulated, and the right-remedy test allows courts to
manipulate their definition of the right to produce the desired
remedy. 80 Consider United States v. Virginia.'81 At issue was the all176. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,

PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §

9, at 39 (5th ed. 1984).
177. Whether that right has much meaning independent of its remedy is another matter
altogether, but what the right affords is clear without reference to its remedies.
178. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954)(Brown I).
179. The meaning of the right declared in Brown I, for example, has been the source of
continuing debate. See, e.g., the articles cited supra at note 2.
180. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 659-60 ("[Tlhe even more formidable-perhaps
impossible-task facing courts is to design remedies that enforce a particular right rather
than, in effect, create different rights depending on which remedy is chosen."). See
generally Goldstein, supra note 147.
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male admission policy for Virginia Military Institute (VMI), a public
college. While most of the opinion was devoted to holding that the
Commonwealth of Virginia discriminated against women by
operating VMI, part of the opinion addressed defendants' remedy for
the violation-a separate program exclusively for women, the
Virginia Women's Institute for Leadership (VWIL), located at a
private school for women, Mary Baldwin College. 182
The seven members discussing the scope of the remedy all
agreed that the remedy must place the victims in the position they
183
would have been in "but for" the violation (the rightful position).
Yet, the articulated remedial standard depended on the application of
a very uncertain term-what were the rights of the women denied
admission to VMI?
Justice Ginsburg, for the Court, defined the violation as the
exclusion of women who were interested in VMI's special program.
To remedy this exclusion, these women should be afforded the
opportunity of admission into VMI. The scope of the violation would
then equal the scope of the violation1 84
Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed. He defined the violation as
"not the 'exclusion of women' ...but the maintenance of an all-men
school without providing any-much less a comparable-institution
for women."1 85 Thus, the remedy for Chief Justice Rehnquist need
not necessarily be women cadets at VMI or an all-women VMI-like
program. The remedy instead could be a separate, but comparable,
school for women, 186 a standard which Mary Baldwin failed.' 87 In
sum, given the uncertainty over the right to be free from gender
discrimination (and the meaning of most public law rights), courts can
manipulate their definition of the right to produce any desired
remedial options.
The Kansas City school desegregation cases also demonstrate
how the right, and thus the remedy under the right-remedy
connection, lacks definition and is subject to manipulation. In the
181. 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
182. See idat 526.
at 565 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in the judgment).
183. See id at 547-48; id.
184. See id.at 550-51 ("It is on behalf of these women that the United States has
instituted this suit, and it is for them that a remedy must be crafted, a remedy that will end
their exclusion from a state-supplied educational opportunity for which they are fit, a
decree that will 'bar like discrimination in the future."') (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v. Louisiana, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965)). The Court compared the VWIL
approach to that of the State of Texas when Herman Sweatt sued to gain admission to the
University of Texas School of Law and the State of Texas established the Texas State
University for Negroes. See id at 553-54.
185. See id. at 565 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring in judgment).
186. See id.
187. See id.
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Kansas suit the remedy included nothing about quality of
education, 188 while Missouri school children received extensive
quality of education remedies. The difference in the remedies can be
explained on the grounds that the Kansas district court judge found
no fault with the educational offerings of USD No. 500, while the
Missouri district court judge found a causal relationship between de
jure system and achievement scores. Yet, this justification begs the
question of why the district courts reached different conclusions
about the connection between unlawful school segregation and
achievement.
The difference can best be explained by the differences in initial
litigation strategy. No party in the Kansas suit even alleged inequities
in quality of education, while every party in Jenkins argued such
disparities. Yet, it is hardly plausible that the Missouri de jure system
had an impact on student achievement but the Kansas de jure system
did not. The hallmark of unlawful school systems was the unequal
treatment of children according to their race, which surely had an
impact on student achievement. The different remedial categories in
the two Kansas city cases suggest that the school desegregation right
is manipulable by the parties, and thus so is the school desegregation
remedy. Children on the Missouri side of the Kansas River received
a wide range of programs designed to increase their achievement: a
systemwide magnet program, attainment of AAA status, reduction of
class size, summer school, full day kindergarten, tutoring, early
childhood development programs, staff development, and effective
school programs, while students on the Kansas side received
nothing. 189 As a result, it appears that what remedy a student receives
depends more on where the student lives, and what the parties
request and the court grants, than on the actual violation and its
effects. 90
188. See supraPart I.B.1.a.
189. See supraPart I.B.1.
190. It is true that the judge in USD No. 500 found the quality of education
"impressive," and that the plaintiff in USD No. 500 made no claims regarding quality of
education in the liability phase, while the judge in Jenkins found inequities based upon the
presented evidence. It is also true that no nationwide model of de jure segregation exists.
In fact, differences should be expected. No school desegregation suit is the same: different
lawyers, patterns of housing segregation, white flight, facilities, school boards, and
community groups prevent a cookie cutter approach to school desegregation. See Milliken
v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 287 (1977)(Milliken II) (recognizing that no school district
remedy can be a "blueprint" for another, factually different school district); Green v.
County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,439 (1968) (noting in school desegregation case that "there
is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case"). The same is true for any type
of institutional reform litigation. Different facts produce different remedies. See Fiss,
supra note 11, at 51 ("Such a varying remedial pattern has, in fact, emerged, but it does
not seem to me to be objectionable, for these may well be differences between the various
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(ii) The Connection between Right and Remedy

Related is the issue of the connection between public law right
and remedy. The right-remedy test and the rightful position both
presume a close connection-that the remedy flows logically from the
right. This connection would in fact enable judges to demonstrate
that they were exercising appropriate judicial behavior, and not
making policy decisions better left to other governmental entities.
Yet, even proponents of public law remedies readily concede the
loose connection between the public law right and public law
remedy.' 91 For example, declaring that school children have a right
not to be separated by race in public schools says little about how to
remedy past segregation or how to ensure future compliance with the
Equal Protection Clause. That right also does not answer the
question of whether the appropriate remedy is race-neutral admission
standards or cross-town busing192 In part, this is not surprising given

the lack of definition of the right. Even the facts proving a violation
are of little assistance in determining the appropriate remedy. 193
The right at issue is not, however, irrelevant in determining the
communities that justify the different treatment."). Yet, the essence of dejure segregation
must include some impact on quality of education. Students were segregated according to
their race into schools with unequal resources, and resources are important only because
of their impact on quality of education and student achievement.
191. See Chayes, supra note 13, at 1293-94, 1298-1302 (1976) ("The form of relief does
not flow ineluctably from the liability determination, but is fashioned ad hoc."); Diver,
supra note 11, at 50 ("Pronouncing [public law] rights, however, does nothing to illuminate
the remedy."); Fiss, supra note 11, at 47 (acknowledging only a loose connection between
right and remedy); Goldstein, supra note 147, at 4-5 ("In public law litigation, there has
been a deepening bifurcation of the liability and remedy stages of the lawsuit, with the
result that once a right and violation have been found, the judge may exercise broad
discretion to order a wide range of innovative, experimental, and intrusive remedies.").
192. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 652 (describing the choices to desegregate schools as
"virtually limitless"). Professor Susan Sturm makes a similar point about the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment:
Should the court order the defendants to hire more guards, reduce the prison
population, establish screening and training programs for guards, eliminate the
inmate trustee system, introduce work and educational programs, improve the
classification system, restrict the movement of inmates in the prison or require
unit management? There is no single correct remedial approach dictated by the
eighth amendment [sic].
Sturm, supra note 4, at 1363. Likewise, the right to be free from employment
discrimination does not reveal whether the remedy should be achievement of a particular
ratio of employees (by race, national origin, or gender) or whether the remedy should be
achievement of non-discriminatory hiring and employment system. See Thomas W.
Bergdall, A Practioner'sGuide to Injunctive Civil Rights Settlements and Consent Decrees,
531 PLIILrr 305, 342-43 (1995); see also Fiss, supra note 11, at 48 (arguing that the rightremedy test "obscures the need for a choice, and the fact that the remedial phase of a
structural suit is largely devoted to making that choice").
193. Sturm, supranote 4, at 1364.
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remedy. Public law right and remedy are connected; but the remedy
does not arise solely from the right. Public rights "provide only the
goals and boundaries for the remedial decision."' 94 The right is
defined in part by the remedy, and the remedy is defined in part by
the right. In other words, there is no line clearly separating the two;
the two are not separate categories, but are overlapping.
The two Kansas City cases, which "applied" the right-remedy
connection, demonstrate the loose connection between right and
remedy.' 95 In neither case did the court define the right separate
from the remedy. The violations were defined generally-i.e., the
establishment of de jure schools and, in the case of Jenkins, the
provision of unequal resources-but not in a concrete way to lead to
the remedy. Rather, the liability rulings only established the
categories of relief to be considered. In Kansas, the liability holdings
on student and faculty assignment meant that the remedy would focus
on these two categories.1 96 Likewise, in Missouri, the broad range of

vestiges determined in the remedy hearing ensured that the remedy
would focus on the identified vestiges. 97 But other than identifying
the categories to consider, the right provided little guidance on the
actual remedy to be afforded.
The recent Supreme Court cases also demonstrate that the test
can be used only to include or exclude particular categories of relief
and provides little other guidance.
For example, at issue in Lewis v. Casey 98 was the access to courts
afforded to Arizona prisoners, a right protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court had
made clear in the earlier case of Bounds v. Smith. 199 The Supreme
Court held that the district court's systemwide remedy covering all
Arizona prison facilities exceeded the violation because the violation
concerned only two particular prison facilities.2°° But the rightremedy connection gave no guidance on what the remedy in the two
194. Sturm, supra note 4, at 1364, 1377; see also Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 678-79
("There is a permeable wall between rights and remedies.").
195. The major remedial order in each case relied upon the right-remedy connection.
See United States v. Unified Sch.Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas,
No. KC-3738, at 7 (D. Kan. June 8, 1977); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23 (W.D.
Mo. 1985), affd in relevantpart,807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986).
196. See supra Parts I.A.1, I.B.l.a.
197. See supra Parts I.A.2, I.B.l.b.
198. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
199. 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (holding that "the fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and
filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or
adequate assistance from persons trained in the law"). Specifically, in Lewis, plaintiffs
complained of their access to legal research materials. See 518 U.S. at 346-47.
200. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 360 n.7.
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institutions should include or on how specifically compliance with
Bounds can be achieved. Likewise, in United States v. Virginia,201 the
Court reveals little about what the admission of women to VMI
should actually entail. The details of the admission to women to VMI
are critical; yet, the right-remedy test provides no guidance. 2°2
In sum, the standard of the scope of the right determining the
scope of the remedy depends on a definable right, separate from any
remedy, and also a connection between right and remedy. For once
the right is not definable apart from its remedy, then the scope of the
right is not determining the remedy. Further, if the connection
between right and remedy is loose, then the right cannot determine
the remedy. As a result, factors other than the definition of the right
must be considered in determining the remedy. The right-remedy
connection, although it appears to permit little "choice" in crafting
the remedy, actually allows a great deal of choice because of its
indeterminacy.
(b) Causation
The right-remedy connection is also problematic because it
depends on a causation analysis that is all but impossible in the public
law case. The dependence on proximate cause is most clearly
demonstrated by the rightful position doctrine: that the remedy is to
place the plaintiffs in the position they would have occupied but for
the violation. In a breach of contract case, for example, it is usually
possible to ascertain the position the buyer would be in "but for" the
201. 518 U.S. 515 (1996); see supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
202. In admitting women to VMI, the district court, for example, had to decide whether
separate bathrooms would be established, how the physical safety of women cadets would
be provided, what physical standards would be imposed on women, and whether different
grooming standards would be afforded. See Robert O'Harrow, Jr., VMI Report Sets Rule
for Women; Jewelry, Makeup, Crew Cuts Covered,THE WASH. POST, May 29, 1997, at D3
(discussing VM's proposal on how to modify its programs for enrollment of women).
The doctrine was also used to exclude a category of relief in the Kansas City, Missouri
school desegregation case. The Supreme Court held that the remedial goal of
"desegregative attractiveness" was impermissible under the right-remedy test. The state
defendants had challenged the salary increases ordered for almost all school district
employees. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 81 (1995)(Jenkins Ill). The salary
increase was ordered partially on the grounds of "desegregative attractiveness"--the goal
of attracting white students into the majority African-American school system, thereby
increasing the level of integration in the school district. See id. at 81. The Court (per
Chief Justice Rehnquist) held that the remedial goal of desegregative attractiveness
exceeded the scope of the violation. The violation held by the district court was deemed
to be purely intradistrict (i.e., the violation was confined within the borders of the
KCMSD boundary lines), while "desegregative attractiveness" was an interdistrict remedy
(i.e., the goal of the remedy exceeds the borders of KCMSD school district). See id. at 9192. For an argument that the remedy was not interdistrict, but intradistrict, see Joondeph,
supra note 4, at 630-36.
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seller's breach. 2 3 With public law, such reconstruction of a but-forposition provides, however, little meaningful information.
For example, courts cannot possibly know what a school district
would look like absent de jure segregation. Determining all the
effects of segregating students by race-the effects on the school
district, on all individual school children, and on private actors-is an
insurmountable task.204 It is even less clear how a court could
magically create205a world free of all the unlawful effects of defendants'
discrimination.
203. This is not to suggest that proximate cause is always easy in a private law case.
The argument is more narrow: proximate cause is often useful in determining the private
law remedy.
204. Justice Scalia readily admitted the limits of proximate cause in Freeman v. Pitts, a
school desegregation case. See 503 U.S. 467 (1992) He argued that "[r]acially imbalanced
schools are... the product of a blend of public and private actions, and any assessment
that they would not be segregated, or would not be as segregated, in the absence of a
particular one of those factors[,] is guesswork." Id.at 503 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Epstein, supra note 4, at 1111-15 (arguing that "the inability to disentangle the remote
causes of the present situation renders unworkable the traditional causal inquiries"). The
difficulties of proximate cause in school desegregation is further explored supra Part
II.B.2.c.
205. One law review article described the problem well:
First, it makes an evidentiary assumption that social science can construct a
precise model of what the world would have looked like if the discriminatory
conduct had not occurred. This requires a district court to construct complex
causal chains ....But, even if such chains could be developed in some instances,
the moral effects of illegal government activity on private behavior could hardly
be factored into sociologist's multivariate equation. Second, the Court's analysis
depends on a peculiarly narrow conception of 'cure' in matters of complex social
change. The Court's notion of 'make-whole relief' assumes that reconstruction
of a previous condition, the status quo ante, is possible. The idea that cure
involves neither growth nor change but merely restoration is unrealistic. For
cure requires new adaptions and wholeness demands response to new conditions.
Goldstein, supra note 147, at 42. The causation problem remains, even if the Supreme
Court had ordered in Brown II to desegregate now, rather than with "all deliberate
speed." Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955)(Brown II). Although the
causation analysis would have been simplified by the smaller gap in time between the
unlawful system created by state or local law and the beginning of the remedial process,
the problem of defining all the effects and "re-creating" a world without the effects of de
jure segregation remains. See LOUIs MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNET,
REMNANTS OF BELIEF: CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 112 (1996) (noting
that "it is not readily apparent" what baseline the courts should use in evaluating
compliance with Brown); Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty:
JurisdictionalFormationand Racial Segregation,49 STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1388 (1997) ("As
a matter of causation, one cannot neatly sever 'private choice' from government
imposition, since government helped to create the context in which the private choices
occur."); Leubsdorf, supra note 174, at 135-37 ("Plainly, such questions cannot be
answered with any reliability except by those possessing a time machine."); Michael Selmi,
Proving Intentional Discrimination:The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. LJ.
279, 280-81 (1997) ("Our current and past discrimination deprive us of the kind of
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As discussed below, the two Kansas City cases demonstrated the

futility of a meaningful causation analysis.2°6 In short, the rightremedy test depends on a knowable and ascertainable proximate
cause connection between the violation and its effects, but proximate

cause is rarely a useful concept in public law litigation.
(c) Group Rights

A third criticism of the right-remedy connection is that it
presumes that the relief is directed at individual plaintiffs.

The

rightful position doctrine focuses on restoring particular victims of the
unlawful behavior to their rightful position, but public law remedies
are typically directed at groups. 2 7 Individual plaintiffs may not
receive any remedy, or individuals may benefit from the remedy even
though they are not victims of the violation. For example, in school
desegregation children receive no remedy if the remedy is ordered
after they graduate, drop-out, or transfer from the school.20 8 Further,

the remedy provides benefits to those who were not the victims of the
defendant's unlawful acts. Children who transfer into a school district
undergoing school desegregation, for example, are not excluded from
the remedy; white children regularly receive benefits as well. Thus,
some individualized harms are ignored altogether, while other
individuals receive a remedy even though by definition they are
2°9
outside of the victim class.
This, in fact, further complicates the proximate cause analysis
required by the rightful position doctrine; the victims of the initial
violation are different from those receiving the remedy. Further, the
right-remedy test requires that courts misconceive the very nature of
information that would be necessary to evaluate the reality of a nondiscriminatory
world.").
206. See infra notes 372-96 and accompanying text.
207. See Fiss, supra note 11, at 19 ("The victim of a structural suit is not an individual,
but a group."); Yoo, supra note 4, at 1136 ("The injured plaintiff was replaced by social
groups."). Brown I has been identified as particularly concerned with group rights. See
SEIDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 205, at 104-6 (1996). This concept of group rights is
increasingly at odds with the Supreme Court's recent interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause in affirmative action cases, which focuses on the rights of the individual,
not the group. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
208' See Friedman, supra note 13, at 743, 746-47 (noting that prospective orders "often
take years to achieve and thus do absolutely nothing to compensate the high school
student who brought the suit").
209. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,110-11 (Jenkins Ill)(O'Connor, J., concurring)
(noting that "some who did not suffer under-and, indeed, may have even profited frompast segregation" were beneficiaries of the Jenkins remedy); Epstein, supra note 4, at 1113
(noting that in Jenkins "none of the current beneficiaries of the [remedy] fall into even the
most capacious definition of the injured class"); Fiss, supra note 11, at 21 ("In the
structural context ...the victims and beneficiaries need not be coextensive.").

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

what the public law right requires. The test instructs a focus on an
individual in devising a remedy, when the presence of the individual
right is the exception rather than the rule.
In sum, the right-remedy test provides little guidance for the
contours of the remedy, for it presumes an independently definable
right that also defines the remedy and a causation analysis that are
rarely present in public law litigation. Further, the test is oriented
toward individual harms, but public law rights and remedies are
directed toward groups.
(2) Supreme Court's Commitment to the Right-Remedy Connection

In light of the widespread criticism and obvious indeterminacy of
the right-remedy connection, it is surprising that the Supreme Court
has continued to employ the test to "decide" the scope of the
injunction. Yet, not only has the right-remedy connection survived,
the Supreme Court has actually strengthened the principle in three
ways. First, the Court has extended the connection's "make-whole"
premise-that the victims can be restored to their "whole" previolation state -to the test for termination. The other two ways
concern the Court's treatment of judicial discretion and proximate
cause. To argue that the right-remedy connection has been
"strengthened" does not mean that the right-remedy has actually
gained in its prescriptive capacity. Rather, the Supreme Court's
treatment of judicial discretion and proximate cause has added to the
reach of the right-remedy connection, but the principle still does not
help decide the remedy.
(a) Termination Standards
Two school desegregation cases concerning when to terminate
the public law remedy are premised upon principles underlying the
right-remedy connection. The standard for termination, although
developed in the context of school desegregation, has been applied to
other types of institutional reform litigation.210 In Board of Education
v. Dowell,211 the Supreme Court considered whether the school
desegregation lawsuit against the Oklahoma City school district could
end. The school district had operated under a school desegregation
210. See Johnson v. Heffron, 88 F.3d 404, 407 (6th Cir. 1996) (prison conditions);
United States v. City of Miami, 2 F.3d 1497, 1505 (11th Cir. 1993)(employment
discrimination); Consumer Advisory Bd. v. Glover, 989 F.2d 65, 67 (1st Cir.
1993)(conditions at state institution for mentally retarded); Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925
F.2d 954,960-61 (6th Cir. 1991) (employment discrimination).
211. 498 U.S. 237 (1991). For a detailed examination of Dowell, see Brown, supra note
2, at 21-25, and for a description of the drafting of Dowell based on Justice Thurgood
Marshall's papers, see SIEDMAN & TUSHNET, supra note 205, at 511-12.
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decree requiring busing for thirteen years. The defendants argued

that jurisdiction in the case had already ended and that they could
operate, without judicial permission, "neighborhood" schools.2 12 The
Court held that the lawsuit could end, even if the schools remained
segregated or would become segregated after compliance with the
courts' orders ended. To terminate court supervision, defendant must
prove, among other factors, 213 that it has eliminated "the vestiges of
past discrimination... to the extent practicable.
2 5

'214

In Freeman v.

the school desegregation case for DeKalb County, Georgia,
the Supreme Court re-affirmed Dowell's test for terminating the
public law suit.216
Requiring the elimination of vestiges of discrimination is
founded on the same premise of the right-remedy connection: that
plaintiffs are entitled to and can receive "make whole" reliefmeaning that the remedy should strive for returning the plaintiffs to
the position they would have occupied but for the violation. When
Pitts, 1

this occurs, the plaintiffs are made whole. This approach requires, in

part, that the present day effects of the past violation be both
identifiable and redressable so that the plaintiffs are returned to their
rightful position.
The termination test, by requiring the elimination of the vestiges
of the prior unlawful activity, assumes the availability of make whole
212. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242.
213. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text (articulating the three-part test for
termination).
214. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. Before, the Court had directed defendants to achieve
"the greatest possible degree of actual desegregation." Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971). To achieve dismissal of the suit, a defendant must also
prove that it has "complied in good faith with the desegregation decree since it was
entered" and that it would not "return to its former ways," and if defendant so proved, it
was no longer a dual school system, but had achieved "unitary status." Dowell, 498 U.S. at
247-50. In considering the appropriate standard for terminating relief, the Supreme Court
had to consider the application of the "grievous wrong" standard of United States v. Swift
& Company, 286 U.S. 106 (1932). The court of appeals had held that the school
desegregation remedy remained in effect until a school district could show "grievous
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions." Dowell v. Board of Educ., 890 F.2d
1483, 1490 (10th Cir. 1989)(quoting United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932)),
rev'd, 498 U.S. 237 (1991). The Supreme Court rejected the grievous wrong standard as
inconsistent with the temporary nature of institutional reform litigation and with "the
allocation of powers within our federal system." Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248. Likewise, in
Rufo, the Court rejected the grievous wrong standard for determining when a
modification should be afforded. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367,393
(1992); infra note 269.
215. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). For a detailed discussion of Freeman, see Brown, supra note
2, at 25-30.
216. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 491; see also Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 89
(1995)(Jenkins I) (stating the three-part test from Dowell).
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relief. For the suit to end, defendants must prove the absence of (or
impracticability of redressing) present day effects of their past
unlawful acts. For if the effects of the violation continue, then the
remedy should continue. The test, in other words, depends on the
remedy being able to make whole the victims of the violation and the
defendants' ability to define and redress the present day effects of the
past violation, as with the rightful position. In this crucial respect, the
termination test presumes the217impossible, the availability and
definability of make-whole relief.
(b) Judicial Discretion

Through the treatment of judicial discretion, the Supreme Court
has further demonstrated its commitment to the right-remedy
connection. Prior to cases decided in the 1990's, the Supreme Court
judged the scope of an injunction not just by the right-remedy
connection, but also according to the idea of equitable discretion and
with appellate court deference to district courts. These additional
tests limited the reach of the right-remedy connection because they
legitimized and protected district courts' making of judicial, remedial
choices. The right-remedy connection, on the other hand, presumes a
legally compelled result, reachable by any court through impartial,
judicial logic. Recently, however, the Supreme Court has all but
disavowed equitable discretion and deference to district courts, and
thus has increased the reach of the right-remedy connection.
Before 1990, the Supreme Court often held that in determining
the scope of injunctive relief, a court was to be guided by "broad"
equitable discretion.218 According to the equitable discretion analysis,
public law remedies have inherent "breadth and flexibility," 219 and it
is the judge's equitable discretion that guides the choice in
determining the remedy. The court is not confined to a definition of
the right at issue, or even to the concerns of the parties before it: "In
equity, as nowhere else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the
practical realities and necessities inescapably involved in reconciling
competing interests ... .,,220 Through their equitable discretion,
217. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the significant weaknesses of the right-remedy
connection).
218. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). See
generally John R. Kroger, Supreme Court Equity, 1789-1835, and the History of American
Judging, 34 Hous. L. REv. 1425 (1998) (examining the historical antecedents to the
remedial equitable power announced in Brown II). For a strong defense of equity in
public law litigation, see Roach, supra note 174, at 862-64; and for a historical treatment of
equity concluding that equity power in public law litigation is problematic, see Yoo, supra
note 4, at 1151-66.
219. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 15.
220. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201 (1973) (Lemon II); see also id. at 200
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courts can weigh the competing interests presented by the case and
221

determine the appropriate remedy.
Throughout the 1970's, sometimes even within the same opinion,
the Supreme Court would apply the right-remedy connection to rule a
remedy excessive and also apply equitable discretion to uphold a

remedy that on its face violated the right-remedy connection.222 As a
result, Supreme Court opinions were noted for their "confusion"' 3

and inconsistencies. 224
Relatedly, the Supreme Court in the past has required deference
to district court judges. Specifically, appellate courts were required to
afford a district court's remedy some unspecified level of deference,
apart from the clearly erroneous standard applied to factual

("Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special
blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable.") (footnote omitted);
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 375 (1977) ("In devising
and implementing remedies under Title VII, no less than in formulating any equitable
decree, a court must draw on the 'qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation between the public interest
and private needs as well as between competing private claims."') (quoting Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,329-30 (1944)).
221. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 372 ("Because the class of victims may include some
who did not apply for line-driver jobs as well as those who did, and because more than one
minority employee may have been denied each line-driver vacancy, the court will be
required to balance the equities of each minority employee's situation in allocating the
limited number of vacancies that were discriminatorily refused to class members.").
222. The classic example of conflict within a single case is Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), and the classic example of conflict
between two cases is Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)(Milliken II) and Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974)(Milliken I).
Professor Gewirtz explains the inconsistency as depending on what sorts of interests
are determinative for the court. He defines the two approaches as Rights Maximizing and
Interest Balancing. See Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 588-89. Rights Maximizing focuses
exclusively on providing the most effective remedy possible for the plaintiff; all other
matters must yield to providing a most effective remedy for the plaintiff. See iL at 591-92.
Interest Balancing, on the other hand, considers not just remedial effectiveness for the
plaintiffs, but also other "social interests ...[that] may justify some sacrifice of achievable
remedial effectiveness." Id.at 591. Professor Gewirtz further explains that "[tihese two
approaches separate two points of view that frequently are blurred in analyzing equitable
remedies: that of victims of the violation who seek to eliminate its effects, and that of
persons who bear the costs of remedying the violation and may seek to limit their
burdens." Id.
Professor Laycock makes a related point about the different approaches in all types
of injunctive cases-one tradition of focusing on the rightful position, another tradition
focusing on achieving "equity." He explains that the "two traditions can fairly be thought
of as poles on a single continuum describing the extent of the trial judge's discretion."
LAYCOCK, supranote 166, at 271.
223. Yudof, supra note 147, at 87.
224. See Goldstein, supra note 147, at 26-43.
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The trial judges not only heard the evidence first hand

but, more importantly, they lived with the cases over a long period,
thereby developing expertise. This deference to district court judges,
like the equitable discretion analysis, recognized and legitimized the
idea of judicial discretion guiding the remedial process. Thus, choices
were to be made, and courts, particularly district courts, were
permitted explicitly to make these choices.

Interestingly, since 1991, the ideas of equitable discretion and
district court discretion have had a negligible impact on the remedial
calculus3 -6 The idea of judicial choice is no longer recognized. As a
result, the right-remedy connection, with its presumption of legally
compelled remedies, has an even stronger reach in determining the
remedy.

In five of the seven recent cases addressing public law remedial
power-Lawyer,Lewis, Virginia, Rufo, and Dowell-the concepts of
equitable discretion and district court discretion deserved no mention
in the majority opinions, although they occasionally arose in nonmajority opinions. 227 Further, the Supreme Court readily rejected
225. See, e.g., United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 184 (1987) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion); see also id. (noting a district court's "firsthand experience with the parties [which
makes it] best qualified to deal with the 'flinty, intractable realities of day-to-day
implementation of constitutional commands' (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ. 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971))); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 688 (1978) ("[T1he
exercise of discretion in this case is entitled to special deference because of the trial
judge's years of experience with the problem at hand and his recognition of the limits on a
federal court's authority in a case of this kind."); Lemon II, 411 U.S. at 200 ("In shaping
equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power, appellate review is
correspondingly narrow."); Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 466 (1972)
(determining that the school desegregation remedy "is a delicate task that is aided by a
sensitivity to local conditions, and the judgment is primarily the responsibility of the
district judge"); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955)(Brown II)("Because of
their proximity to local conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts
which originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal."). Part of the
reason for discretion to lower courts has been described as "inescapable... [because]
[u]nlike the relief granted in most traditional lawsuits, the appropriate remedy in
institutional actions generally cannot be derived directly from the nature of the
defendant's unlawful conduct." Fallon, supranote 13, at 41.
226. Likewise, the Supreme Court has curtailed the reach of equity in public law cases
by its decisions concerning non-remedial areas as well, i.e., abstention, standing, implied
rights of action, and party joinder devices. See generally Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., No Final
Victories: The Incompleteness of Equity's Triumph in Federal Public Law, 59 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105 (1993).
227. The clearest support for equitable discretion can be found in Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992).
There she argued that "the District Court took too narrow a view of its own discretion,"
and emphasized a particular need for appellate deference to district courts judges who
have "effectively been overseeing a large public institution over a longer period of time."
Id at 394-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Equitable discretion also arose in two non-
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district courts' remedial orders, 2 affording them no particular
deference. Even when approving a district court, the Court placed
little, if any, importance on equitable discretion or deference to
district courts.229
Equitable discretion was deemed worthy of mention in only two
In Freeman, the Supreme Court
school desegregation cases.
affirmatively afforded equitable discretion to the district court.P0
majority opinions in Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 393, 404 (1996). Justices Souter's and
Justice Stevens' separate opinions noted the equitable discretion afforded to district courts
in crafting the remedy, but did not examine the role of discretion in considering the
particular order before the Court. See id. Justice Souter reasoned that "the state of
evidence simply left the District Court without an adequate basis for the exercise of its
equitable discretion in issuing an order covering the entire system." Id. at 397 (Souter, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). In faulting the
majority for deciding issues beyond that pursued by the defendants in ways that benefit
the defendants, Justice Stevens argued that "allowing... [defendant] to prevail in a forum
that is not as inhibited by precedent as are other federal courts, the Court's decision
undermines the authority and equitable powers of not only this District Court, but District
Courts throughout the Nation." Id at 414 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. The Supreme Court rejected the approach of the district court in United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 558 (1996)(rejecting the remedy approved in United States v.
Virginia, 852 F. Supp. 471, 485 (W.D. Va. 1994), affid and remanded, 44 F.3d 1229, 1230
(4th Cir. 1995)); Lewis, 518 U.S. at 364 (rejecting the remedy approved in Casey v. Lewis,
834 F. Supp. 1553, 1569 (D. Ariz. 1992), affd in part,vacatedand remanded in part,43 F.3d
1261, 1272 (9th Cir. 1994)); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 100 (1995)(Jenkins HI)
(rejecting the remedy approved in unpublished opinions by the district court); Rufo, 502
U.S. at 393 (rejecting the district court's use of the "grievous wrong" standard in denying
the requested modification in Inmates of Suffolk County Jailv. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561,
566 (D. Mass.), affd, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 1990)). The Supreme Court also rejected the
district court's approval of race-neutral admission policies to desegregate Mississippi's
public colleges and universities. See United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 743 (1992)
(reversing Ayers v. Allain, 674 F. Supp. 1523, 1554 (N.D. Miss. 1987)), affd, 914 F.2d 676,
678 (5th Cir. 1990)).
229. Lawyer v. Department of Justice was a direct appeal from a three-judge district
court to the Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the district court's factual findings and
legal holdings. See 521 U.S. 567 (1997) (affig Scott v. Department of Justice, 920 F. Supp.
1248, 1248 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (three-judge court)). Other than applying the clearly
erroneous standard to factual findings, the Supreme Court failed to recognize that the
lower court was entitled to an abuse of discretion standard on appeal or equitable
discretion in approving the consent decree. In two other cases in which the district court
was upheld, the Supreme Court may not have mentioned the idea of deference because
the decision was a primarily a legal issue. In Board of Education v. Dowell, the question
was the standard for termination. See 498 U.S. 237, 244 (1991). In Freeman v. Pits, the
issue was whether partial unitary status was permissible. See 503 U.S. 467, 471, 490-91
(1992). Yet, the Supreme Court noted no deference to the district courts' factual findings
at issue in Dowell and Freeman.
230. 503 U.S. at 487. The Court characterized the district court's examination of quality
of education as an appropriate exercise of equitable discretion. See id. at 493. Further, the
court characterized partial unitary status -a court may terminate its jurisdiction over part
of the remedy and need not await complete remedial success-as another use of equitable
discretion. See id.
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Specifically, the Court held that the district court appropriately
exercised equitable discretion-even in a case already lasting twentythree years-to order new remedies in areas not covered by the
original remedy.31
More recently, however, in Jenkins III, the Court specifically
stressed the limited role of equitable discretion and afforded no
deference to the district court.

While recognizing the equitable

the Court
discretion thread of public law remedial analysis,
2
emphasized that the concept has always had limits.P
In short, the equitable discretion and deference to district court
lines of analysis have all but disappeared from recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence, leaving the Court firmly committed to the rightremedy connection as the only recognized measure of the scope of
the injunction.
(c) Proximate Cause and School Desegregation
The Supreme Court has also begun to use proximate causation as

a limit on school desegregation cases, thereby increasing the reach of
the right-remedy connection in this area. The application of
proximate cause may appear unremarkable (perhaps even obvious),
but before 1991, proximate cause had a very minor role in school
desegregation remedies because the Court had established two

powerful causation presumptions for school desegregation. First,
systemwide discrimination was presumed (absent persuasive proof to
the contrary) from discrimination in a substantial part of the
3
Second, and more importantly in the later stages of
systemP3
231. See id. at 492.
232. See Jenkins I1, 515 U.S. at 86. To explain the limited nature of remedial
discretion, the Court quoted at length from Swann v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of
Education,402 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1971). Relying on Swann for the limited nature of equitable
discretion is ironic given the universal conclusion that the case stands for the Supreme
Court taking the concept of equitable discretion to extremes. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 11,
at 46 n.94 (characterizing the remedy in Swann as "the most untailored remedy
imaginable"); Yudof, supra note 147, at 90 (describing Swann as "an enigmatic opinion
that can be cited for virtually any proposition").
233. See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 455-58 (1979) (Columbus
II)("Proof of purposeful and effective maintenance of a body of separate black schools in
a substantial part of the system itself is prima facie proof of a dual school system and
supports a finding to this effect absent sufficient contrary proof by the Board .... ."); Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973) ("[A] finding of intentionally segregative
school board actions in a meaningful portion of a school system... creates a presumption
that other segregated schooling within the system is not adventitious. It establishes, in
other words, a prima facie case of unlawful segregative design on the part of school
authorities, and shifts to those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated
schools within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative actions."); see
also Joondeph, supra note 4, at 610-12 (tracing the presumptions to Green v. County
School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968)). But see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
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litigation, once a violation was held, any current disparity was
presumed to be caused by the defendant's unlawful actions, unless the
defendant proved that their actions in no way contributed to the
disparity.234 Through the causation presumptions, defendants were
essentially held responsible for all current disparities, with little use of
proximate cause to determine the effects of defendants' unlawful
actions.
The almost complete absence of proximate cause from the
remedial calculus greatly weakened the prescriptive capacity of the
rightful position doctrine because the causation presumptions
The causation
effectively established the rightful position.
presumptions presumed that, had defendants not unlawfully
segregated the schools, the schools would have been race neutral and
integrated. 235 In other words, through the causation presumptions,
the rightful position was defined as the absence of racial disparities
throughout the school system. The rightful position doctrine had
little prescriptive capacity because the causation presumptions
already defined plaintiffs' rightful position (a world absent racial
disparities) or a world of racial equality/integration-unless the
defendants proved otherwise. Further, because of the causation
presumptions, parties had little incentive to develop a record of the
contours of the violation and its effects. The plaintiffs had the benefit
of the presumptions, and the defendants were placed in the almost
406, 420 (1977) (Dayton I) (holding that lower courts "must determine how much
incremental segregative effect these violations had on the racial distribution... as
presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to what it would have been in
the absence of such constitutional violations").
The presumption reflects the reality that intentional segregation for particular schools
affects (with the school district's knowledge) the racial composition of other schools in the
district and that school districts rarely desire segregation in only part of a school system.
See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208. The decision greatly simplified the necessary proof of
intentional segregation in states without school segregation laws. A contrary decision
would have effectively required desegregation on a school-by-school basis, with the
plaintiffs having to prove that the defendant was racially motivated in its student
assignment practices for each school. The decision allowed school desegregation to take
place on a district-by-district basis-once part of a district was proven to be intentionally
segregated, the case would include the entire school district unless the defendants
effectively rebutted the presumption.
234. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979) (Dayton II)
(holding the defendants responsible for current segregation if the segregation was "caused
at least in part by [the defendants'] prior intentionally segregative official acts....");
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 211 n.17 (holding that "the burden becomes the school authorities' to
show that the current segregation is in no way the result of those past segregative
actions").
235. See Neal Devins, School Desegregation Law in the 1980's: The Court's
Abandonment of Brown v. Board of Education, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 7, 19-25, 38
(1984); Yudof, supra note 147, at 80.
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impossible position of proving what the world would look like absent
their wrongdoing.
Recently, the Supreme Court has limited the reach of the
presumptions and has used proximate cause in considering school
desegregation remedies. By doing so, the Supreme Court has
imposed significant limits on the reach of the school desegregation
remedy through the right-remedy connection and the termination
standard.
In 1992 in Freeman v. Pitts.26 the Supreme Court considered
whether the DeKalb County school district had desegregated its
student assignment practices and policies. Although significant
segregation remained in the school buildings,237 the Court held that
the current segregation was not the result of defendants' unlawful
actions, but the result of demographic changes in housing patterns
and racial population changes over which the defendants had no
control.238 The Supreme Court reached this conclusion by applying
the causation presumptions-the defendants had to prove that any
current disparity was not the result of their unlawful actions239 -and
by making the "rare" holding that the defendants had met that
burden. 40
Yet, the Supreme Court predicted a future decline in the
applicability of the causation presumptions:
As the de jure violation becomes more remote in time and these
demographic changes intervene, it becomes less likely that a
current racial imbalance in a school district is a vestige of the prior
de jure system. The causal link between current conditions and the
attenuated if the school district has
prior violation is even more
demonstrated its good faith.241
In Missouri v. Jenkins,242 that prediction came true, when the
Supreme Court failed even to mention the causation presumptions
and applied an "incremental effects" approach to causation in school
desegregation 243 Part of this school desegregation remedy included
236. 503 U.S. 467 (1992).
237. See id at 476-77; see also id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("The majority of
'black' students never have attended a school that was not disproportionately black.").
238. See id. at 494-95.

239. See icL at 494 ("The school district bears the burden of showing that any current
imbalance is not traceable, in a proximate way, to the prior violation.").
240. Id. at 503 (Scalia J., concurring) (describing the defendants' ability to rebut the
causation presumptions as "rare"); see also supra note 204 (explaining further Justice
Scalia's approach to proximate cause).
241. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 496.

242. 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (Jenkins I1).
243. See id. at 101. In doing so, the Supreme Court returned to the causation standard
articulated in Dayton I (not be confused with Dayton II, which adopted the causation
presumption). See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406,420 (1977) (Dayton I)
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redressing through quality of education programs the systemwide
reduction in achievement that the district court had found at the time
of the initial remedy. 244 Subsequently, the State challenged its
continued responsibility for redressing the gap in achievement scores
between African-American and white school children.
The Supreme Court held the district court in error for not
determining the portion of the achievement gap due to the
defendants' unlawful activities. 245 To the extent the gap in
achievement scores was the result of factors other than de jure
segregation, the remedy was not to address those effects, and the
defendants were not responsible. 246 The Court directed the district
court on remand to determine what incremental effect defendants'
unlawful actions had on the achievement gap and only hold the
defendants responsible for that portion.
The incremental effects standard was not only applied to a
defined vestige of de jure segregation (the systemwide reduction in
achievement), but also to the student population as a whole. The
Court noted that some students had attended KCMSD schools
operating under a school desegregation order for up to eight years
and questioned whether these children were in need of any future,
court-compelled compensatory education. 247 This strongly suggested
a time limit on certain school desegregation remedies, regardless of
any continuing discrimination or racial inequities and regardless of
the effectiveness of the remedy.
The Court's application of proximate cause was exacting.
Another issue considered in Jenkins III was the remedial goal of
desegregative attractiveness. 248 This goal sought to increase the white
student population of KCMSD by attracting white students living
both within and outside the KCMSD boundary lines through the
systemwide magnet programs and voluntary interdistrict transfers. In
(holding that lower courts "must determine how much incremental segregative effects
these violations had on the racial distribution... as presently constituted, when that
distribution is compared to what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional
violations"). The incremental effects standard greatly lessened the reach of the proplaintiff aspects of Freeman v. Pitts, particularly the holding that it was acceptable to
examine quality of education in determining unitary status. 503 U.S. 467, 492-93 (1992);
infra Part II.B.2.c.
244. See supraPart I.B.l.b.
245. See Jenkins 111, 515 at 100-01.
246. See id. at 101 (noting that the District Court had never identified "the incremental
effect that segregation has had on minority student achievement or the specific goals of
the quality education programs"); see also i&. at 102. ("So long as these external factors
[beyond the control of the defendants] are not the result of segregation, they do not figure
in the remedial calculus.").

247. See iL at 102.
248. Desegregative attractiveness was first discussed supra note 202.
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ruling that desegregative attractiveness (defined as an interdistrict
remedial goal) exceeded the purely intradistrict violation, the
Supreme Court had to consider the proximate cause between white
flight and the violation. For if the violation caused white flight
outside the school district boundary lines, then the remedy could
likewise reach outside the school district boundary lines.
In considering the link between the violation and white flight, the
Supreme Court required direct proof and held that white flight was
not proximately caused by the violation. The district court's factual
findings on these matters were deemed contradictory. 249 The
Supreme Court essentially chose the fact findings by the district court
of no interdistrict violation (meaning no violation with "substantial"
effects outside the boundaries of KCMSD) and declared the idea of
white flight as being part of the violation inconsistent with these
findings. For defendants to have to redress white flight, the plaintiffs
would have had to prove that the white flight was caused by the
segregation, for example that white parents fled the school district

because of disrepair in facilities. Plaintiffs in Jenkins III failed to
demonstrate this. Significantly, the Court refused to consider white
flight due to efforts to desegregate to be part of the original
violation.250 The Supreme Court's approach froze the effects of the
violation to the time of the violation itself and failed to acknowledge
that the effects of the violation can include effects caused by the
remedy itself (i.e., white flight caused by the efforts to desegregate).251
Under the causation presumptions, the Court assumed a world
free of segregation if state discrimination and its effects were
eliminated. Under the incremental effects standard, however, the
Court allowed the possibility of segregation for which state and local
officials are not legally responsible. In other words, the Court
249. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,94-95 (1995)(Jenkins III).
250. The majority flatly ignored factual findings by the district court that defendant's
actions had caused the white flight. See Ford, supranote 205, at 1387; Joondeph, supra
note 4, at 647-53.
251. The dissent, on the other hand, viewed white flight as an effect of de jure
segregation. See Jenkins III, 515 at 161-64 (Souter, J., dissenting). White flight could be
caused by de jure segregation or by the desegregation remedy itself. Both instances
included causation by de jure segregation because the desegregation remedy only arises
because of the de jure system. The dissent reasoned that this was not inconsistent with the
district court's finding of no interdistrict violation. For an interdistrict violation to occur,
there must be a segregative effect in the districts surrounding KCMSD. Given that the
predominately white schools, not part of any historical exclusion of students by race, were
receiving more white students did not cause a violation in the receiving school districts.
These "unitary school districts," not a school district of "black" schools and "white"
schools, incorporated these former KCMSD white students into their already unitary,
predominately white school system. These additional students did not change the
existence of a unitary school district. See id. at 161.
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presumed that the world would not necessarily be free of segregation
if official discrimination and its effects ended.
In sum, it is no longer enough for the unlawful actions to be a
factor in the disparity for the defendants to be responsible for the
entire disparity. Nor does the Supreme Court presume that any
current segregation is the result of defendants' unlawful actions
unless they prove otherwise. Defendants are only responsible for the
2
incremental effects of their action, which will be narrowly analyzed 52
As a result, the right-remedy connection should have increasing
importance in school desegregation cases. Before the rise of
incremental effects analysis, in the heyday of causation presumptions,
defendants were held responsible for all current disparities for which
defendants could not prove their lack of responsibility; thus, the rightremedy connection had a minor role in determining the scope of the
school desegregation remedy. The plaintiffs' "rightful position" was
presumed to be a race-neutral or integrated world; the right-remedy
connection had a negligible impact on the remedy. The incremental
effects standard, on the other hand, is not premised on a race-neutral
or integrated world, absent governmental discrimination, and holds
the defendants responsible only for their contribution to present
racial disparities. In this situation, the right-remedy connection
should become increasingly "important" for the courts are now truly
charged with determining the plaintiffs' rightful position-what the
world would look like absent the effects of defendants' unlawful
actions.
(3) A Recap of the Right-Remedy Connection

The right-remedy connection has long faced substantial criticism.
In public law cases, the principle offers little guidance for determining
the remedy because it depends on a right definable apart from its
remedy and on a remedy arising from the right. Further, the rightremedy connection presumes a meaningful role for proximate cause
and a remedy directed toward individuals, neither of which are
present in public law cases. The standard of "make-whole" relief is
unsatisfactory both at the stage of the initial remedy and at the
termination phase. The Supreme Court has responded to this
252. Under both the incremental effects standard and the causation presumptions, the
defendants can be attempting the same proof-the portion, or absence, of their
responsibility for racial disparities. Yet, the standards are not identical. Under the
presumptions, when defendants fail to prove that portion of the racial disparity for which
they are responsible or fail to prove the absence of their responsibility for the racial
disparities, the defendants are then presumed to be the cause of the entire racial disparity.
Under the incremental effects standard, defendants' similar failures of proof would leave
the court with no means with which to hold defendants responsible for any portion of the
racial disparity.
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criticism by adopting the principle in its current cases (including
extending it to the termination phase) and by changing other
principles that limited the role of the right-remedy connection. The
Court has eliminated its reliance on equitable discretion and
deference to district courts in devising the remedy. Further, the
Court has subjected school desegregation to proximate cause.
C. Deference to Defendants

The Supreme Court's recent cases reaffirm another traditional
principle: throughout the remedial process, state and local
government defendants deserve deference2

3

In doing so, the Court

has adopted what Professor Susan Sturm defines as the "deferrer
model of the judicial role. ' 2.54 Specifically, courts should afford the
defendants the first opportunity to propose the initial remedy, should
afford that proposal deference, and should defer to the defendants
when considering motions to modify the remedy. Although courts
certainly exercise some judicial discretion in crafting the remedy, and
although public law remedies depend in large part of discretionary
choices, despite the Supreme Court's directives to the contrary,255 the
only explicit allowance for discretion in the remedial process is now
held and exercised by the defendants. Given that important remedial
choices must be made-for no public law remedy is legally and
logically compelled-and that courts have no meaningful standards
with which to evaluate a remedy, deference to defendants cedes to

the defendants exceptional control.
253. Reference to the deference to defendants in institutional reform litigation is first
found in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 299 (1955) (Brown II) (stating that
"[s]chool authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving
these problems"). The deference to defendants is designed to take into account the
federalism concerns raised by public law remedies. The remedy, whether it is a relatively
general order or a highly detailed order, will have an impact on local or state policy and
fiscal matters. Even though the order is entered in response to proven violations of the
law, the law recognizes that the local and state authorities still have a valid concern in
managing their own affairs, and the remedy should take this concern into account.
Deference to defendants is also based on competency concerns-that the defendants have
more expertise than federal courts in devising appropriate remedies and will more
effectively implement a remedy for which they had a role in drafting. See infranotes 35556 and accompanying text.
254. Susan Sturm, Resolving the Remedial Dilemma: Strategies of JudicialIntervention

in Prisons, 138 U. PA. L. REV.805, 849-51 (1990); Sturm, supra note 4, at 1367-68. As
early as 1989, Professor Erwin Chemerinsky argued that the approach of the Rehnquist
Court placed the Court "in a very deferential posture" with its "majoritarian paradigm,
the idea that judicial review-in particular, judicial value imposition-is in tension with
American democracy." Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term ForewordThe Vanishing Constitution,103 HARV. L. REV.43,57,73 (1989).

255. The actual exercise of judicial discretion is discussed infra Part III.
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(1) Recent Supreme Court Cases

Deference to defendants was strictly enforced in Lewis v.
Casey,25 6 the case concerning the right of access to the courts afforded

to Arizona prisoners.257 The Supreme Court unanimously concluded
that the remedial process failed to afford the defendant the
appropriate level of deference and that this failure alone was reason
enough to remand.2 8 In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens,
however, placed more blame on the defendants for the faulty

process.25 9 Specifically, the district court erred in appointing a special
master to propose a remedy based on an order in an earlier, similar
26°
case involving the same defendants and a different prison facility.
Instead, the district court should have afforded defendants the "first
opportunity" to propose a remedy for the district court's
consideration.261 Defendants' proposed 262
remedy was then entitled to
an unspecified level of deference as well.
The details of the district court's order also failed to show proper
deference to the defendants. 263 The Court held that "[o]ne need only
256. 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
257. This case is first discussed infra Part II.B.l.a.
258. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 363 ("The State was entitled to far more than an
opportunity for rebuttal, and on that ground alone this order would have to be set aside.");
id. at 398 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the
judgment) ("[1] would remand simply because the District Court failed to provide the
State with an ample opportunity to participate in the process of fashioning a
remedy .... "); id at 410-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I also agree that the failure in that
process 'alone' would justify a remand in this case.").
259. See id. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("I emphatically disagree, however, with the
Court's characterization of who is most to blame for the objectionable character of the
final order. Much of the blame for its breadth, I propose, can be placed squarely in the lap
of the State.").
260. See id. at 347, 363; see also Lawyer v. Department of Justice, 521 U.S. 567, 576-77
(1997) (emphasizing the importance of affording voting rights defendants the first
opportunity to propose a remedy and of accepting that proposal so long as it is
constitutional); Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F. Supp. 1309, 1309 (D. Ariz. 1988), affd, 951 F.2d
1504, 1512 (9th Cir. 1991)(setting forth the remedy used by the district court in Lewis).
The defendants were the same in the two cases, and the Ninth Circuit had affirmed the
earlier remedy. In the past, use of special masters in devising the remedy was relatively
common. See, e.g., Chayes, supra note 13, at 1300-01; Sturm, supra note 4, at 1371-73.
261. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362-63. The Court held that "'[t]he strong considerations of
omity... also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct errors made in the
internal administration of their prisons."' Id. at 362 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
U.S. 475, 492 (1973)). The only possible limit on this opportunity is perhaps "obstructive
tactics" by defendants, which did not occur in this case. See id. at 363 n.8.
262. See it. at 362-63.
263. See id. at 347-48. The 25-page remedial order was replete with details on what sort
of library, legal assistance, and access was to be afforded the Arizona prisoners. The
Supreme Court noted that the order specified "the times that libraries were to be kept
open, the number of hours of library use to which each inmate was entitled (10 per week),
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read the order ...to appreciate that it is the ne plus ultra of what our

opinions have lamented as a court's 'in the name of the Constitution,
becom[ing] ... enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.'"264
In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail,2 65 the Court
established the standard for modifying the public law remedy and also
emphasized the deference due to defendants, but again without
specifying what the deference entails.

266

In Rufo plaintiffs contested

the constitutionality of the conditions of confinement afforded to pretrial detainees.267 Of particular significance was whether the pre-trial
detainees would be housed in single or double cells. The parties had

entered into a series of consent decrees guaranteeing a new facility of
single cells, and the district court had denied the defendants' motion
to modify the consent decrees, a motion filed after an increase in
prison population, to house two pre-trial detainees in some of the
268
single cells.

The Supreme Court held that the district court's legal standard
the minimal educational requirements for prison librarians (a library science degree, law
degree, or paralegal degree), the content of a videotaped legal-research course for inmates
(to be prepared by persons appointed by the special master but funded by ADOC) and
similar matters." Id. at 347; see also id. at 390 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The
microscopically detailed order leaves no stone unturned."); Nagel, supra note 11, at 710
("[T]o the extent that a decree is so detailed as to approximate judicial operation of school
or prison systems, the relative displacement of executive and legislative authority is
extremely broad, extending even to matters not under adjudication.'); Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1174 (arguing that "[t]he precise particulars concerning the end of segregation and the
implementation of a plan [sh]ould be left to the political branches or to the local
government"). For a discussion of the importance of detail in ensuring an effective
remedy, see Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 598 & n.30; Anderson, Implementation, supra note
25, at 730 ("A consent decree may be so vague that the court is unable to exercise effective
supervision. A statement of general goals together with specific obligations is particularly
well-adapted to solving the problems presented in complex cases."); Rufo v. Inmates of
Suffolk County, 502 U.S. 367, 402 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("In view of the
complexity of the institutions involved and the necessity of affording effective relief, the
remedial decree will often contain many, highly detailed commands.").
264. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 362 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,562 (1979)).
265. 502 U.S. at 367.
266. Although Rufo involved a consent decree in the institutional reform setting, see id.
at 376, the analysis is applied to structural injunctions and other court-ordered relief as
well. The Supreme Court applied the Rufo test to injunctive relief in Agostini v. Felton,
521 U.S. 203, 215 (1997). This case is discussed infra notes 271-72. Moreover, Rufo has
been applied to injunctions in non-institutional reform litigation. See Building & Constr.
Trades Council of Philadelphia v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1995); United States v.
Western Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1203 (D.C. Cir. 1995). See generallyJeff Goldfarb, Note,
Keeping Rufo In Its Cell: The Modification of Antitrust Consent Decrees After Rufo v.
Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 625 (1997); Bernard T. Shin, Comment,
From Jail Cell to Cellular Communication. Should the Rufo Standard Be Applied to
Antitrust and CommercialConsentDecrees?, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1781 (1996).
267. See 502 U.S. at 372.
268. See id. at 375-77.
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for denying the proposed modification was in error, and the Court
2 69
adopted a "flexible," two-step standard for allowing modifications.
The first step entails examining the reason for the modification.
Courts can grant requests for modifications for one of two reasons.2 70
Either a significant change of fact271 or law272 would support a
modification.273 In examining the alleged change in fact or law, the

court must determine whether the change was actually anticipated by
the parties. If the change was anticipated, the alleged change would
not be an appropriate basis for modification. 274
The second step consists of the party seeking modification
demonstrating that the "proposed modification is suitably tailored to
the changed circumstance."2 75 At this step, the defendants are
entitled to deference.2 76 More specifically, the Court required that a
269. Id. at 380-81. The Supreme Court rejected the lower courts' use of the "grievous
wrong" standard of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1932). As discussed
supra note 214, the Court had likewise rejected the grievous wrong standard for
determining when an institutional reform suit should end.

270. The Court developed a different standard for "minor changes in extraneous
details... (e.g., paint color or design of a building's facade)... [that] are unrelated to
remedying the underlying constitutional violation." Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County
Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383-84 n.7 (1992). These changes should be made, in absence of party
agreement, if "the moving party has a reasonable basis for its request." Id. at 383 n.7.
271. The Supreme Court set forth three instances when a change in facts may warrant a
modification: "[w]hen changed factual conditions make compliance with the decree
substantially more onerous ... [;] when a decree proves to be unworkable because of
unforeseen obstacles ... ; or when enforcement of the decree without modification would
be detrimental to the public interest .... ." Id. at 384 (citations omitted). In Agostini v.
Felton, the Supreme Court held that the cost of complying with the original order was not
an adequate factual change for modification because the parties and the courts had
anticipated the costs of compliance at the time of the order. 521 U.S. 203,216 (1997).
272. Two changes in the law warrant modification: when the law has changed to make
legal what decree was designed to prevent or when an agreement was based on a
misunderstanding of the underlying law. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390. A change in law can
occur after an injunction is issued, even within the same case, when the legal principle
upon which the injunction is based is no longer good law. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216-17.
273. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 383.
274. See id. at 385; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 216. If the parties had anticipated the changed
conditions, a party could still seek modification. If the moving party had "agreed to the
decree in good faith, made a reasonable effort to comply with the decree," the moving
party had the "heavy burden" of proving that the party "should be relieved of the
undertaking under Rule 60(b)." Rufo, 502 U.S. at 385.
275. See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
276. See id. at 392 n.14. Regarding deference, the Court noted that "the public interest
and [c]onsiderations based on the allocation of powers within our federal system require
that the district court defer to local government administrators, who have the primary
responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving the problems of institutional reform,
to resolve the intricacies of implementing a decree modification." Id. at 392 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
argued that "[d]eference to one of the parties to a lawsuit is usually not the surest path to
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defendant's financial situation, which cannot affect
whether a
277
violation has in fact occurred, should be considered.
Critically, the concept of deference has a different tone in the
recent cases when compared to earlier cases noting deference to
defendants. While earlier cases were written in terms of defendants'
responsibilities to provide effective remedies, 78 Lewis and Rufo
contain no such obligation on the defendants. Instead, deference now
appears founded primarily on federalism and competency. Previously
deference carried with it the responsibility for enduring an effective
remedy, a responsibility practically ignored in the recent cases.
In sum, the Supreme Court has clearly instructed lower courtsboth through its rhetoric and actions-that defendants are entitled to
deference in determining the scope of the remedy, at the stage of
both the initial remedy and of modification. That deference does not
appear to come at the cost of affirmative responsibility for meaningful
remediation.
(2) The Two Kansas City Cases

The district courts in the two Kansas City cases followed
Supreme Court precedent and afforded defendants great deference
throughout the remedial process. As a result, defendants were able
to exercise a great deal of control throughout the remedial phase.
In both Kansas City cases, the district courts requested that
defendants propose their own remedies, and the defendants'
proposed remedies were afforded great deference. In Kansas City,
Kansas, the district court approved, with minor modifications, the
defendants' proposed initial remedy.279 In Missouri, the district court
was certainly more involved in devising the initial remedy. But here,
too, it was the defendants (both KCMSD and the State of Missouri)
taking the lead in proposing the initial remedy.280 The school district
and State at the outset proposed much of the quality of education
programs approved by the district court. Likewise, both defendants
recognized the need for capital improvements, and KCMSD was
directed to devise a specific plan. Finally, rather than imposing the
court's own plan after rejecting the defendants' student assignment
plan, the district court required the school district to develop a plan
for desegregating the student body.
Further, in later remedial stages, both Kansas City courts were
equity .... I"d.at 398 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

277. See iLat 392-93.
278. See Davis v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 349 U.S. 294,299 (1955)(Brown II).
279. See supra Part I.B.1.a.
280. See supra Part I.B.l.b.
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primarily responding to the defendants' requests for modification.
Although the courts in fact changed defendants' proposals at times,
the proposals generally set the particular approaches to be decided,
with the judge modifying particular details, usually in the name of
efficacy.
Thus, the district court judges occasionally became
enmeshed in the details of the remedy, but most remedial decisions
were made by the defendants.
In USD No. 500, the district court's involvement after the initial
remedy was primarily limited to granting the defendants' unopposed
motions for modifications.281 The defendants drove the remedial
process and actively sought judicial involvement in the details of
school administration that most directly affected student assignment
throughout the district, even though only five schools were held to be
unlawfully segregated. Rather than requiring particular remedial
approaches, the district court would ask that the defendants consider
a remedy.38
In Jenkins, although the district court and Eighth Circuit were
almost constantly involved in the modifications, most of that
involvement was confined to either approving the school district's
proposal or to revising details of the remedy-the 283
presence of a tenmeter diving board, asbestos removal, and the like
The Kansas City, Missouri case admittedly presented unusual
incentives for the defendant school district. KCMSD, only nominally
a defendant, had at one point developed a "friendly" relationship
with the plaintiffs2 4 and was able to request remedies with the
understanding that the state defendants would bear some financial
responsibility (and that the district court would adjust the property
tax levy to ensure payment of KCMSD's portion). Even with these
incentives, however, it is still a defendant, not the court or the
plaintiffs, that had a great deal of remedial power-even at times
when a defendant has the incentive to propose expensive programs.
The plaintiff class, acting alone, would never have been able to secure
the remedial options KCMSD was able to achieve. Nor is it likely
that a district court, acting on its own initiative, would have ordered
such remedies.
D. Federalism

The Supreme Court's recent public law remedial decisions

281. See supra Part I.B.2.a.
282. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
283. See supra Part I.B.2.b.
284. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 79 (1995) (Jenkins III). This is discussed in
more detail supra text accompanying note 108.
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evidence a third principle: federalism counts.28 5 Most prominently,
defendants,
federalism is shown through the deference afforded to 286
but federalism appears elsewhere in the remedial calculus.
(1) Local Control
For example, in the three cases concerning school desegregation

remedies, Jenkins III, Freeman,and Dowell, the Supreme Court made
"local control" an explicit remedial goal of school desegregation
remedies2 sT The Court has defined the "end purpose" of the suit as
both the elimination of the violation and also the return of local
control to school authorities.288 In one sense, the idea of local control
can be entirely consistent with that of providing plaintiffs an effective
remedy.
The Supreme Court has not eliminated effective
remediation from the remedial calculus, it has only added local
control. In that sense, effective remediation and local control can
occur at the same time. Once the remedy has achieved its remedial
goal of eliminating the present day effects of past violations, then the
case may end and local control can be restored. If that is the use of
local control, then there is no limit on what a school desegregation
remedy should do.
But by making the goal of local control explicit, rather than a
natural consequence of a completed remedy, one assumes that the
Supreme Court had something in mind other than providing that a
case can end once the plaintiffs are afforded their remedy.289 By
making the "end purpose" of the suit the return of local control,
federalism becomes part of the remedial calculus.
Further, the other components of the remedial calculus,
285. By doing so, the Supreme Court has further committed itself to the approach
defined by Professor Paul Gewirtz as "Interest Balancing." See Gewirtz, supra note 4, at
600 n.32; supra note 222.
286. But see Yoo, supra note 4, at 1133, 1176 (arguing that until Lewis the Supreme
Court did not use federalism as a real constraint on public law remedial power).
287. Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 89; Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992); Board of
Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237,248 (1991).
288. Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. at 89, 102 (holding that redressing the violation and returning
local control should be the "end purpose" of the litigation); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 489
("We have said that the court's end purpose must be to remedy the violation and, in
addition, to restore state and local authorities to the control of a school system that is
operating in compliance with the Constitution.... Although this temporary measure has
lasted decades, the ultimate objective has not changed-to return school districts to the
control of local authorities.").
289. If this were the case, presumably the court would have said so rather than making
local control a goal of the remedy. Justice Marshall's dissent in Dowell argued that
making local control the goal of a remedy was wrong because it would be used to trump
effective remediation. 498 U.S. at 267 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He believed that local
control should only be relevant when examining feasibility. See id.
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particularly the aim of eliminating the vestiges of segregation, are
difficult to access and attain, while local control is easy to attain. One
needs only to eliminate federal court jurisdiction. This strengthens
the possibility that local control will more readily be granted at the
expense of the other remedial goals.
In Jenkins HII, the idea of local control was one reason for
striking down the remedial goal of "desegregative attractiveness," the
goal of attracting white students to enroll in KCMSD. 29° As
explained above, desegregative attractiveness had supported many
expensive remedies funded partially by the State of Missouri and by a
court-ordered property tax levy, and the school district became
dependent on court-ordered funding as a result.291 The school district
thus became dependent on continued court jurisdiction, and the
Supreme Court maintained that the goal of desegregative
attractiveness was therefore inconsistent with local control.
The use of federalism as a limit on particular remedial goals
should not, however, be overstated. Federalism has not been used
alone as a reason for mandating or excluding a particular remedy.292
In Jenkins M, other justifications existed for striking down the
remedial goal of desegregative attractiveness-namely that the
remedy exceeded the scope of the violation. 293 The private law
principle of the right-remedy connection has been more readily
employed to limit particular remedial goals, as discussed above. 294
Yet, because of the weakness of other school desegregation
remedial goals, defining the return to local control as an explicit goal
foretells a meaningful limit on remedial power, to the extent school
districts seek termination, as demonstrated in the two Kansas City
cases.

290. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 99 (1995) (Jenkins III). Desegregative
attractiveness is also addressed supranotes 202,248-51 and accompanying text.
291. See supra Parts I.B.2.b, I.B.3.b.
292. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 1133 ("The Court does not appear to have ever
invalidated a structural remedy on the ground that it improperly intruded upon the proper
authority of state and local institutions."). Yet, federalism is not ignored- in City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, the Court, after holding that plaintiffs had no standing, further rejected
the availability of injunctive relief on the grounds of equity, comity, and federalism. 461
U.S. 95, 112-13 (1983); see also Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 378 (1976) (noting the
"important considerations of federalism" as a reason to reject plaintiffs' request for a
police complaint board to investigate police misconduct). It should also be noted that the
Court has used federalism in non-remedial areas such as immunity and abstention to
curtail the availability of public law relief. See Rowe, supra note 226, at 117; Gene R.
Shreve, FederalInjunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 382, 406-10
(1983).
293. Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. at 100.
294. See supra Part II.B.1.a.
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(2) The Two Kansas City Cases

In both Kansas City school desegregation cases, the courts
emphasized that the remedies should ensure the return of local
control, which is easily more definable (and attainable) than
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination, the other primary goal of
school segregation.
In the Kansas suit, the district court appears from the beginning
of the lawsuit to have been quite respectful of local control issues. 295
The district court kept its intrusion on local control to a minimum
throughout the duration of the case and terminated the suit when
requested to do so, even though, as discussed in detail
below, it was
296
far from clear that desegregation had been achieved.
More telling is that even in Jenkins, the district court has focused
its energies on ending the suit.297 The district court directed the
school district to devise a plan for achieving termination-a mere
eight years into the remedy and even before the Supreme Court
decided Jenkins II. Local control was a driving force behind the
approval by the district court and Eighth Circuit of the settlement
agreement that guaranteed the dismissal of the State of Missouri in
exchange for a sum certain. 298 Both courts approved the agreement
because of the need to discontinue school district reliance on state
funding and to achieve local control quickly. Yet, the school district
was in turmoil, with fundamental problems in its administration and
in its curriculum and teaching. That the courts would focus so heavily
on providing an end of the lawsuit-in face of judicially-recognized,
extreme implementation problems caused by the defendants and the
scope of what remains to be accomplished 299-suggests that school
desegregation cases in active litigation will focus on termination, no
matter what the status of implementation of the remedy.
E. Consent Decrees
While injunctive relief is guided by the right-remedy connection,
the decline in equitable discretion, the deference afforded to
defendants, and federalism, the Supreme Court's fourth principle of
295. In both the original liability and the final decision, the district court specifically
emphasized the importance of respecting local control. See United States v. Unified
School District No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1372
(D. Kan. 1997); United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte
County), Kansas, No. KC-3738, at 7 (D. Kan. June 8,1977).
296. See infraPart II.F; see also supraPart I.B.3.a.
297. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
298. See id
299. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1167-69 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 122 F.3d 588
(8th Cir. 1997); supra notes 135,137.
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public law remedial power allows parties to circumvent these
limitations. The Court has continued to impose almost no limits on

consent decrees (perhaps because the federalism concerns inherent in
consent decrees are less than the federalism concerns in injunctive
relief).30 As a result, consent decrees remain a powerful tool for
redressing public law violations, and are plaintiffs' most promising
301
opportunity to have an effective voice in the remedial process.
Once the consent decree is held to fulfill mainly procedural

considerations, a consent decree can mandate a broad range of
activity. 3°2

A consent decree is not confined to the minimum

requirements of the decisional law at issue, and thus the parties can
agree to terms that the court could not have ordered after
establishing liability.30 3 The parties' agreement provides the basis for
the court's authority to approve a consent decree.3 4 The parties may
explicitly disagree about the defendant's liability and still enter into a
decree. Once a court approves a consent decree, it becomes judicially
300. Federalism concerns continue, of course, because federal court jurisdiction places
state and local government defendants in the position of needing settlement. The Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) has attempted to curtail the ability of parties in prison
condition cases from resolving disputes via consent decrees. PLRA requires that any
consent decree meet the same standard for injunctive relief. Defendants in prison
condition cases can no longer deny liability but enter into a judicially enforceable
settlement agreement. PLRA's standards extend to existing consent decrees addressing
prison conditions as well. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(b)(2), (c) (1999); Mark Tushnet & Larry
Yackle, Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: The Pathologies of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 47 DUKE L.J. 1, 49-52
(1997). For analysis of the impact of federalism on consent decrees, see generally Jeremy
A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional
Limits on the Enforcement of Settlements with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REV.
203 (1987); Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal Consent Decrees Against
GovernmentalEntities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1796 (1988).
301. One noted public law proponent, Professor Owen M. Fiss, has been quite vocal in
his opposition to consent decrees. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ.
1073 (1984). For those disagreeing, see, e.g., Peter M. Shane, FederalPolicy Making by
Consent Decree: An Analysis of Agency and JudicialDiscretion, 1987 U. CQ. LEGAL F.
241, 277-78; Laycock, supra note 25, at 1012-13; Sturm, supra note 25, at 982 n.7; Sturm,
supra note 4, at 1390.
302. Before a court may even consider whether to approve a proposed consent decree,
the decree must be deemed to have arisen from and attempted to resolve a dispute within
the court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Local No. 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City
of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986). Furthermore, the decree must be related to the
case as pled, must be consistent with the intent of the law under which the complaint was
made, and may not mandate illegal activity. See id Courts of appeals have also developed
a whole host of factors to consider when evaluating a proposed consent decree. See, e.g.,
Leverso v. Southtrust Bank, 18 F.3d 1527, 1531-34 (11th Cir. 1994). If the case is a class
action, the court must also consider the fairness of the settlement pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e). FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
303. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,389 (1992).
304. See Local No. 93,478 U.S. at 522.
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enforceable.
Two recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate the Court's
continued commitment to allowing parties to circumvent the limits of
injunctive relief. In Rufo, the prison condition case addressing the
standard for modification, 305 the Court protected remedial efforts that
required more than that compelled by the Constitution by holding
that the "proposed modification should not strive to rewrite
a consent
'3°6
decree so that it conforms to the constitutional floor."
Further, the Court has continued to allow defendants to deny
liability and still enter into a consent decree.30 7 Such ability is critical
for defendants willing to undertake remedial actions but unwilling to
admit guilt publicly. In Lawyer v. Departmentof Justice,308 the Court,
in a 5-4 decision, re-affirmed the option of contesting liability but
seeking a judicially enforceable remedy. In Lawyer, plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a voting district for a Florida state
senate seat under the Equal Protection Clause.3°9 During pretrial
proceedings, the defendants and defendants-intervenors, without the
plaintiffs, entered into a settlement agreement. The settling parties
"concurred that 'there is a reasonable factual and legal basis for
plaintiffs' claim,"' but the district court did not enter liability findings;
nor did the defendants make admissions as to liability. 310 After
holding that the proposed redistricting plan was constitutional, the
district court approved the settlement.
The Supreme Court affirmed. The majority rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that the district court should have first deemed
the challenged voting district unconstitutional and then afforded the
State the opportunity to devise a constitutional district.311 The Court
agreed that the State should first be given the opportunity to devise
the voting district (the result of which must be upheld so long as the
plan is constitutional), but the majority characterized the State's
312
decision to enter into a settlement agreement as that opportunity.
305. This case is first discussed supra Part ILC.1.
306. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 391.
307. Congress has mandated differently in prison condition cases. See supra note 300.
308. 521 U.S. 567 (1997). The five-member majority was unusual. Justice Souter
authored the majority opinion, and he was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens.
309. Plaintiffs were residents of a county partially covered by the challenged voting
district. See id at 571. Defendants and defendants-intervenors included the State of
Florida, the state attorney general, the U.S. Department of Justice, the State Senate, the
State House of Representatives, the incumbent state senator for the contested senate seat,
and a group of black and Hispanic voters in the contested senate district. See id. at 571-72.
310. Id. at 572 (quoting the district court settlement agreement).
311. See id. at 575-78.
312. See id. at 578 ("Since the State, through its attorney general, has taken advantage
of the option.., to make redistricting decisions in the first instance, there are no reasons
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The majority also noted that the Attorney General and the lawyers

representing the State House and Senate had authority to enter into
3 13 Interestingly, four Justices would have
the settlement agreements.
314
ruled differently.

With injunctive relief, courts are directed to grant defendants
deference. No such obligation arises at the consent decree phase. All
parties to the proposal must be in agreement for the court to approve
the proposal. Thus, with consent decrees plaintiffs have a direct
in those cases to burden its exercise of choice by requiring a formal adjudication of
constitutionality.").
313. Further, the majority held that the district court need not first hold liability before
approving the proposed consent decree when a plaintiff does not agree to settle.
Plaintiffs' consent was not necessary for the district court to have authority to order
approval of a consent decree. The agreement did "not impose duties or obligations on an
unconsenting party or 'dispose' of [plaintiffs'] claims ...... Id.at 579 (citing Local Number
93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986)). A court's
ability to approve and enforce a settlement agreement is not dependent on a holding of
liability. Rather, the court's authority comes from the parties' agreement, so long as the
jurisdiction/procedural requirements are present. See id.at 579 n.6 Finally, the majority
noted that a holding of liability would put the plaintiffs in their present position-the
defendants and defendants-intervenors would be able to enter into the settlement
agreement and the plaintiffs would have the opportunity to voice their objections to the
plan. See id. at 580.
314. The dissent characterized the majority as allowing an "unprecedented intrusion
upon state sovereignty." Id.at 583 (Scalia, J., dissenting). In some respects, the dissent's
argument was factually narrow. The dissent focused on the lack of settlement authority
held by the lawyers representing the state parties. This lack of authority of the parties to
the settlement agreement meant that the district court lacked the authority to make the
settlement agreement judicially enforceable. The dissent argued that the parties could not
have made a contractually binding settlement agreement because the Florida Constitution
vested redistricting authority in the state legislature and state supreme court, not in the
state attorney general and not in private citizens. See id. at 585-86. Further, the dissent
argued that the state attorney general did not have settling authority in the absence of
liability and that it was not clear that the attorneys representing the state house and state
senate had settlement authority. See id. at 586-87. As a result, the parties' agreement was
not a binding contract, enforceable on a breach of contract claim. See id. at 586. The
dissent's argument also went further. Justice Scalia argued that "[e]ven an authorized
private agreement cannot serve as the basis for a federal apportionment decree." ld. at
587. Rather, to enter the settlement, the lower court should have first held a violation of
federal law. The dissent further contended that the process that produced the settlement
in the case was not the appropriate way to give the state legislature the first opportunity to
devise a constitutional redistricting plan. Rather, the "normal legislative processol" is the
only way to afford the voting rights defendants their proper regard and deference. Id. at
589 ("The 'opportunity to apportion' that our case law requires the state legislature to be
afforded is an opportunity to apportion through normal legislative processes, not through
courthouse negotiations attended by one member of each House, followed by a court
decree."). This aspect of the dissent's argument on its face is limited to the voting rights
context. The dissent emphasized a particular need for careful attention to the judicial
power to order a remedy in the voting rights context, where district courts only draw the
voting boundaries as "a last resort." Id. at 586.
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ability to influence the terms of the remedy, an ability significantly
greater than that held by the plaintiffs with injunctive relief.
Yet, the plaintiffs' role should not be over-estimated. The
consent decree option only arises if the defendants assent. Further,
the defendants realize, both before and during consent decree
negotiations, their options of foregoing the consent decree approach
and of seeking injunctive relief, a process in which they receive
deference.
In the Kansas City school desegregation cases, the parties often
resolved disputes through consent decrees. 315 The parties to the
Kansas suit resolved almost all their remedial issues through consent
decrees or motions by agreement for the last thirteen years of the
suit. Even when the parties were contesting the extent of the
defendants' liability, the parties in USD No. 500 were still able to
resolve some issues through consent decrees. In Missouri, the parties
also utilized consent decrees, but deep divisions between the State
and KCMSD resulted in many issues being put before the district
court. Yet, many issues were resolved via consent decree, including
the highly significant agreement between the State and school district
allowing the State's dismissal from the lawsuit. In short, the parties in
the two Kansas City school desegregation cases found consent
decrees to be a useful device for resolving remedial disputes. Further,
only through consent decrees were the plaintiffs able to exercise
much control over the remedial process.
F. Public Interest/Effectiveness
A fifth principle arises from the Supreme Court's recent
treatment of public law remedial power: the interests of the public
and plaintiffs are subordinate to defendants' interests.
In earlier public law remedy cases, the Supreme Court would
consider, through the idea of equitable discretion, the impact of the
remedy on the public interest.316 Public law cases by definition impact
315. See supra Parts I.B.2, I.B.3.
316. See, e.g., Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 444 U.S. 437, 452
(1980) (Powell, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari as improvidently granted) ("A
desegregation remedy that does not take account of the social and educational
consequences of extensive student transportation can be neither fair nor effective.");
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 n.39 (1976) ("[iun equity, as nowhere
else, courts eschew rigid absolutes and look to the practical realities and necessities
inescapably involved in reconciling competing interests") (internal quotation marks
omitted); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200-01 (1973)(Lemon II)("'The qualities of
mercy and practicality have made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and
reconciliation between the public interest and private needs as well as between competing
private claims."') (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944)); Swanm v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (same as Lemon II); Brown v.
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the public at large, thus they raise the question of how any public law
remedy will address the public interest. Likewise, in the early stages
of the two Kansas City cases, both district courts examined the impact
of the remedy on the public. 317 More recently, the idea of the public
interest arose in only three cases, Rufo, Freeman, and Dowell, but in
each of the three instances the public interest was expressed in terms
318
of avoiding judicial interference with the defendants' operations.
Thus, the public interest today is expressed as a federalism concern
and is otherwise absent from the remedial calculus. The Kansas City
cases demonstrate this as well. To the extent public interest was
recognized in later stages, it was in terms of returning the school
319
district to "local control," which is essentially a federalism issue.
One may wonder where the concern for an effective remedyplaintiff's viewpoint-fits into the remedial calculus. Effectiveness,
prominent in earlier public law remedial power cases, 320 gets one
Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955)(Brown II)("Courts of equity may properly take
into account the public interest in the elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and
effective manner."). But see Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network, 519 U.S. 357, 393 (1997)
(Scalia, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)(calling it unprecedented and "dangerous"
to consider public interest as a basis for injunctive relief). Granted, the public's interests
can be used to counter the interests of the plaintiffs. The current role of equitable
discretion is discussed supra Part II.B.2.b.
317. For example, in the Kansas suit, the district court considered in the original
remedial order the impact of the remedy on the community at large and on education. See
United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, No.
KC-3738, at 8-9 (D. Kan. June 8,1977); Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19,45 (W.D. Mo.
1985), affd in relevantpart,807 F.2d 657, 712 (8th Cir. 1986) (noting the importance of the
public interest in ensuring an effective remedy).
318. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367,381 (1992) ("[T]he public
interest is a particularly significant reason for applying a flexible modification standard in
institutional reform litigation because such decrees 'reach beyond the parties involved
directly in the suit and impact on the public's right to the sound and efficient operation of
its institutions."') (quoting Heath v. De Courcy, 888 F.2d 1105, 1109 (6th Cir. 1989)). The
Court in Rufo also noted that while parties may agree to do more than the constitutional
floor in a consent decree, a court should recognize the public interest in the litigation when
ruling on a modification request based on changed conditions making it "more onerous to
abide by the decree." Id at 392. Further, the idea of the public interest appears in the
termination cases, Freeman and Dowell, in that the Court notes the need to respect the
impact of school desegregation on the public's interest in education. Freeman v. Pitts, 503
U.S. 467, 490 (1992) ("When the school district and all state entities participating with it in
operating the schools make decisions in the absence of judicial supervision, they can be
held accountable to the citizenry...."); Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991) ("Local control over the education of children allows citizens to participate in
decisionmaking, and allows innovation so that school programs can fit local needs.").
319. See supra Part I.B.3.
320. See, e.g., Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 443 U.S. 526, 538 (1979) (Dayton II)
("[T]he measure of the post-Brown I conduct of a school board under an unsatisfied duty
to liquidate a dual system is the effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing
or increasing the segregation caused by the dual system."); Davis v. Board of Sch.
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single mention in these recent cases. Only in Freemandoes the Court
speak directly of the need to ensure effective remediation for the
plaintiffs. 32' There, the Court noted with approval the lower court's
examination of quality of education, which took place years into the

remedial process, on the grounds that inquiry into quality of
education proved necessary to ensure that the plaintiffs are in fact
3
afforded a meaningful remedy. 22
Further, although the Supreme Court's approach to public law
remedies is generally transubstantiate, the Supreme Court appears
particularly impatient with the continued presence of school
desegregation cases. The Court seems struck by the longevity of the
remedies (since 1990 it has always begun its school desegregation
opinions by stating the age of the lawsuit), 321 despite the longevity of
the violation and the usual delays in ordering and implementing the
remedy. 32 4 Significantly, the Court's impatience is not demonstrated
by concerns with a delay in providing plaintiffs an effective remedy,
but by concerns with a delay in the return to local control. In this
sense, it appears that the Court is "giving up" on the quest for
325
desegregation.
As demonstrated in the two Kansas City cases, lower courts have
heeded the message of the need to terminate school desegregation
Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) (holding in a school desegregation case that "[t]he
"); Swann v. Charlottemeasure of any desegregation plan is its effectiveness ....
Mecklenburg Bd.of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25 (1971) (noting that a remedial decree is to be
judged by its effectiveness).
321. 503 U.S. at 492-93; see also supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
322. Yet, to the extent Freeman opened the door to including quality of education and
remedial approaches absent from the original order, Jenkins III's approach to proximate
cause set forth a significant limit with its incremental effects approach to current
disparities. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
323. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 73 (1995) (Jenkins III) ("This school
desegregation litigation enters its 18th year."); Freeman, 503 U.S. at 471 ("DCSS has been
subject to the supervision and jurisdiction of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Georgia since 1969."); Dowell, 498 U.S. at 240 ("This school
desegregation litigation began almost 30 years ago."); see also Chris Hansen, Are the
Courts Giving Up? CurrentIssues in School Desegregation,42 EMORY L.J. 863, 864 (1993)
("Courts, which by their nature are used to finite projects with a definite beginning and a
certain, usually prompt end, are increasingly uncomfortable with school desegregation,
which appears to have no end.").
324. See Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 175 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("The Court stresses that
the present remedial programs have been in place for seven years. But compared to more
than two centuries of firmly entrenched official discrimination, the experience with the
desegregation remedies ordered by the District Court has been evanescent.").
325. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1014 (1994) ("Dowel!
and Freeman,and especially their emphasis on returning schools to local control, indicate
that the Court is declaring victory over the problem of school inequality and simply giving
up.").
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lawsuits, 326 even at the expense of effectiveness. This is most easily
demonstrated with the treatment of faculty. To establish the racial
identifiability of schools, school districts not only assigned children on
the basis of race, but faculty as well. Thus, white students would
attend schools to be taught by white teachers, and African-American
students would attend schools to be taught by African-American
teachers. To erase the racial identifiability of schools, both students
and faculties had to be desegregated, and both Kansas City district
courts so ordered.
In both Kansas and Missouri, substantial progress has been made
in redressing the racial identifiability of a school caused by racial
identifiability of its faculty. Yet, by no means has the remedy been
entirely effective, and neither district court exhibited any concern
with completely redressing the situation. In the Kansas City, Kansas
case, for example, twenty-four out of forty-six schools did not meet
the school district's self-imposed standard (plus or minus five
327
percent) of what would constitute a desegregated faculty.
Although most of the twenty-four schools would have met a plus or
minus fifteen percent standard, it is telling that for all twenty-four
schools, the schools with a disproportionate number of white teachers
were majority white schools and the schools with a disproportionate
number of African-American teachers were majority minority
schools.328 The three schools that would have failed even a fortypoint permissible range of deviation all had a highly disproportionate
number of African-American faculties teaching student populations
ranging from seventy-eight percent to ninety-nine percent AfricanAmerican. 329 Yet, the district court in Kansas ordered no additional
efforts to desegregate the faculty.
Even in the Kansas City, Missouri case, where the court has been
much more proactive, the defendants are held to a "close enough"
standard. In 1997, the district court required that only eighty percent
of the elementary schools meet a plus or minus fifteen percent

326. See supra Part I.B.3.
327. See Motion of Defendants Unified School District No. 500, Kansas City,
Wyandotte County, Kansas, Members of the Board of Education and Superintendent of
Schools of Said District for Declaration of Unitary Status and Order of Dismissal, Exs. 1, 3
at 38, United States v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County),
Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367 (D. Kan. 1997)(No. KC-3738).
328. See id.
329. The school with the student population of 78% African-American had a
mandatory student reassignment plan for grades three through six; otherwise the school
would have been even more racially segregated. See United States v. Unified Sch. Dist.
No. 500, Kansas City (Wyandotte County), Kansas, 974 F. Supp. 1367, 1375-76 (D. Kan.

1997).
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standard.3 30 Thus, twenty percent of the elementary schools have no
mandated desegregation of faculty, and the remaining eighty percent
of the elementary schools have a thirty-point span within which to
desegregate their faculty. Remarkably, the degree of segregation in
elementary faculty has actually increased in the recent years,
exhibiting
a diminished school district commitment to a desegregated
faculty.3 31
The lack of commitment to full faculty desegregation is telling.
First, a faculty's racial makeup sends a clear message to the
community at large whether the school is "white" or "African
American." Second, the lack of desegregation cannot be explained or
justified as beyond the control of the defendants.
Unlike
achievement or student assignment, which depend on a number of
non-school district factors, school systems have complete control over
where to assign their faculty. Even Justice Thomas, a vocal opponent
of public law remedies, has noted the relative simplicity of faculty
desegregation. 332 The problem instead is one of commitment to
desegregation in the face of the need for local control.
III. Directives for School Desegregation Remedies in the
Twenty-First Century
Overall, the Supreme Court has taken a quite cautious approach
to public law remedies. It continues to rely on standards articulated
in the 1970's. No member of the Court has heeded Justice Thomas'
call for jurisdiction to end as the remedy is ordered. 333 Nor has the
Court joined Justice Thomas' claims that public law remedies should
be rejected or severely limited because the judiciary lacks
competency 334 or because the remedies violate federalism, separation
330. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1168 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 122 F.3d 588
(8th Cir. 1997).
331. See id. at 1166, 1168.
332. Justice Thomas has argued that remedies addressing student assignment,
transportation, staff assignment, resource allocation, and activities are "fairly
straightforward and [have] not produced many examples of overreaching by the district
courts. It is the 'compensatory' ingredient in many desegregation plans that have
produced many of the difficulties in the case before us." Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70,
136 (1995) (Jenkins III) (Thomas, J., concurring). For Justice Thomas' criticisms of public
law remedies, see infranotes 333-335 and accompanying text.
333. Justice Thomas has argued that courts should terminate jurisdiction after ordering
the remedy because continued jurisdiction "inject[s] the judiciary into the day-to-day
management of institutions and local policies-a function that lies outside of our Article
III competence." Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 135 (Thomas, J., concurring); see also Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 392 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court's continued
jurisdiction in public law litigation expands the federal judiciary's power beyond Article

III).
334. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 386 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The judiciary is ill equipped
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335
of powers, or the Eleventh Amendment.
That caution should not, however, be mistaken for a Supreme
Court committed to ensuring an effective public law remedy.
Through five approaches, the Court has laid the groundwork for a
very limited public law remedial power for the federal judiciary (with
the possible exception of the Supreme Court itself), which works to
the detriment of the plaintiffs.
First, the Supreme Court is limiting the role of lower courts in
the remedial process.
The Court no longer recognizes any
meaningful equitable discretion to be exercised by any federal court
in crafting the remedy and has ceased affording district courts

appellate deference for their remedial decisions.3 36 This explicit limit
is coupled with a hidden limit on lower courts' remedial authority.
The right-remedy connection also limits the role of lower courts in
the remedial process. The connection leaves lower courts with almost
no guidance on how to craft the remedy.3 37 The test can reveal
categories of relief,338 but even this can be manipulated through the
definition of the right. 339 Yet, the public law remedy clearly involves
choice.
Given the indeterminacy of the right-remedy connection, some
lower court judges may, at times, respond with remedies reflecting
their personal viewpoint;-4 the right-remedy connection can justify
almost any remedy. That choice may or may not benefit plaintiffs'
interests in an effective remedy and may or may not harm the
defendants' legitimate interests in autonomy.
Certainly, both Kansas City courts ordered remedies arguably
exceeding the scope of the violation. The court in USD No. 500, for
example, involved non-liability schools in the plan to desegregate

to make [judgments over state programs and budgets], and the Framers never imagined
that federal judges would displace state executive officials and state legislatures in charting
state policy."); see also id.at 385 (noting that states cannot set necessary long-term goals
or exercise flexibility to make reasonable short-term judgments because of structural
injunctions); Jenkins III, 515 U.S. at 131 (Thomas, J. concurring) ("Federal courts do not
possess the capabilities of state and local governments in addressing difficult educational
problems.").
335. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 385-93(Thomas, J., concurring); Jenkins 111, 515 U.S. at 13133 & n.5 (Thomas, J., concurring). In Jenkins III, Justice O'Connor noted, among other
points, some agreement with Justice Thomas' arguments regarding federalism and
separation of powers. See id. at 112-13 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The necessary
restrictions on our jurisdiction and authority contained in Article III of the Constitution
limit the judiciary's institutional capacity to prescribe palliatives for societal ills.").
336. See supra Part II.B.2.b.
337. See supra Part II.B.1.
338. See supra notes 194-202 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 180-90 and accompanying text.
340. See Fiss, supranote 11, at 11, 51.
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elementary schools and approved the defendants' request to place
magnet programs in non-liability high schools. 341 In Missouri v.
Jenkins, the Supreme Court explicitly ruled that the lower courts had
exceeded the scope of the violation with the remedial goal of
"desegregative attractiveness," although in this case it was harder for
a remedy to exceed the scope of such a broadly defined violation4 2
A second point, however, effectively restricts district courts as a
general rule from imposing their own viewpoints. The Supreme
Court has ruled that the lower courts should not craft the remedy, but
should allow defendants first to propose the remedy and defer to the
defendants whenever possible. 343 Given the ambiguity of the rightremedy connection and absence of a meaningful remedial standard
for judges to evaluate a remedy, lower courts are left with only one
prescriptive standard from which to govern the remedy-let the
defendants decide, except perhaps when it comes to details. As a
result, most judicial "choice" is in fact the approval of the defendants'
proposals, with at most minor changes.
The deference to defendants is a significant modification of
traditional remedial principles, is unique to public law, and suggests3 44a
lack of commitment to the underlying substantive rights.
Deference to the wrongdoer elevates the defendants' interests to an
explicit part of the remedial calculus, rather than keeping the remedy
focused on redressing the rights of the victims. 345
The Supreme Court has provided almost no guidance on what
exactly deference to defendants entails. 346 In Lewis,347 the Supreme
341. See supra Parts I.B.L.a, I.B.2.a.
342. 515 U.S. 70, 98-99 (1995) (Jenkins I); supra Parts I.B.l.b, I.B.2.b.
343. See supra Part II.C.
344. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 664. Professor William A. Fletcher explains:
In crude summary, the greater the importance the Court has attached to a
constitutional value, the more judicial remedial discretion it has been willing to
tolerate as a consequence of its definition of the right that gives effect to that
value. As a corollary, the Court has tried to reduce the role of discretion by its
formulation or choice of legal rule, so that in those areas where it has been able
effectively to eliminate or reduce remedial discretion the Court has been more
willing to recognize constitutional rights than it might otherwise have been.
Id
345. Granted, defendants' proposal can be influenced by what the defendants think the
court will find acceptable. See Fletcher, supra note 11, at 653 ("[T]he presence in the
background of a court with the power to impose a decree if the parties are unable to agree
almost necessarily affects the nature of the plan to which the parties are willing to
consent."). Yet, the level of deference actually afforded to defendants' proposals greatly
limits how much the defendants will craft their proposal to fit their predictions of the
court's preferences.
346. The Supreme Court was equally evasive in earlier school desegregation cases. See
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 682 and n.148 (noting that the Court "has not spoken
significantly to permissible means of solicitation of and selection among [school]
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Court noted with approval the approach of the district court in
Bounds v. Smith, where the district made "minor changes" to the
defendants' proposed remedy. 348 Logically the deference to be
afforded defendants would surely cover minor details. Only items of
particular significance would necessitate saying "no" to the
defendants. Yet, under the regime of deference, "minor" matters
may be changed-presumably the matters that are not that
important-while "major" matters may not be changed-unless they
conflict with the law. It is these non-"minor" matters that matter a
great deal and should receive a high level of scrutiny, particularly
given that the defendants are alleged or adjudicated violators of the
law.
The limited role of judicial choice is reflected in the two Kansas
City cases. For example, the choices made in the Kansas City,
Missouri case reached a wide scope-the level of the property tax
levy, expansive capital renovations, the number of additional teachers
to staff the desegregation plan-but the orders, to a large extent,
reflected the defendants' (particularly the school district's) remedial
choices. 349 The orders were not purely judicial choices. In the Kansas
suit, the district court approved uncontested or joint motions and
imposed no discretion or choice contrary to the defendants' for the
last sixteen years of the suit.350 The two district courts rarely changed
overall remedial approaches, instead confining their analysis to
particular remedial details (i.e., the number of schools to be included
in a particular program 351 or the letter sent to parents regarding the
352
transfer program).
In sum, most judicial choice consists of approving defendants'
proposals. Not only are defendants explicitly afforded deference, but
the lower courts have no meaningful standards with which to judge
the proposals. Thus, the courts are rarely imposing their own views
on the remedy, with the possible exception of details, but instead are
353
usually approving the defendants' views.
desegregation plans"). Professor Robert Nagel has articulated specifically how deference
to defendants might be used to ensure the judiciary's compliance with structural concerns,
particularly separation of powers. See Nagel, supra note 11, at 718-23.
347. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343,343 (1996).
348. Id at 362-63; see also Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 818-19 (1977).
349. See supra Parts I.B.L.b, I.B.2.b.
350. See supra Parts I.B.l.a, I.B.2.a.
351. See supra note 76.
352. See supra note 62.
353. By taking this approach "[t]he current Court appears motivated primarily by a
desire to avoid judicial value imposition, a philosophy that makes judicial invalidation of
government decisions problematic." Chemerinsky, supra note 254, at 96. Thus, no longer
can judges be accused of "designing and superintending major changes in institutions."
Diver, supra note 11, at 44; see also Fletcher, supra note 11, at 641 (describing the role of
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Additionally, one hidden and significant consequence of this

deference is the power it cedes to the defendant to define the right at
issue. The contours of public law rights are greatly affected by the
parameters of the remedy.35 4 In other words, it is through their
remedies that public law rights have gotten their meaning. Thus, by
deferring to defendants in the remedy, courts are granting some
authority to the defendants to define the right.

This is particularly troublesome. On the one hand, good reasons
to defer to defendants in the remedial process exist. Defendants may
have expertise in determining the best way to restructure their

organizations to comply with the statutory or constitutional law at
issue.3 55 Defendants, the parties charged with implementation, may
also more effectively implement a remedy that is not imposed
be afforded
unilaterally. 356 But for no reason should defendants
357
deference to define, even in part, plaintiffs' rights.

The defendants' remedial power is strengthened by their
opportunity to articulate first the remedy. To afford defendants the
first opportunity to propose a remedy cedes a significant power to the
defendants. As a strategic matter, the first chance to persuade the
judge and to set the agenda for discussion cannot be overemphasized.
The proposal will likely set the tone for the entire remedial process,
putting the plaintiffs in the position of asking for more, rather than
putting the defendants in the position of explaining why they cannot
undertake a particular task.
the judge as "mov[ing] far beyond the normal competence and authority of a judicial
officer, into an arena where legal aspirations, bureaucratic possibilities, and political
constraints converge"). This role is also inconsistent with that envisioned by one of the
earliest proponents of public law litigation. See Chayes, supra note 13 at 1284 ("The judge
is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case."). Professor Richard A. Epstein
viewed the role of the judiciary in Jenkins differently. See Epstein, supra note 4, at 1103
("The bottom line is that the federal courts have taken control of state and local budgets
and are making management decisions in complete disregard of the considerations that
would properly be taken into account by a responsible school board."). He reached this
conclusion by emphasizing that the district court "ordered an extensive remedial
educational program," but did not consider the defendants' role in proposing these
programs as the appropriate remedy. For a description of the active role of both the State
and school district in proposing the remedial education program, see supra Part I.B.L.b. I
also disagree with the conclusion that "school district officials... [are nothing] more than
special masters or magistrates subject to the orders of a federal judge." Yoo, supra note 4,
at 1134.
354. See supra Part II.B.l.a.i.
355. But see Diver, supra note 11, at 83.
356. See Anderson, Implementation, supra note 25, at 727; Diver, supra note 11, at 90;
Sturm, supra note 4, at 1399 n.237.
357. But see Fletcher, supra note 11 at 694 ("The only legitimate basis for a federal
judge to take over the political function in devising or choosing a remedy in an
institutional suit is the demonstrated unwillingness or incapacity of the political body.").
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Given that the defendants violated the law, one cannot assume
that their requested remedy will be the best one to vindicate
plaintiffs' rights. The defendants operate in the environment that
permitted the violation in the first place, so one cannot safely
presume that the proposed remedy will be principally concerned with
vindicating plaintiffs' rights.
Recall also that the defendants, outside of the proposed consent
decree context, usually have not admitted liability. Even if held
liable, however, defendants may still believe that their policies and
practices are lawful or-more commonly-that the policies and
practices only need minor refinements. 358 Yet, this is not always the
case or even presumably so in the majority of cases. For this reason
as well, defendants are less likely to propose a fully effective remedy.
A third result of the Supreme Court's approach further enhances
the authority of defendants. Courts have little opportunity to
articulate the end purpose of the lawsuit. Through the right-remedy
connection and the deference to defendants, district courts are largely
placed in the role of issuing negative injunctions (i.e., "do not violate
the law"), plus very general orders regarding the requisite categories
of relief. The courts then generally defer to defendants' remedial
proposals, with the possible exception of courts questioning and
countering particular details of the remedy. Through this process,
courts typically approve the defendants' proposed remedial terms.
But at no point is a court required to articulate specifically, for the
benefit of the parties and the community at large, what the remedy is
seeking to achieve. And defendants' plans are rarely so outcomeoriented. Even in the Kansas City, Missouri case, the district court
never stated with precision the remedial goals.359
Given the complexity of public law remedies, courts should not
rely solely on the tenns of a remedy as the definition of the goals of
the remedy. Compliance with particular remedial terms guarantees
only that a particular process has been followed, and not necessarily
that the violation has in fact been cured. In fact, the difficulty of
redressing the violation strongly suggests that modifications of
particular remedial terms will prove necessary. Restructuring
organizations is a process, and how to restructure successfully can
rarely be predicted in advance of beginning that process.
The failure to define the specific goals of the remedies orients
the lawsuit towards compliance with a remedial decree that may or
358. See Diver, supra note 11, at 83 ("The defendants will avoid considering any options
that severely threaten established institutional routines or arrangements.").
359. See ORFIELD & EATON, supra note 31, at 255 ("Judge Clark indicated no plan of
standards of improvement for academic achievement test scores, attendance, or dropout
rates, nor did he specify any numerical targets for desegregation.").
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may not be effective (both from the plaintiffs' and defendants'
respective viewpoints). In addition, the failure to articulate expected
outcomes allows the articulated expected outcome of local control to
dominate the remedial process. This leaves parties confined, at best,
to compliance with terms devised largely by defendants and to an
eventual return of local control.
The standards for modification and termination on their face
seek to ensure compliance with more than remedial terms, i.e. the
objectives of the remedy. Yet, in practice, neither remedial stage
provides a meaningful opportunity to define the purpose of the
lawsuit. The modification standards 360 can involve the judiciary in
ensuring an effective remedy because they allow change if a remedy is
ineffective in achieving its goal. Yet, the modification standards do
not compel a court to state the precise goals of the lawsuit and
presume that the court reviewing the requested modification already
has an idea of the end purpose of the lawsuit.
The three-part termination standard likewise gives little
assurance of an effective remedy.361 The termination standard
explicitly (and rightly) inquires as to whether the end purpose of the
lawsuit has been fulfilled, 362 but given that the end purpose is never
described, this requirement alone imposes little. Courts could use the
termination stage as an opportunity to articulate what the lawsuit
should achieve, but few have.
This leaves the other two elements of the termination standard,
neither of which focus on effective remediation. For the lawsuit to be
terminated, defendants must also show their good faith commitment
to future compliance with the law, but proof of this good faith
commitment often collapses with the third element: compliance with
the terms of the remedy. Compliance with the remedy, in other
words, is often taken as adequate proof of defendants' good faith
commitment to complying with the law. Yet, compliance with the
remedy is not akin necessarily to fulfilling the end purpose of the
lawsuit. Defendants in large measure devised the remedy. Even if
one would presume that the defendants had the incentive to propose
and implement a truly effective remedy, the complexity of providing
an effective remedy requires more than compliance with a set of static
terms to ensure a successful remedy. Yet, the termination standards
generally offer plaintiffs only a guarantee of "good faith" compliance
360. See supra notes 265-77 and accompanying text.
361. The termination standards are discussed supra Part II.B.2.a.
362. In school desegregation cases, the termination standard asks whether the vestiges
of discrimination have been eliminated. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 250
(1991). In other public law areas, courts directly inquire as to whether the "end purpose"
of the suit has ever been achieved. See supra note 210 and cases cited therein.
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with the terms of remedial decrees, with little in-depth analysis of the

achievement of the purposes of the lawsuit.
A fourth consequence of the Supreme Court's approach must
also be noted. The Supreme Court has actually allowed itself to
impose its viewpoint onto the scope of the remedy. The Court has
done so by limiting the role of equitable discretion, emphasizing the
right-remedy connection, while imposing on itself no obligation to

defer to defendants' proposed remedies. Given that discretion most
certainly exists, that the right-remedy test compels no particular result
and that district courts are generally afforded no particular discretion
on appellate review, the Supreme Court (or the final decisionmaker
in the case) is given (although not explicitly) the discretion to impose
its sentiment, so long as it need not defer to the defendants. 363
The cases strongly suggest that the Supreme Court is not
hesitating from actually imposing its own viewpoint onto the remedy.
The Court has afforded a searching review of public law remedieseven if arguably beyond the scope of the issues accepted for review; 364
even if, as discussed earlier, approved by a district court with first
hand knowledge of and long experience with the case; 365 and even if
proposed by defendants.
The Supreme Court itself has had no difficulty in rejecting
defendants' proposed remedies. The Supreme Court rejected the
remedies proposed by the defendants in United States v. Fordice3 66
363. See Chemerisky, supra note 254, at 100 (describing the Supreme Court in 1988 as
"appear[ing] to have avoided value choices by deferring to the political process, when in
reality it has made a value choice in choosing such deference").
364. Justice Souter argued in both Lewis and Jenkins III that the majority reached
issues beyond that accepted for review, to the detriment of the parties supporting the
remedies. Casey v. Lewis, 518 U.S. 343, 393-94 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment) (contending that by considering
standing, the majority "reach[ed] out to address a difficult conceptual question that is
unnecessary to resolution of this case, was never addressed by the District Court or Court
of Appeals, and divides what would otherwise presumably have been a unanimous
Court"); Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 139 (1995) (Jenkins HI) (Souter, J., dissenting)
("[T]he Court's failure to provide adequate notice of the issue to be decided (or to limit
the decision to issues on which certiorari was clearly granted) rules out any confidence
that today's result is sound, either in fact or law."); see also Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F.
Supp. 1151, 1153 (W.D. Mo.) (contending that "the Supreme Court strained legal
reasoning to examine both the scope of the remedy and the voluntary interdistrict remedy
prescribed by this Court"), aff'd, 122 F.3d 588 (8th Cir. 1997).
365. As discussed above, see supra Part II.C, when reviewing public law remedies, the
Supreme Court has afforded district courts no equitable discretion nor any deference from
appellate courts. The Supreme Court also has had no difficulty rejecting remedial
decisions made by lower courts. See supra note 228.
366. 505 U.S. 717,729 (1992). Because the Supreme Court analyzed this case as one of
liability and not remedy, see id at 727-28, this case is not considered in the group of cases
concerning the Supreme Court's concept of public law remedial power. Yet, the decision

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

(race neutral admission policies for Mississippi's public colleges and
universities), in United States v. Virginia367 (the Mary Baldwin

program for women interested in a state-funded military-style
college), and in Jenkins I1368 (salary increases in school desegregation
suit), without any discussion of deference to the defendants.
That the Supreme Court rejected particular remedies proposed
by defendants should not, standing alone, be indicative that the
defendants' proposals are not entitled to deference. If most remedies
originate with the defendants, then the class of considered cases will
be dominated by remedies proposed by defendants. Yet, the
Supreme Court's own willingness not to defer to defendants suggests
that perhaps the Supreme Court expects lower courts to defer to

defendants, as demonstrated in Lewis and Rufo, 369 but that the
Supreme Court holds no similar expectation for itself.
The viewpoint imposed by the Supreme Court is one of at least
attempting to restrain the scope of public law remedies. The
Supreme Court is tightly restricting judicial discretion; public law
cases are not an opportunity for a judge to "do justice," but to address
only the exact violation proven-a concept with little prescriptive
power other than the remedy should not appear to reach beyond the
areas identified in the violation. More specifically, the message for
school desegregation cases is that the cases have too long interfered
with local control. Significantly, the Supreme Court has been able to
effectuate a speedier return to local control not by emphasizing the
need for an immediate, effective remedy, but by increasing the

does have some remedial implications, one of which is that the Supreme Court does not
refrain from rejecting defendants' remedies. In Fordice, the Supreme Court held that
race-neutral admission policies, defendants' requested remedy, were insufficient to
desegregate Mississippi's public colleges and universities. See id. at 729.
367. 518 U.S. 515, 547-57 (1996).
368. 515 U.S. at 100. The American Federations of Teachers and KCMSD sought the
increase in salary. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755,766 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 515 U.S.
70 (1995). Jenkins III raises the question of whether a nominal defendant is entitled to the
same level of deference afforded to other defendants. See supra text following note 108.
One reason for deference-the specialized expertise of the defendants-is clearly
applicable to even nominal defendants. But the other reason for deference-that our
system of federalism vests primary responsibility in the area in state and local entities and
officials-is not so neatly applicable to nominal defendants. The school district in Jenkins
III sought federal judicial intervention; the district court had realigned the school district
from plaintiff to defendant at the outset of the litigation. See supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text. In other situations, the nominal defendant may have started as the
defendant, but in either instance, the defendant is not adverse to federal court
intervention and supervision. But this lack of aversion does not alone answer the
federalism issues presented in public law litigation. The Supreme Court did not reach this
issue, instead failing to mention deference to the defendants at all.
369. See supraPart II.C.
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370
importance of local control in the remedial process.
The Supreme Court has imposed significant limits on public law
remedial power in a fifth way specific to school desegregation. The
Court's incremental effects standard37 '-that defendants are only
responsible for continuing racial disparities to the extent their
unlawful actions contributed to the disparities-foretells a time limit
on school desegregation remedies.
The incremental effects standard in some respects makes sense:
why should defendants be responsible for all current disparities in
their school systems, given that the many disparities are multivariate
in origin? School desegregation concerns eradicating the de jure
systems and their effects, but explicit exclusionary or segregative
Further, most pending school
policies ended decades ago.
desegregation cases have already lasted decades. Thus, the causation
presumptions appear to lessen in validity over time, thereby
necessitating a shift to the incremental effect standard.
The problem, however, is with applying the incremental effect
standard at the midpoint, or endpoint, at the litigation. Given the
strong causation presumptions, parties had little reason to develop
the record on the immediate effects of the violation, as demonstrated
in both Kansas City cases, more than simply proving the types of
faculty
achievement,
(i.e., facilities,
encountered
effects
assignment). 372 Rather than developing a record of the precise effects
of the violation, the parties and courts focused on redressing all
disparities, which were presumed (under applicable Supreme Court
precedent) to be caused by the violation. Yet, a record of the precise
effects of the violation at the time liability was determined (when the
time period at issue was smaller) would be helpful in assessing the
current effects of the unlawful system. To now determine the precise
effects of the violation, usually at least a decade after the violation, is
a quite difficult task, if not impossible 373-and unfair to plaintiffs who
reasonably relied on the presumptions.
Jenkins-in which the district court applied the incremental
effects standard to the gap in achievement scores-aptly
demonstrates the difficulty and potential unfairness of the
incremental effects approach. The district court had initially held that
the de jure system had caused a systemwide reduction in achievement
scores, but the court did not determine the precise reduction caused
by the violation. 374 Under the presumptions, the defendants were

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.

See supraPart I.E.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
See supra Parts I.A.1, I.A.2.
See supra note 205.
The district court's approach, in fact, was entirely in line with the causation
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responsible for the entire disparity in achievement scores between
African-American and white children, unless the defendants proved
that their actions in no way contributed to the disparity.
Subsequently, the district court, at the direction of the Supreme
Court in Jenkins III, had to determine the exact proportion of the
existing disparity due to defendants' unlawful actions.375 In some
respects, the lack of definition of the violation at hand impeded this
effort. If the Supreme Court had required the incremental effects
standard at the time of liability ruling, then the Court would have had
to define the exact effect defendants' actions had on achievement
scores, i.e., that defendants' unlawful actions had caused, say, fifty
percent of the gap in achievement scores. Then the present task
would be to determine whether the defendants had eliminated half of
the achievement gap.376 Although determining the original figure
itself would be complicated by the change in students, the analysis
would be easier than determining the connection between disparities
in 1998 with violations held in 1983 because of the closer connection
in time between the original violation and its immediate effects.
In other words, the incremental effects approach would make
more sense if baseline data were available. The experts in Jenkins,
presumably recognizing the lack of data to undertake the above
described analysis, took a different, but flawed, approach. The
experts determined what portion of the achievement gap was due to
differences in socioeconomic status (SES) between white and
African-American school children. The portion that could not be
explained by SES was declared to be the result of race (hereinafter
the "race percentage"). But it was not clear that the race percentage,
or what part thereof, was the result of unlawful activity by the
defendants 7 7 The district court, accepting the school district expert's
testimony, defined the race percentage as four percent to nine

presumptions. Under the presumptions, if the unlawful activity is a contributing factor for
the disparity, the entire disparity is deemed to be the result of defendant's unlawful
activity, unless the defendants proved otherwise.
See supra notes 233-34 and
accompanying text.
375. See supranotes 242-52 and accompanying text.
376. Granted, determining that the achievement gap had been reduced in half would
not necessarily prove that the defendants had redressed their half of the achievement gap.
Other factors that contributed to the other half of the achievement gap may have abated,
thus producing the reduction in the achievement gap. Further, the analysis in some
respects is counterintuitive because the school children for which 50% of the gap was
attributed to the defendants are not the same school children for which the reduction in
50% is assessed. Thus, proximate cause in general suffers in public law litigation because
of the group nature of the rights at hand. See supra Part II.B.2.c.
377. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1158 (W.D. Mo.), aff'd, 122 F.3d 588
(8th Cir. 1997).
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percent of the achievement gap. 378 In addition, the district court
found an impact on achievement due to low teacher expectations
connected to the violation-two percent to four percent of the gapbut failed to explain the connection between the low teacher
expectations and the violation, other than stating that a connection
existed. 379 The district court then took the high end of both figures
and defined thirteen percent of the gap as due to defendants'
unlawful actions. Finally, the district court noted that the gap in
achievement generally increased the longer the students were in
school and found that the defendants were responsible for the
increase in the achievement gap over time.380 The district court
therefore increased from thirteen to twenty-six the portion of the
achievement gap for which defendants were responsible. 381 The court
failed to explain why the race percentage should be doubled and
again failed to explain why the defendants' unlawful activities (past or
present) caused the gap generally to increase with the length of time
the students are in the school system.
Although this type of analysis falls short of providing any
reasonable assurance of how defendants' past and present unlawful
actions incrementally impacted on the achievement differences
between African-American and white schoolchildren, it is
questionable whether any better analysis exists. In all likelihood, the
precise gap in achievement due to defendants' unlawful actions is
unknowable at this point (and perhaps at any point), even by the
standard of preponderance of the evidence. The question who bears
the burden is therefore crucial.
Yet, it is highly probable that the defendants' unlawful actions
impacted present day achievement in Missouri. 382 First, the plaintiffs
in Jenkins presented evidence demonstrating an intergenerational
effect on student achievement.3 83 Through a survey of parents who
attended only KCMSD segregated schools and who had children
currently enrolled in KCMSD, plaintiffs demonstrated a "significant
relationship" between their parents' segregated KCMSD experience

378. See id. at 1164.
379. See id.
380. See id at 1164-65.
381. See Jenkins v. Missouri, 122 F.3d 588, 598 (8th Cir. 1997); Jenkins, 959 F. Supp. at

1165 ("It seems reasonable to this Court that the 'race effect' plays just as substantial a
role in the increase that it did in creating the original gap.").
382. But see Epstein, supra note 4, at 1115 ("We have long passed the time when

corrections at an institutional level bear any relationship to the commission of any wrong
to any individual victim.").
383. Jenkins v. Missouri, 959 F. Supp. 1151, 1161 (W.D. Mo.), affd, 122 F.3d 588 (8th

Cir. 1997).
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and the students' achievement scores. 384 Granted, correlation does
not prove causation, but given the almost universal conclusion that
parents' educational level affects their children's educational
attainment,385 it appears quite likely that a parents' segregated,
inferior education would impact on their children's achievement.
Further, KCMSD is clearly a troubled school district and misses
the cornerstones of effective learning: the school has no district-wide
core curriculum, 386 some teachers have documented low expectations
of African-American students, 387 and teachers receive only
"fragmented" staff development.3 88 Further, the school district has
exceedingly high administrative costs and has had a remarkable
number of superintendents in nine years-no less than ten,3 89 with the
number continuing to increase. 390 In short, KCMSD is clearly a
troubled school district, and its children suffer as a result. This raises
the question of whether the difficulties faced by KCMSD are the
Certainly the school district
result of the de jure system.
demonstrates that money alone is not the path to educational
achievement. But the abandonment of the school district by a
majority of the city's population (demonstrated by the white flight
and by the local electoral defeat since 1969 to increase the property
tax levy) is certainly tied to de jure segregation, and this abandonment
certainly has affected the effectiveness of KCMSD as a school district.
The attempt of the district court judge in Jenkins to apply the
incremental effects standard demonstrates the difficulty of proximate
cause in general. For no matter what the standard, connecting past
discrimination with current disparities is difficult. The causation
presumptions therefore place a difficult burden on defendants to
prove their lack of responsibility for any current disparities. Most
courts, in fact, barely attempt to begin to utilize proximate cause.
Courts typically approach proximate cause as the court did in the
Kansas City, Kansas case-stating the correct proximate cause
standard, but not even attempting to engage in the required analysis.
In terminating the suit over USD No. 500, for example, the district
court in Kansas ostensibly placed on defendants the burden to prove
that current disparities were not the result of their unlawful actions,
which was consistent with causation presumptions, and that they had
desegregated the school system to the extent practicable. 391 Although
384. Id.

385. See icL
386. See icL at 1162.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.

See icL at 1160.
Id at 1173.
See id.
See supra note 138.
See supra Part I.B.3.a.
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USD No. 500 may have fulfilled this high burden, 392 the district court
actually applied a different standard. The district court concluded
with little analysis that any current disparity was not the result of
defendant's unlawful actions and emphasized the progress in
(rather than desegregation to the extent
producing desegregation
393
practicable).
Because of the limits of proximate cause in school desegregation,
the reparative aspect of the right-remedy connection-the idea that
the remedy is to "make whole" the plaintiff-is increasingly difficult.
Before the incremental effects standard, the causation presumptions
defined the rightful position as a world free of racial disparities
(absent defendants' proof to the contrary). 394 The incremental effects
standard, on the other hand, accepts a reality of racial disparities that
defendants need not attempt to redress.3 95 If the defendants' role in
creating the racial disparity cannot be proved by a preponderance of
the evidence, a real possibility, then the defendants have no legal
responsibility for any portion of the disparity.
Yet, plaintiffs are put in a unique position with the adoption of
the incremental effects standard because they relied on the causation
presumptions adopted by the Supreme Court. They therefore
devoted little effort to define precisely the impact of defendants'
unlawful actions, and that information today would be helpful in
applying the incremental effects standard. In other words, it appears
unfair to change the standards in a way detrimental to the plaintiffs.
Nor does it appear clear that the presumptions have no foundation in
396

reality.

This Part proposes changes to the Supreme Court's
transsubstantive approach to public law remedies to improve the
chances for effective remediation of de jure school segregation. For
the proposed changes to be grounded in empirical reality, three facts
must be recognized. 397 First, the Supreme Court will not change the
392. For the difficulties with proximate cause in public law litigation, see supra notes
203-06 and accompanying text.
393. See supraPart I.B.3.a.
394. See supraPart II.B.2.c.
395. See Ford, supra note 205, at 1387 ("Rather than attempt to create integrated
institutions no one wants, the new segregationist asserts, the state must recognize the
desire of its citizens to live and congregate in racially separate sphere."); Selmi, supra note
205, at 334 (arguing that the Supreme Court "has seen discrimination only when there are
formal barriers predicated on race or when ostensibly neutral practices have led to the

total, or near total, exclusion of African-Americans").
396. See supra notes 382-90 and accompanying text.
397. See Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 680 (contending that "legal scholarship... must
address the complexities of acting within an imperfect, resisting, often vulgar real world");
Peter H. Schuck, Public Law Litigation and Social Reform, 102 YALE LJ. 1763, 1764
(1993) (arguing that "empirical reality must inform the normative theories that we
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right-remedy connection. The Court has responded to the decadesold criticisms of the test by increasing its reach. 398 Any proposal that
seeks implementation must recognize that it must take place within
the right-remedy connection. Second, school desegregation remedies
will concern only modification and termination in the twenty-first
century; the filing of new lawsuits is almost unimaginable. 399 Thus,
effective change should focus on these remedial stages. Third, for the
reasons stated above, 400 proximate cause provides little information
today on the appropriate reach of the remedy. Recognizing these
realities, I contend that changes can take place to provide a plaintiff
with a stronger opportunity for a meaningful remedy.
The first change that must take place is a stronger definition of
the school desegregation right-to what are plaintiffs entitled? If the
right-remedy connection is to remain and, given that it is now too
manipulable to guarantee vindication of plaintiffs' rights, one way to
concentrate attention on effective remediation is to state clearly the
expected outcomes of the lawsuit.
The present school desegregation right is too ambiguous to
provide the expected outcomes. Brown I in 1954 held that public
school children cannot be segregated by race,4°1 and Green in 1968
further held that Brown I meant more than race-neutral assignment
policies. 4°2 But since then, little further development of the school
desegregation right has occurred. 4°3 Other early school desegregation
cases, although slow in imposing any immediacy on school
desegregation remedies, paid little attention to the nature of the right
at hand, jumping instead to considering the remedy.
Further, the
causation presumptions meant the court and parties could pay little
attention to defining the exact contours of the violation and its effects
embrace").
398. See supra Part II.B.3. For an argument that the Supreme Court should be more
candid about the defects of the right-remedy connection, see Gewirtz, supra note 4, at 66668,674.
399. Federal court litigation concerning school desegregation today is exclusively
concerned with pending school desegregation cases. Although significant, new school
desegregation remedies were ordered in the 1980's, see Liebman, supra note 2 at 1468-70,
the 1990's saw no new school desegregation remedies in federal court. Federal school
desegregation litigation today involves exclusively outstanding remedial orders.
400. See supra notes 371-96 and accompanying text.
401. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,495 (1954)(Brown I).
402. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968).
403. See, e.g., Shane, supra note 2, at 1044-77 (noting the lack of clear articulation of
what harms the school desegregation remedy should seek to redress); Yudof, supra note
147, at 87-88.
404. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) (Milliken II) (affirming
compensatory education remedy); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402
U.S. 1, 30-31 (1971) (approving busing as a school desegregation tool).
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in individual school desegregation cases. This is reflected in later
school desegregation cases.4°5 To the extent the right has been
defined, it has taken place almost entirely in the context of the
remedy, a process over which defendants exercise a great deal of
control. That the defendants should define, even partially, the rights
of those victimized by their wrongdoing suggests weaknesses in any
resulting right. The difficulties of proximate cause, compounded by
the longevity of most suits, further complicates the ambiguities of the
school desegregation right. In short, the development of the meaning
of the school desegregation right, separate from remedial concerns,
has been limited. Because of this, the right-remedy connection is
especially troublesome in school desegregation; both the right and
remedy can easily be manipulated under the right-remedy connection
test, leaving plaintiffs with little concrete protection. The unique
retardation of the development of the school desegregation right
should require courts to develop further the contours of the school
desegregation right, particularly if the right-remedy test is to
continue.
As it now stands, courts often proceed with only a limited
understanding of what the lawsuit is supposed to achieve. Courts
have an understanding of the terms of the remedial decrees. But to
the extent the remedy concerns not only a process and compliance
with particular terms but also a particular result, there is confusion as
to the desired result, except for the return of local control. The courts
have little understanding of the actual degree of desegregation that
should be achieved. The limits of proximate cause make a precise
statement of the result difficult, if not impossible. The lack of clarity
about the level of desegregation expected allows desegregation to be
sacrificed for local control.
A clearer definition of what the lawsuit should achieve would
enable courts to apply the modification and termination standards so
that they are geared toward effective remediation. Both standards
ask the right questions. Modification allows the remedy to change in
the face of ineffectiveness, which is critical for success. The test for
termination goes beyond compliance with a decree and inquires as to
whether the suit has been successful. By its terms, the test is quite
searching and is focused on the ultimate outcome of the action. The
problems that arise with the modification and termination phases rest
instead on the lack of a definable expected outcome (other than the
return of local control). This allows deference to defendants and the
return of local control to dominate modification and termination.
405. See Goldstein, supra note 147, at 28 (noting that the presumptions "enabled the
Court to proceed directly from the violation to the remedy without clarifying the nature of

the right involved").
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Stating that a more concrete understanding of the desired
outcome of the law suits raises a more difficult question: how should
the expected outcome be defined? The existing approach, to the
extent one exists, focuses on eliminating the vestiges of discrimination
to the extent practicable. But that approach attempts to create a
school district that cannot be legally defined, much less achieved and
leads to frustration. The concept of "make whole" relief simply does
not work.
Rather than applying a reparative approach to school
desegregation, the remedial goal should be more prospective in its
orientation. The outcome should be defined, throughout the
modification and termination stages, in terms of barring
discrimination today and in the future. 40 6 These two goals can be
justified on the past unlawful behavior; 407 yet, the goals avoid the
futility of proximate cause present in the reparative function of
eliminating the vestiges to the extent practicable.
Focusing on eliminating current and future discrimination would
require that defendants justify any current practice or policy that has
a segregative effect or any disparity between African-American and
white school children. 408 Permissible justifications would include
practicality and sound educational policyA°9
Stating the expected outcomes would be different than requiring
compliance with a particular set of steps. Plaintiffs should be entitled
406. See Chayes, supra note 13, at 1298-1302 (arguing that the public law remedy "seeks
to adjust future behavior, not to compensate for past wrong"); Fiss, supra note 11, at 23
("The structural suit seeks to eradicate an ongoing threat to our constitutional values and
the injunction can serve as the formal mechanism by which the court issues directives as to
how that is to be accomplished.").
407. Proof of intentional discrimination should not be necessary. The original violation
provides the requisite intent.
408. This is similar to the liability standard articulated in United States v. Fordice, 505
U.S. 717, 729 (1991). In Fordice, the plaintiffs challenged Mississippi's attempts to
desegregate its colleges and universities with the adoption of a race-neutral admission
policy. Id. at 725. The Supreme Court held that race-neutral policies were an insufficient
remedy and held that the defendants had to justify--either on practicality or educational
grounds--current policies and practices that had a segregative effect and that were
founded in the de jure system. See id. at 729. My proposal includes policies and practices
that were not necessarily present in the de jure system. At the primary and secondary
level, educational programs are continually changing from year to year; few (if any)
programs and practices from the de jure system exist today. One major exception, of
course, is the concept of "neighborhood" schools. That educational programs change
should not negate the strong possibility of continuing discrimination. Further, the chance
of being able to demonstrate that a policy or practice was present pre-1954 is slim fortyplus years later.
409. For example, bilingual programs certainly have a segregative effect, but such
programs can be justified on the grounds that they are the best means of teaching English
to non-English or limited-English speaking students.
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to an effective remedy, not compliance with a set of inputs which are
more or less chosen by the defendants. Thus, the court would state
particularly what the remedy is supposed to produce, with input from
the parties, but no obligation to defer to one party.
Doing so can easily take place in pending lawsuits and would
involve all district courts overseeing pending school desegregation
cases to devise the expected outcomes. To a certain extent, the
district court in Jenkins undertook similar measures when approving
the settlement agreement between the State and the school district.410
Then it set forth what it expected the school district to achieve in the
next three years, and the expectations were expressed in terms of
outcomes.
Finally, district courts should recognize their own role in
exercising choices that are inherent in school desegregation remedies,
rather than completely ceding that deference to the defendants. 411
Courts certainly exercise discretion, but that discretion presently
focuses primarily on the details of the remedy, as demonstrated in the
two Kansas City cases. By doing so, courts cede too much control
over the remedy. Although there may be reasons to defer to
defendants as to the details of the remedy, there is no reason to defer
to defendants in setting the expected outcomes of the lawsuit. Court
systems currently have the responsibility of informing the parties and
the public what the judiciary is attempting to accomplish through its
jurisdiction-not the defendants.
In the two Kansas City cases, this approach would have changed
the remedial process so that it more clearly focused on remediating
plaintiffs' rights, which is the proper foundation for all remedies. In
the Kansas suit, USD No. 500, the district court would have stated
during the modification and termination the lawsuit's expected
outcomes. This would be done on a prospective basis: what
characteristics should the school district achieve? This would expand
the focus of the remedial process from the school district's
compliance with the decree to include the attainment of the needed
outcomes.
In the Missouri suit, Jenkins, the district court was clearly
interested in outcomes until recently. This proposed new approach
would reorient the court to ensuring that the desire for local control
does not come at the expense of effective remediation.
Remedial uncertainly in the two Kansas City cases would still
410. See supra note 137.
411. See Fallon, supra note 13, at 46 ("Standards of remedial propriety probably never
should be cast as determinate rules; trial court discretion seems unavoidable within the law
of remedies."). For a discussion of the benefits of judicial oversight of constitutional
issues, see Chemerinsky, supra note 254, at 85-86.
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remain. School desegregation remedies will continue to reflect choice
in the above approach, particularly when defining the expected
outcomes of the lawsuit and in determining whether disparities can be
justified on the grounds of practicality or sound educational policy.
Yet, given the increasing importance of local control and almost
meaningless current definition of plaintiffs' rights, plaintiffs must be
afforded a 2 firmer foundation or their rights will never be
41
vindicated.
By requiring courts and parties to engage in a process by which
the expected outcomes are explicitly stated, plaintiffs' rights, as
expressed in the expected outcomes, will be harder to discount in the
name of local control. Further, the expected outcomes will focus the
defendants' efforts toward what needs to be achieved. This in turn
would create attention on outcomes, rather than compliance with
particular remedial terms. Thus, remedial decrees would not take on
a life of their own, whereby compliance occurs despite obvious
educational or effectiveness concerns.
This will encourage
defendants to evaluate their progress toward goals, rather than
applying outdated remedial terms. Finally, this approach will lessen
the need for judicial involvement in the details of the remedy.
Previously, the details of the remedy were critical because the lawsuit
focused on compliance with the terms of the decree; therefore, the
number of teachers, the cluster configurations, and the like were
critical because the decisions were often the only real opportunities to
impact desegregation. When setting goals that are actually enforced,
plaintiffs and courts can monitor the defendants' progress, and can
certainly critique that progress, but it would remain the defendants'
responsibility to achieve the goals. Additional remedial devices
would need to be considered to the extent defendants failed to meet
their goals.
Justice Marshall in Board of Education v. Dowell expressed
understandable concern with not focusing remedial attention on
413
eliminating the vestiges of discrimination to the extent practicable.
Yet, focusing on present disparities effectively achieves what the
causation presumptions required-defendants must explain any
current disparities. The end result is decidedly the same, but the
method of arriving there through this Article's proposal is more
412. Or at least if the rights are not to be vindicated, that the courts be forced to
acknowledge that the goals of the remedy will be limited. As it stands now, rights may not
be vindicated, but that reality is obscured by discussions of local control or by senseless
proximate cause analysis.
413. 498 U.S. 237,261 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("By focusing heavily on present
and future compliance with the Equal Protection Clause, the majority's standard ignores
how the stigmatic harm identified in Brown I can persist even after the State ceases
actively to enforce segregation.").
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honest, and thus offers plaintiffs stronger protection. It is more
honest because it does not pretend the "make whole" relief is
possible or that proximate cause actually reveals much in school
desegregation litigation.
Moreover, placing the burden on defendants appears appropriate
because they created the de jure system that causes some of the
current remedial uncertainty, 414 because they have the requisite

evidence and knowledge to examine current disparities, and because
school districts should never accept racial disparities. For by
accepting racial disparities, school districts would be implicitly stating
that education can have no impact on increasing achievement or
achieving racial balance in school buildings and school classrooms. In
other words, defendants would have to abandon their very function in
our society.
This is not to argue, however, that a school district can only
achieve dismissal of the lawsuit by actually achieving racial parity.
Granted this proposal takes as a presumption that in a race neutral
world striking disparities would not exist. But the argument does not
assume that the defendants can create a race neutral world, only that
judicial attention should focus on requiring explanations of inequities,
rather than excusing inequities in the name of local control.
In crafting a prospective definition of the end purpose of the
lawsuit, courts must also recognize that the issues surrounding school
desegregation necessarily will touch upon almost every conceivable
aspect of school administration. Thus, in a sense it is not surprising
that in both Kansas City cases, the remedy's scope grew after the
initial remedy and included a wide cross-section of school
administration.
For example, in Kansas, although the initial remedy was quite
limited, through defendants' requested modifications the remedy
reached grade configuration, magnet curriculum, redrawing of
attendance lines, changes in clusters and pairs, school closing, new
school construction and sale of real property.415 The court in Jenkins
likewise was involved in a wide range of matters: asbestos abatement
and school security are the matters that appear most tangentially
related to school desegregation.4 16 Even matters directly related to
the initial remedy have a broad reach. The Missouri district court, for
example, had to decide whether Central High School needed a tenfoot meter diving board and an additional coach to support the
414. This is consistent with the compensatory damage rule that defendants are
responsible for uncertainty in the extent of damages caused by their unlawful actions. See
LAYCOCK, supra note 166, at 135.
415. See supra Parts I.B.L.a, I.B.2.a.
416. See supra Parts I.B.L.b, I.B.2.b.
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school's Classical Greek magnet theme, which includes an athletic
emphasis and which was ordered to
increase achievement and attract
417
non-minority students to KCMSD.
The range of remedies should not be mistaken for a lack of
remedial focus. Even the most limited school desegregation plan will
touch upon a wide cross-section of school administration. 418 For
example, deciding that a school should operate a magnet program to
desegregate schools raises the following questions: what curriculum
or magnet theme will best desegregate the school; what changes in
facilities are necessary to accommodate the curriculum and magnet
theme; how should teachers and administrators be selected for the
magnet program; how should the magnet program be funded; how
should students be recruited to apply for admission; how should
students be selected for admission; should the school employ racial
quotas; how should students be transported to the magnet school; and
to what school should children currently enrolled in the proposed
magnet be sent (the answer to which depends on current and
anticipated facilities, current and anticipated student enrollment
patterns, current and anticipated traffic patterns, and current and
anticipated student housing patterns).
The answers to the questions will continually change, as
particular approaches prove ineffective from the standpoint of
desegregation, practicality, or educational excellence. The answers
will also change as the school district changes facets of its operation in
response to changes in educational theory or demographic changes.
For example, as demonstrated in Kansas City, Kansas, a decision to
change grade configuration of middle schools will necessarily involve
changes in a desegregation plan involving the grades and facilities at
issue.
In short, school desegregation remedies will necessarily involve a
wide variety of school administration. School desegregation remedies
may falsely appear to suffer a lack of focus, to be touching upon every
conceivable facet of school desegregation. Yet, the reality of school
administration compels that even straightforward remedial goals will
reach a wide cross section of issues.
Conclusion
Approximately one out of ten school districts presently operate
417. See id.
418. See Fiss, supra note 11, at 3 ("In time it was understood that desegregation was a
total transformational process in which the judge undertook the reconstruction of an
ongoing social institution."); Leubsdorf, supra note 174, at 82 ("Removing discrimination
and its effects from a complicated school system is a task so diverse that many measures
can be justified as promoting it.").
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under school desegregation court orders. 419 Within these orders,
strong race conscious remedies continue to be possible. Existing
school desegregation decrees also influence social policy, reaching
beyond the idea of integrating student bodies.420 The Supreme Court
is attempting to limit substantially the reach of school desegregation
remedies, in ways detrimental to the victim class, through its
conception of public law remedial power. Solving this problem will
be far from easy. To begin that process, this Article seeks to unmask
the remarkably well hidden power that defendants have in the
remedial process and to provide practical directives for building a
stronger foundation for affording plaintiffs an effective school
desegregation remedy.
Specifically, this Article argues that the expected outcomes of the
school desegregation suit should be clearly articulated. This will
make it more difficult to allow local control to trump the need for
effective remediation and will advise the community at large as to
what are the reasonable expectations from the litigation. As the
process now stands, plaintiffs are provided only a promise of a "close
enough" compliance with remedial terms chosen by the defendants,
which may or may not be effective. This Article places on the courts
the duty to articulate the expected outcomes, for it is a clear role of
the judiciary to state the objectives of any remedial decree. Finally,
this Article seeks to have the outcomes defined in a meaningful
fashion-that our school districts, operating under court order, justify
(either on practicality or on educational policy) any practice that
segregates school children.

419. See ARMOR, supra note 16, at 166 (estimating that 13% of public schools operate
under court-ordered school desegregation plans in 1991-1992 school year).
420. For example, a federal district court ruled that Proposition 227, which limits
bilingual education in the State of California, conflicts with outstanding remedial orders in
the San Jose school desegregation suit. The court therefore held that Proposition 227
could not be implemented in the San Jose public schools. See U.S. Judge Rejects EnglishOnly Measure,WASH. POST, Aug. 19,1998, at A18.

